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We have learned about democracies’ peaceful behaviour but we know relatively 
little about why some democracies are more peaceful and use more soft power 
instruments than others.  I argue that contrary to competing theories that link soft power 
use to budget size or institutions, it is the variation in the public’s social trust that drives 
the variation in peaceful behaviour. Individual’s social trust toward peaceful foreign 
policies are shaped by their core beliefs about trusting other people, which vary across 
democracies. I argue that leader’s with more trusting populations will be more likely to 
use soft power instruments becasue they can generate more public support for peacful 
actions effectively.   
My mixed method approach first statistically evaluated social trust’s role in the 
selection of soft power actions relative to hard power actions using regression analyses of 
fifty-one democratic countries over the time period of 1995-2010. My analysis revealed 
that even though social trust is positively correlated with soft power use, it was not a 
statistically significant indicator. The quantitative analysis pointed to the perception of 
geopolitical threat. Using a most similar case design of Finland and New Zealand, my 
qualitative analysis found that Finland uses high soft power due to the Russian 
geopolitical threat. Further my crucial case design of the U.S found that in addition to 
geopolitical threat, in the case of the U.S. the desire to be global leader is also a boosting 
factor in its soft power use. These findings indicate that scholars should pay more 
vi 
attention to democracies’ geopolitical differences to understand their foreign policies and 
more attention should be paid to understanding how and why country’s construct their 
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My exploratory analysis revealed that there is a large variation among 
democracies’ reliance of peaceful instruments such as soft power tools. Some countries 
like Finland greatly favors soft power instruments over hard power tools as they use 92% 
soft power instruments in their overall foreign interactions, while Australia only uses 
62% soft power instruments (Trunkos 2017). Despite the fact that relying on soft power 
has been widely noted in international relations, policy makers and academics alike are 
currently unsure about what factors stimulate countries’ use of soft power tools. While 
not all soft power tools are peaceful, the nature and the objective of soft power 
interactions are generally considered cooperative (Nye 2011). A detailed investigation 
and analysis of soft power can significantly improve the peaceful use of foreign policy 
tools. In addition, there is an increasing criticism of relying on force and coercion which 
often leads to instability and hate as opposed to cooperation among nations (Johnson 
2000, Yalcinkaya and Ozer 2016).  
In the past, the concept and use of soft power was closely associated with the 
United States and its Cold War policies. But since the Cold War, many countries have 
been utilizing their soft power options which have not been quantified before in a large 
international scale. Using digital diplomacy and social media as a diplomatic tool (Sandre 




performance indicators of various countries (Kelley and Simmons 2013) are just a few of 
the new ways to achieve foreign policy goals. Other compelling examples of a 
government that uses soft power is the United States and their reliance on military soft 
power in the form of officer exchanges (Atkinson 2014) or the cleaning efforts of the 
U.S. Navy battleships after oil spills in the Gulf of Mexico (Elleman and Pain 2015). 
          Peace and cooperation is favored over war in most societies and yet there is not 
enough information about why some democracies use more peaceful instruments such as 
soft power tools than other democracies. Democracies have been identified and studied 
since the works of Kant (1970) as a possible group of countries with more peaceful 
foreign policies than non-democracies. Building on Kant’s work research has further 
studied foreign policy differences between democracies and non-democracies (Maoz and 
Abdoli 1989, Valentino et al. 2010) but their objective was not to study the variation 
amongst democracies. Similarly to Stein (2015) I limited my research to democracies 
because I wanted to understand the variation amongst them. Democracies spread out in 
the world (Stein 2015) and they impact their region as well as the world. Previous 
literature has shown that there is variation among democratic countries’ soft power 
reliance (McClory 2017). In democracies the norms and values of the society can also 
influence foreign policy via the democratic process and the democratic accountability 
(Aldrich, Sullivan and Borgida 1989, Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995) and this 
mechanism offers a great opportunity for my research to find out how much influence can 
the variation of a specific value, namely trust play in democracies’ differences in their 




Despite the fact that soft power instruments are becoming more available and 
easier to use, not every democracy uses them to the same degree. Some democracies such 
as Sweden, Germany, France along with the United Kingdom and the United States 
reportedly top the existing soft power world rankings (McClory 2017), while other 
democracies such as Poland and Brazil barely succeed in ranking at the bottom of the list 
(McClory 2017). I argue that the reason for such variation amongst democracies lies in 
the differences in their society’s norms and values. Specifically, I theorize that 
democracies with more trusting populations are more likely to support their leaders’ soft 
power choices over hard power options and as a result trusting countries end up using 
more soft power tools than their non-trusting counterparts. Trusting populations by 
definition feel that others are generally benign, cooperative and honest (Brewer and 
Steenberger 2002) which makes persuasion and not coercion the most cost-effective and 
logical choice of interaction with other nations. I argue that trusting societies find the use 
of soft power tools the most effective as their goal is to sway others into working together 
with them as opposed to coercing them to do so. This thought process manifests itself 
when the population supports their leader to prefer and select soft power instruments over 
force when possible.  
When explaining the domestic difference among democracies and their variances 
in foreign policy outcomes, public opinion in recent literature has been identified as an 
explanatory variable (Tomz and Weeks 2013, Stein 2015). When studying the choice of 
using peaceful instruments or force, public preferences vary in different countries 
(Hurwitz and Peffley 1987, Feldman 1988) and attitudes towards peace have their roots 




(Caspary 1970) impacts foreign policy. In the case of major events such as 9/11 in the 
United States the mood can change but in general the basic core values of societies 
remain consistent. Scholarship has also argued that democracies in general are more 
equipped to settle disputes in a peaceful manner (Dixon et al. 1994); however, there is no 
adequate information about the actual differences among democracies. My research is 
important because by using public opinion it will provide clarity about societies’ impact 
on their countries’ instrument selection patterns and it will provide further explanation of 
why Norway and Finland rely mostly on soft power instruments while Ireland or Mexico 
do not. 
There are certain countries that consistently seem to advance more peaceful 
solutions then other nations in the form of soft power use (McClory 2012, 2015, 2016, 
2017). In recent PEW survey ten European democracies’ populations were asked if they 
felt that relying too much on military force was counterproductive. The results of this poll 
clearly show the variation within European nations regarding their attitudes towards 
coercive versus peaceful solutions (Pew 2016a). The Netherlands (66%) and Germany 
(64%) revealed the most concern about using force while Italy (39%) and Poland (30%) 
scored the lowest regarding this matter. These domestic differences in core values and 
attitudes towards peaceful interactions are the foundation of my research. 
Competing theories explaining the variation of peacefulness have usually focused 
on resources (Palmer and Morgan 2000, Chiba Machain and Reed 2012) or institutions 
(Morgan and Campbell 1991, Clark and Nordstrom 2005). Resource-based theories argue 
that governments use and prioritize their foreign policy instruments based on their 




soft power than poor countries and the variation amongst democracies could be explained 
by their variation in the resources such as GDP, military capability and budget. Resources 
are definitely key factors in countries’ foreign policy decisions as they provide insight 
into what countries have at their disposal, but they do not provide answers about the 
differences in foreign policy decisions between countries with the same resources. This 
suggests that normative examinations of the influencing factors are also warranted (Maoz 
and Russett 1993). I believe the reason for this is that governments allocate their 
resources based on their foreign policy goals (Palmer and Morgan 2011) which in 
democracies are influenced by the population’s opinion. I argue that as a result, some 
democracies such as Ireland will utilize coercive solutions while Switzerland will rely on 
more soft power instruments. The interesting comparison here is that Ireland and 
Switzerland have roughly the same resources and yet Switzerland relies on soft power 
instruments more than Ireland (McClory 2017). Therefore, only looking at their resources 
will not provide an adequate picture concerning their foreign policy preferences. I argue 
that the variation in those countries’ attitudes regarding trust will complete our 
understanding of their selections.  
The other known theory concerning countries’ foreign policies points to 
institutional differences. Based on this theory, institutional differences such as the timing 
of elections, political competitiveness, the extent of political participation and the level of 
legislative constraints on the executive all impact the foreign policy outcome. While 
examining the institutional variation amongst democracies provides some answers 
regarding the likelihood of peaceful behavior, they do not provide a clear explanation 




above-listed indicators are identical. Based on my theory, the reason for their failure is 
the lack of inclusion of societies’ differences in their norms and values. I also concur with 
Stein (2015) and Weeks (2014) that democratic institutional differences have proved to 
be weak predictors of variation in nonviolent interactions because they have little 
variance1. Using the same examples of Ireland and Switzerland again the commonly used 
democratic institutional indicators such as Freedom House and Polity would rate these 
two countries equally and would not provide explanation about the differences in the two 
countries soft power use.  
The variation in social trust on the other hand is able to provide a clearer 
explanation about the variance of democracies and their use of soft power because their 
political system is built on feedback from public opinion regarding government actions. 
For instance, numerous polls have demonstrated the differences in trust level regarding 
the Syrian refugees entering Europe. The polls clearly show the variation in trust among 
European democracies as in Sweden (24%), Germany (31%) and the Netherlands (36%) 
only a small percentage of the population feels threatened by the Syrian refugees while in 
other countries such as Poland (73%), Greece (69%) and Hungary (69%) the percentages 
are much higher (Pew 2016b). Building on this argument I will test the variation in trust 
and its impact on the soft power use of democracies. 
 
1 Institutional differences have been utilized much more successful in predicting the 
behavior of non-democracies (Kinne and Marinov 2013; Pickering and Kisangani 2010; 
Way and Weeks 2014; Weeks 2008, 2009, 2012). Large bodies of literature have focused 
on domestic institutional constraints on non-democratic leaders’ decision to initiate 
conflict (Morgan and Campbell 1991, Maoz and Russett 1993, Dixon 1994, Ray 1995, 




First, I will study democracies’ peaceful foreign policies via their detailed soft power 
actions. Soft power has been defined as the ability to achieve goals using persuasion and 
attraction (Nye 2011).  While not all soft power tools are peaceful in nature, I argue that 
they represent policies that are based on the intention of strengthening relationships with 
other nations. Soft power is a complex concept.  Thus, for this study I disaggregate it into 
measurable units in the form of diplomatic, economic and military instruments and 
further divide each into resources and actions. The key contribution of my instrument 
typology is that it separates soft power actions and resources and focuses my theory and 
analysis on soft power actions. My approach using the individual soft power actions will 
provide more information about the type of actions leaders are likely to take.  
          Secondly, I propose to explain the variation in democracies’ soft power use by the 
differences in their social trust.  Building on the role of core values from the literature on 
public opinion formation (Chong 2000) and research on the relationship between trust 
and peaceful foreign policy (Kydd 2005, McGillivray and Smith 2000) I hypothesize that 
democratic leaders with more trusting populations will be more likely to rely on soft 
power because they can generate public support for peaceful actions more effectively. In 
order to study trust’s influence on democracies’ soft power reliance, I will use attitudes 
regarding trust as a proxy for measuring the level of variation of trust amongst societies. 
Then using mixed methodologies, I will first conduct a large N statistical analysis about 
the frequency of democracies’ soft power use versus hard power use and then I will test 
social trusts’ influence on such outcomes. Based on the results of the statistical analysis, I 
will select case studies to further investigate the connection between public opinion and 




          Once my analysis is complete, I expect to find that trusting populations will be 
more likely to employ soft power instruments to achieve their foreign policy goals than 
non-trusting societies. I will also have a better understanding of the variance of 
democratic government’s frequency of turning to soft power instruments as well as their 
reliance on hard power tools which will provide previously hidden information about the 
fundamental values of those populations and as a result it will also provide indicators 
about their future foreign policy choices.  
1.2 GOALS OF PROJECT AND CHAPTER OUTLINE  
In the following Chapter (Chapter 2), I will examine the literature on the 
competing theories related to leaders’ foreign policy choices. I will also discuss the 
under-utilization of public opinion in such models. In Chapter 3 I will clarify the concept 
of soft power by creating four new concepts in the form of soft power actions, soft power 
resources hard power actions and hard power resources. In the same chapter I will 
develop my theory connecting public opinion and soft and hard power instruments 
arguing that trusting populations’ leaders will rely on soft power instruments more than 
those of less trusting nations. 
In order to test my theory, I will use mixed methods including large N statistical 
analyses and three case studies. Chapter 4 will explain my research design in detail. 
Using a most similar case design I will closely examine Finland (Chapter 5) and New 
Zealand because these two democracies have similar resources and institutions they vary 
greatly in their leader’s selection of soft power relative to hard power. My most similar 




similar countries’ outcome variables (soft power actions) and alternative independent 
variables (social trust values). Finland has a very high soft power percentage use while 
New Zealand has one of the lowest reliance on soft power over hard power among 
democracies. I will study how these two countries’ trust impacts the variation in their soft 
power instrument selection. Finally, I will study the United States (Chapter 6) as it is a 
hegemon that plays a leading role in the world as well as it provides an exceptional case 
of a country that relies on high soft power and hard power actions. The in-depth 
examination of these three cases’ will provide information about public opinion 
previously not recovered in the statistical analysis and its connection with soft power and 
hard power instrument choices. My research will conclude with my discussion of the 




















LITERATURE REVIEW OF SOFT POWER AND SOCIAL TRUST 
 
Soft power instruments are not used equally amongst democracies. Publications 
regarding the differences in governments’ soft power reliance have concluded that the top 
soft power users are the Western countries such as the United Kingdom, the United States 
and Germany along with France and the Nordic nations (McClory 2012, 2015, 2016, 
2017, 2018). This means that based on the current literature other democracies such as 
India, New Zealand, Czech Republic and Portugal are not using as much soft power as 
the previously mentioned countries (McClory 2018). For example, McClory’s 2018 soft 
power rankings gives the United Kingdom’s 80 points while Argentina only receives a 48 
soft power score. This variation in democracies’ soft power achievements need further 
explanations. 
 To better understand the reasons why some countries use more soft power than 
others, I argue that we need to look into a new indicator that varies amongst democracies 
and which is not the usual resource or institution-based explanatory variable. The 
democratic peace literature pointed to democracies’ peaceful foreign policy patterns. This 
is a great start to further examining democracies’ use of soft power and by testing a new 
variable (social trust) this dissertation will offer answers about soft power policy 




This review of the literature shows that the existing soft power literature has not 
provided a clear definition of soft power, which also results in measurement problems. In 
addition, scholars have not provided any predictors of soft power, which again, makes it 
difficult to study why some countries use more soft power than others. I propose a new 
conceptualization, a new measurement method as well a new explanatory variable to 
compare democracies’ soft power use.  
2.1 CONCEPT OF SOFT POWER 
Soft power has been defined as the ability to achieve goals using persuasion and 
attraction (Nye 2011). The key concept in Nye’s (2011) definition is attraction. Countries 
can only wield more soft power if they are able to generate attraction. Attraction refers to 
creating a positive magnetic affect (Nye 2011 p. 92). Soft power builds on this positive 
attraction that sways others to behave in a preferable way. In terms of states’ behaviors, 
Vuving (2009) suggests that there are three types of characteristics that lead to positive 
attraction, namely benignity, competence and beauty. Benignity is an aspect of how an 
agent relates to others.  Benign act produces sympathy and credibility. Competence refers 
to how and agent does things and it produces respect and admiration. Beauty is defined as 
the perception of ideas, values and visions (Vuving, 2009)2. All these characteristics can 
produce positive attraction, which adds to countries’ soft power. 
 
2 The success of soft power depends on both the agent having one the listed qualities, 
otherwise the given actions may produce indifference or dislike (Nye 2011). My 
dissertation does not focus on the effectiveness or success of soft power use, only on the 





Despite that the initial soft power definition (Nye 1990) has been around for 
almost three decades, a fundamental conflict in soft power literature still exists regarding 
a clear measurable definition of soft power and its instruments (Parmar and Cox 2010, 
Naim 2013, Jain 2017, Doeser and Nisbett 2017, Gallarotti 2018).  This issue leads to 
further problems with measuring and categorizing foreign policy tools. Soft power 
literature offers two conflicting conceptualizations; the earlier one is based on a 
conceptual dichotomy of power instruments in the form of soft power and hard power 
tools (Nye 1990, Yan 2007, Sun 2008, Li 2009, Jain 2017) and the later one is based on a 
mixed-approach (Nye 2011, Gallarotti 2011) in which soft and hard power instruments 
mix and interact. For example, soldiers rebuilding schools in a war zone would add to the 
soldiers’ country’s soft power, according to the dichotomous approach via the benevolent 
action of the solders, however, the mixed-approach would evaluate the same scenarios as 
the rebuilding of the school counting for soft power, but the contradictions and harm 
caused by the soldiers and the war taking away from such soft power.  
The dichotomous approach is more focused on identifying the instruments and 
actions and categorizing it as either hard or soft power. But the mixed-approach is more 
interested in a deeper evaluation of the interaction and perception of the used instruments. 
According to their framework, the foreign policy actions can weaken or strengthen each 
other. The next section will review the conceptual development of soft power from the 






2.1.2 CONCEPTUALIZATION OF SOFT POWER. 
This literature review will show that the conceptualization of soft power has 
changed some, but scholars still need to agree on the concept and on a clear measurement 
of soft power. Without a clear conceptualization measurement is also problematic.  
2.1.3 EARLY YEARS. THE DICHOTOMUS SCHOOL 
The early works of Nye (1990) started a conversation about the dichotomous 
understanding of power instruments. Many soft power publications use this 
conceptualization of instruments (Yan 2007, Sun 2008; Li 2009, Jain 2017, Cobaugh 
2017). The dichotomous school views power instruments as mutually exclusive. This 
means that all power tools can be categorized as either a soft power or a hard power tool 
(Nye 1990, Yan 2007, Sun 2008, Li 2009, Cobaugh 2017, Jain 2017). According to this 
view, what matters is the ability to clearly place each tool into one or the other category.  
It is important to note here that the dichotomous school does not argue that there is no 
interaction between the soft and hard power tools, they merely create categories in which 
foreign policy tools can be placed.  
At the time when Nye (1990) introduced the concept of soft power into the power 
literature, scholars were mostly concerned with the various aspects of power also known 
as the faces of power debate. As a reaction to this literature, it was Nye’s (1990) work 
that created the first conceptual separation of soft and hard power. Some of the soft 
power scholars continued to work with the dichotomous understanding of power and 
power instruments (Yan 2007; Sun 2008, Li 2009, Cobaugh 2017, Jain 2017). For 




in peace talks in the Philippines, the Balkans, Colombia, Sri Lanka and the Middle East, 
the country’s increased its soft power as other nations identified shared values with 
Norway. On the other hand, an example of hard power from Nye’s (1990, 14) publication 
explained that the U.S.’ War in Iraq in 2003 was categorized as a hard power action 
because it was a coercive action that was perceived negatively outside of the U.S. In this 
approach, the conceptual focus is on creating guidelines between soft and hard power 
categories in order to be able to recognize, separate and apply them in foreign policy. 
 Another example from a more recent dichotomous conceptual approach is 
Cobaugh’s (2017) work, who stresses the importance of using soft power to make hard 
power more effective. His examples are concerned with current asymmetric conflicts as 
he separates soft power instruments and hard power instruments (kinetic warfare). 
Cobaugh (2017) specifically notes that a more effective and strategic use of soft power 
tools in the form of communication/narrative about the current U.S. conflicts in the 
Middle East would allow the U.S. to have more success in the region. This can only be 
achieved if soft power instruments are recognized and strategically applied. His 
dichotomous conceptualization of soft power and hard power (kinetic warfare) serves as 
another example of scholars separating these power instruments, but it falls short on 
providing a systematic typology of instruments outside of the military. As a result of the 
mentioned efforts, the categorization of power instruments became somewhat clear but 
all hard and soft power instruments were still not comprehensively and systematically 
separated. Instead, what we see in the soft power literature is conceptual focus on only a 
few soft power instruments such as culture, sports or education but no further 




The problem emerging from the dichotomous approach is the difficulty of 
categorizing instruments that can be placed into both power categories. President 
Trump’s social media posts for example, can sometimes be categorized as soft power 
tools when he tweets about Easter at the Whitehouse, but it can also be categorized as a 
hard power tool when it is coercive. For instance, when President Trump insulted the 
North Korean leader by calling him “Rocket Man,” that was clearly a hard power action. 
As this example shows, categorizing Tweeter as a foreign policy tool solely as a soft or 
hard power instrument makes the general mistake of oversimplifying the usage of the 
instrument. Another example is the role of economic instruments. Their classification 
either as a hard or soft power wielding tool has been questioned from the beginning. Nye 
(1990) initially placed all economic tools into the hard power category, and later started 
noting that there are some economic tools such as humanitarian aid that wields soft power 
(2011). As these examples show, soft power conceptualization would greatly benefit 
from a more nuanced new typology in which soft power use is clearly separated from 
hard power use.  
2.1.4 LATER SCHOLARSHIP. THE MIXED-SCHOOL 
With the mixed-conceptual approach scholars argue that there is a significant 
interplay between soft and hard power instruments as some tools can play both roles 
therefore, it is a mistake to separate them into either hard or soft power categories, but 
instead they need to be conceptualized together. Wilson (2008), Nye’s later works (2011) 
and Gallarotti’s (2011) article represent the mixed-conceptual approach. This school of 
thought also produced concepts such as Nye’s (2011) smart power and Kounalakis and 




conceptualizations of power instruments argue that the academic focus should not be on 
the separation of power instruments, but instead the focus should be on the successful 
combination and application of them.  
One of the initial mixed approaches was laid out by Wilson (2008, 111) who 
argued that the national interest was badly served by an imperfect dichotomous power 
debate. Gallarotti (2011) also suggests that soft power should not be separated from 
hard power as it may lead to mistakes when categorizing instruments. Instead, soft 
power and hard power should be evaluated together as they reinforce and weaken each 
other. After his initial dichotomous approach in 2011, Nye also proposed merging soft 
power with hard power, which he called smart power. Nye (2011 p. xiv) defines smart 
power as the ability to combine hard and soft power into an effective strategy. 
According to Nye’s (2011) conceptualization, smart power was an intelligent 
integration of diplomacy, defense, development, and other tools of hard and soft power. 
This mixed concept recognizes that states use different forms of power at different 
times to achieve the most appropriate goals. Another mixed approach was the spectral 
power concept (Kounalakis and Simonyi 2011, Simonyi and Trunkos 2015) which 
offered a visual and a conceptual model for the overlapping nature of power instruments 
similarly to the other mixed approaches mentioned above.  
Kounalakis and Simonyi (2011) and later Simonyi and Trunkos (2015) a 
proposed a conceptualization using light as a metaphor to explain how some 
instruments have both soft power and hard power qualities and instead of searching for 
the cut points to decide where soft power ends and hard power begins, we should study 




hard power based on its appearance as well as based on its impact, the spectral power 
conceptualization would categorize it as hard-hard power and assign the red color to it, 
while soft-soft instruments would be blue color. Any tool that mixes these powers 
would end up creating new colors such as orange for hard-soft instruments or green for 
soft-hard tools (Simonyi and Trunkos 2015).  
          The mixed-conceptualization reveals the importance of the interaction and mutual 
impact of such instruments in foreign policy, but it does not help with the clear 
recognition of soft or hard power tools, in fact, it further confuses them. The mixed-
conceptualization also did not offer any operationalization methods by which any 
measurable values could be attached to soft and hard power tools. This means that 
Nye’s (2011) and Gallarotti’s (2011) points are important as they want to shed light on 
the interactions of soft and hard power tools, they do not offer any measurement 
methods to study such occurrence. While both scholars write about how hard power 
actions can diminish soft power tools, other than a few case studies as examples they do 
not provide any measurements that would allow scholars to test their implications on a 
larger, international scale. Not only the current literature on soft power is not able to 
compare all countries’ soft power use, but also, they do not focus on why some 
countries seem to rely more on soft power instruments than others. 
For example, while the mixed-approach presented by Gallarotti (2011) focuses 
on powers enhancing or diminishing the other and to illustrate that, using the example 
of a positive image bolstering national defense by gaining allies, he does not help to 
categories actions of national defense (such as sending troops). Even more importantly, 




does not offer any ways to validate his claim. He does not develop his theory further to 
offer an operational mechanism which could measure how much certain soft power 
resources or actions can enhance hard power. Also, by recognizing that some 
instruments can wield both soft and hard power, the mixed-approach does not offer a 
way to identify these instruments.  Instead, they argue that we should just focus on the 
effective use of such combination of tools.  
This conceptual debate points to a void in literature in addressing a clear 
conceptualizations and typology of power instruments. The mixed-approach correctly 
points to the overlap of soft and hard power instruments, but it fails to take the next step 
to offer an operational solution separating them. On the other hand, the dichotomous 
approach recognizes the need for conceptual separation but does not provide clear 
guidelines to do so. A good approach must first clarify soft power instruments, then study 
how and why countries’ use them.  
2.2 MEASURING SOFT POWER  
The second problem in soft power research has been the measurement of soft 
power and its instruments. In this effort there are two lines of thoughts; one is comparing 
countries soft power based on their resources (Nye 1990, 2011, McClory 2017, 2018) and 
the other one is doing the same but based on states’ behaviors or actions (Li 2009, Zahran 
and Ramos 2010). So far only the resource-based approach was able to produce 
quantifiable results in the form of an international soft power ranking called Soft Power 
30 (McClory 2018). This composite index of soft power was initially created in 2010 and 
only included 26 countries. These countries were strategic partners of the United 




Singapore and South Africa. It did not include the less important countries that may still 
play an important role in soft power analysis such as Argentina, Portugal, New Zealand, 
Ireland and Hungary. This initial soft power index included capability indicators from 
business/innovation, culture, government, diplomacy and education (McClory 2010). In 
other words, this comparison of 26 countries’ soft power was based on mostly (70%) on 
governments’ capabilities and 30% of subjective elements collected from experts’ panels 
from 20 countries that assessed countries international perception based on seven factors 
including cuisine, culture, technology products and foreign policy (McClory 2010).  
  2.2.1 MEASURING SOFT POWER: THE RESOURCE-BASED APPROACH 
McClory has continue to improve his soft power measurement and today, he 
includes 30 countries in his index. This leading soft power ranking is still heavily relying 
on countries’ soft power capabilities. According to this composite index, the listed 30 
countries’ have the most soft power based on a mix of resources, policies and polling data 
about the perception of the country abroad (McClory 2018). These capabilities include 
countries’ institutions, economic and educational indicators, number of universities, 
business and innovation indicators just to mention a few.  
While the collection of countries’ soft power resources is achieved well, this 
approach led to mismeasurement of countries’ soft powers the following way. Based on 
these soft power capabilities such as the number of UNESCO World Heritage sites, the 
countries are ranked without much attention to their foreign policy actions. For example, 
Egypt has many cultural soft power resources in the form of monuments and museums 
and yet it is not one of the leading soft power users in the world. If measurement relies 




government actions to estimate the country’s soft power use, it does not provide a valid 
picture of the country’s foreign policy strategies.  
Another example is when the United States is ranked high in soft power based on 
its number of top universities in the world and its number of international students in the 
country (McClory 2010), it becomes confusing as to what exactly adds to the soft power 
of the United States. Is it the fact that the U.S. has good schools or is it the perception 
held by international students that the American schools are superior and, thus, they 
strive to attend these U.S. schools for their education? In addition, McClory (2012, 2015, 
2016, 2017 and 2018) mixes government and private soft power initiatives and resources 
which also makes it difficult to know what the governments’ soft power achievements are 
and what are just a result of cultural heritages or private initiatives such as language 
spoken, success in popular music and in high technology exports. In other words, while 
McClory’s soft power ranking is a great accumulation of countries’ total soft power 
resources (public and private), but it is not set up to tell us what governments do to 
practice soft power3. 
Finally, McClory’s (2018) latest research focuses on the top 30 soft power leaders 
in the world which excludes many democracies that according to current literature are 
new and emerging soft power users, such as Mexico (Saraiva 2014, 2016, Delano 2015, 
Dinnie 2015). A larger sample of countries would be more useful to study global soft 
power use to include all rising soft power countries as well.  
 
3 (See Appendix B for comparison of my ranking and McClory’s ranking for the only 




Another resource-based approach to study countries’ soft power use was 
conducted through the federal annual budget where the programs could be identified as 
soft power initiatives (Trunkos 2013). In order to study soft power spending in the U.S., 
budget information was collected from the Department of State’s and from the 
Department of Defense’s various programs. The U.S.’s soft power budget was measured 
with the combined budget of the 75 programs of the Department of State’s Foreign 
Affairs initiatives such as the Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs, the National 
Endowment for Democracy and the United States Institute of Peace. From the 
Department of Defense three temporary programs were counted as soft power programs 
which were all Overseas Contingency Operations in various countries. While some of the 
U.S.’ soft power commitment was correctly captured by this budget approach, this 
method revealed two problems: 1) the annual allocation of the money to these soft power 
programs did not actually mean that all of it was used; and 2) since the collection of soft 
power programs and institutions has not been done for other countries, budget approach 
could not be used to study a large number of countries’ soft power use.  
2.2.3 MEASURING SOFT POWER: THE BEHAVIOUR-BASED APPROACH 
A few soft power scholars have noted that what countries’ have at their disposal 
does not necessarily lead to a correct estimation of their soft power or even to an 
understanding of their foreign policy strategies (Li 2009, Zahran and Ramos 2010, Jain 
2017). Instead, the focus should be on governments’ specific actions and policies 
(behaviors), which will tell us much more about their intentions.  This approach is labeled 
as behavior-based because observation is centered on interactions and not resources. Soft 




policies. Another important argument of the behavior-based approach is that governments 
cannot easily and quickly create soft power resources, but they are able to use behaviors 
that reinforce their existing soft power resources (Zahran and Ramos 2010). In other 
words, the behavior-based approach brings up the issue of intentional soft power use and 
their school of thought continues to conceptually develop such framework in order to 
understand countries’ deliberate soft power reliance. Their focus is not so much the 
measurement of soft power but instead the conceptual development of soft power 
behaviors. 
The behavior-based approach (Li 2009, Zahran and Ramos 2010) critiques the 
resource-based approach by pointing out the problem of not having a clear theoretical 
connection between resources and strategic actions. In other words, Li (2009) and Zahran 
and Ramos (2010) argue that the resource-based measurement fails to address what 
nations do with their capabilities to utilize their soft power. This means that they only 
compare countries’ soft power wielding possessions but do not offer any explanations 
about the strategic use of soft power instruments. While the behavior-based framework 
recognizes this shortfall, they stop short of developing any measurements that could be 
applied and tested as they remain theoretical. In order to resolve this problem, scholars 
need to develop a method by which countries’ intentional soft power use can be studied.   
2.3 DRIVING FORCES OF SOFT POWER USE 
After discussing what soft power is and how we measure it, the next important 
analytical question is which factors influence countries’ soft power use, specifically why 
do some democratic countries use more soft power than others. As of now, the existing 




hand, the conflict literature has been studying the peace-proneness behavior of 
democracies. In this scholarship democracies have been identified and studied since the 
works of Kant (1970) as a possible group of countries with more peaceful foreign policies 
than non-democracies. Building on Kant’s work research have further studied foreign 
policy differences between democracies and non-democracies (Maoz and Abdoli 1989, 
Valentino et al. 2010). According to the democratic peace thesis, when compared with 
non-democracies, democracies use more peaceful policies than non-democracies, 
especially with other democracies (Babst 1972, Doyle 1986, Rummel 1983, Maoz and 
Abdoli 1989, Russett 1993). This school of thought offered a way to understand 
differences in countries’ peaceful foreign policy patterns which helped me identify a 
group of countries that would be useful in studying soft power patterns. This group is the 
democratic countries. 
The literature on the democratic peace thesis offers good insight into democratic 
countries’ foreign policy behaviors for two reasons. First, starting with the Kantian idea 
of Republics (and not democracies) achieving a perpetual peace, it provides a theoretical 
hint towards Republics behaving differently than other types of governments and that the 
ultimate outcome is a peaceful behavior in international relations. Secondly, the Kantian 
idea of a common cosmopolitan citizenship of these Republics also suggests an 
underlying norm or value of the individuals within societies which is welcoming and 
peace-seeking. Both theories are useful when trying to explain why some democracies 
use more soft power than others.  
Soft power use and peaceful foreign policies are not traditionally related concepts. 




Nye’s (1990, 2011) concepts they represent interactions that seek to sway and create 
long-term relationships and do not seek to coerce the other side. Since soft power 
instruments are generally peaceful in nature and because the soft power literature did not 
provide any answers about why some countries seem to use more soft power than others, 
turning to the democratic peace literature can provide the missing explanations. 
2.3.1 DRIVING FORCES OF SOFT POWER USE: INSTITUTIONS 
The previous section showed that from the democratic peace literature we have 
learned so far that democracies’ foreign policies might be more peaceful than non-
democracies’. When trying to explain this pattern, scholars have pointed to democratic 
institutions. According to this literature, democratic institutions play a key role in 
governments’ higher likelihood of selecting peaceful foreign policy instruments over 
coercive ones (Morgan and Campbell 1991, Maoz and Russett 1993, Bueno de Mesqita et 
al. 1999, Clark and Nordstrom 2005).  
In order to explain democratic peacefulness, some of the literature pointed to 
institutional constraint as the mechanism that results in democratic leaders’ peaceful 
foreign policy choices (Morgan and Campbell 1991, Maoz and Russett 1993, Bueno de 
Mesqita et al. 1999, Clark and Nordstrom 2005). Institutional constraint has a number of 
manifestations within democracies and each of them is limiting or delaying the leader to 
start a conflict. In democracies checks and balances allows each government branch to 
limit the other branches’ power and the equally empowered institutions can slow things 




The second constraint of democratic systems is the need for public debate of 
issues (Maoz and Russett 1993, Morgan and Campbell 1991, Russett 1993). The open 
public debate also makes it harder for democratic leaders to initiate conflict, because in 
democracies the public is aware and is watching, and a supportive public opinion is 
needed for the leader in the next election term. In addition, the high audience costs of an 
unsuccessful war make democratic leaders select other options rather than jumping into 
conflict. Democratic leaders can also send more credible threats and signal their foreign 
policy actions to the enemy (Fearon 1994a, Schultz 1999) which is often also enough to 
avoid conflict. Due to transparency and strong domestic audience in democracies, the 
democratic leaders are less likely to back down from threats, which makes the leaders’ 
signaling more credible. This phenomenon is also the result of the democratically set up 
institutions and government where the public influences that leaders by voting them in or 
out. Finally, the impact of the large size of the winning coalition also contribute to 
democratic leaders’ lower likelihood of using force in international relations (Bueno de 
Mesqita et al. 1999).  
In terms of studying countries’ soft power use, the mechanism of institutional 
constraint provides an important theoretical piece as to how democratic leaders are 
constrained by their constituencies and their political structures4 (See Figure 2.1). This 
Figure shows the soft power use average for ten democracies with identical (highest) 
 
4 Joshi, Maloy, Peterson (2015) offer a new insight into democratic institutions as they 
created the Institutional Democracy Index (IDI) to better illustrate the elite and popular 
democratic qualities of democracies. This great effort still does not provide institutional 
answers to foreign policy peacefulness variation among countries with the same IDIs 




institutional scores (Polity 4) for the selected time-period5. The soft power use data is my 
recoded ICEWS events data that was recoded into soft power and hard power actions. 
The soft power use percentage was created by the number of soft power actions divided 
by the total number of actions per state per year. This means that soft power use 
percentage shown on Figure 2.1 indicates each countries’ average soft power use for the 
time frame of 1995-2010. The selected countries on Figure 2.1 all have an average of 10 
democratic institutional scores (Polity 4).  
Figure 2.1 Ten Democracies’ Variation in their Soft Power Use Average over Total 
Instrument Use 1995-2010 
 
5 Soft power average was calculated by dividing the number of soft power actions with 


























As Figure 2.1 shows there is a significant variation in democracies’ soft power 
use (from 94 % to 65 %) which is unexplained by their democracy (polity) scores. This 
question is particularly important when trying to explain the soft power variation among 
strong democracies such as Finland and New Zealand. Both countries are rated high in 
terms of their political institutions and yet Finland uses 94% soft power in her 
international interactions while New Zealand only uses 68%.  
2.3.2 DRIVING FORCES OF COUNTRIES SOFT POWER USE: RESOURCES 
Other competing theories explaining foreign policy choices have focused on resources 
and argue that when it is time to select a foreign policy instrument the main influencing 
factor for leaders is the amount of resources they have at their disposal (Palmer and 
Morgan 2011, Clark, Nordstrom and Reed 2008, Chiba, Machain and Reed 2012).  
Palmer and Morgan (2011) argues that all government actions use some kind of resources 
(time, money, military personnel, security guarantees, diplomatic agreements, etc.) and in 
foreign policy, countries decide what actions to take based on their expected benefits 
when using such resources. In this view, countries are utility maximizers in their foreign 
policies, and they are limited by their resources (Palmer and Morgan 2006). Clark, 
Nordstrom and Reed (2008) along the same lines argue that foreign policy substitutions 
are created due to resource limitations. Countries’ with large amount of resources will 
also have a large selection of foreign policy choices but countries with low resources will 
be limited to the more cost-effective policy choices. The limitation of this approach is 
that it does not offer answers about countries’ variation in the foreign policy outcomes 
with the same or similar resources. In other words, this approach does not explain why 




          Another work that adds to the resource-based foreign policy explanations is Chiba, 
Machain and Reed’s (2012) article, which provides useful data and theory about the 
importance of resources when studying major and minor power countries’ and their 
foreign policy actions. Their categorization of countries helps to identify the amount of 
resources that they have but their study does not seek answers to questions about the 
variation of individual democracies’ peaceful behaviors within the major or minor power 
groups.  
          In order to find the leading indicators of high soft power reliance among 
democracies, scholars need to turn to new explanations. We have seen that resources and 
institutions only provide some answers about countries’ frequency of using peaceful 
instruments, therefore my research examines another factor. As the previous sections 
demonstrated, when trying to explain countries’ peaceful behavior in terms of the most 
influential factors, scholars turn to either institutional explanations (democratic 
institutions), or resource-based explanations (more resource more activity in conflict and 
peace), but none of these explanations are able to provide answers to why are two 
democracies with the same institutions and amount of resources would use soft power 
instruments to a different degree.  
          The search for more answers leads to the normative explanations of leaders’ 
international behaviors because if two countries with the same capabilities and 
democratic institutions still rely on soft power instruments to a different degree, then 
there must be another explanation that needs to be explored. Also, if countries’ structural 
variables seem to be identical, then soft power scholars’ attention needs to dig deeper into 




democratic countries are their core values. These values guide the public when making 
decisions about issues such as foreign policy (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987, Meernik and 
Ault 2001) and public opinion impacts the leader’s decision (Tomz and Weeks 2013, 
Stein 2015).  
2.3.4 DRIVING FORCE OF SOFT POWER: SOCIAL TRUST  
In terms of the normative explanations offered by some of the scholars (Maoz and 
Russett 1993, Chiba Machain and Reed 2012), we have learned that norms and values 
vary among democracies. In addition, Morgan and Campbell (1991, 189) concluded that 
democracies prefer negotiations over fighting due to their abhorrence of violence. But we 
have also learned that while norms may play some role in democracies’ peaceful 
behavior, according to sceptics, democracies abandon their normative commitment to 
resolve their dispute peacefully when they are in conflict (Bueno De Mesquita, et al 2003, 
221). One side of the normative argument argues that norms matter at all times under all 
circumstances, while the skeptics view that norms do not play an important role in 
foreign policy decisions while a country is in danger or in conflict.   
The listed theories tried hard to find and measure democratic norms. Campbell 
and Morgan (1991) found that democratic institutions do not fully explain democracies 
peacefulness and pointed (without testing) towards political culture as a possible 
explanation. Maoz and Russett (1993) looked at the length of political stability and the 
number of death by domestic political violence to measure democratic norms, Chiba, 
Machain and Reed (2012) created major and minor power cultures based on their 




force as they are more sensitive to other threatening changes than minor powers in the 
international world.  
          While these variables provide some answers about the differences among 
democracies, none of them include specific variables for individual level cultural norms 
(collected from surveyed individuals) that would represent variation of people’s core 
values. Instead, for instance in Chiba, Machain and Reed (2012) they use institutional 
indicators and capabilities to group countries into major or minor power status and 
theorize that the grouping also indicates a type of major or minor political culture.  
Scholars have argued that countries major power culture makes them more war-prone 
while countries from a minor power culture would be less war-prone (Ayoob 1991, 
Machain and Reed 2012), but they have not looked into individual-level normative 
variations within major and minor power cultures. We have seen that democratic 
institutions do not vary enough to provide strong predictions (Stein 2015) therefore, soft 
power research needs to dig deeper into individuals’ values and study how the core 
values impact the elected official’s foreign policy decisions.   
While there are numerous norms and values, comparative politics and 
international relations scholars have been consistently pointing to the importance of 
individuals’ social trust (Coleman 1990, Putnam 1993, 2000, Fukuyama 1995, Landes 
1998, La Porta et al 1999, Chong 2000, Brewer and Steenbergen 2002, Brewer et al 
2005) and its impact on various political outcomes. Fukuyama (1995, 26) defines social 




commonly shared norms6. Figure 2.2 demonstrates the variation of social trust among 
democracies. Figure 2.2 shows the percentage of people who said “most people can be 
trusted” for each selected country (data was collected from the World Value Survey for 
the time-period of 1995-2010) (See Appendix B). Figure 2.2 also shows that the range of 
the average social trust of 44 democracies is from 69 % in Norway to 26 % in Spain. 
 
Figure 2.2 Ten Democracies’ Social Trust Percentage Average for 1995-2010 (WVS 
data)  
 
In international relations social trust as an explanatory variable has generally been 
studied to explain cooperation, which is why it might also play an important role in 
peaceful foreign policy actions which also include soft power actions. One side argues 
that social trust is necessary for cooperation (Kydd 2005, McGillivray and Smith 2000) 
 
6 Fukuyama (1995) defines trust among people in the same community. I believe that this 



























and the other side concludes that social trust as an explanatory variable is not strong 
enough to explain cooperative behavior (Cook, Hardin and Levi 2005). The cooperation 
scholars pointed to the importance of social trust in international relations, but their 
game-theoretical models only provide a dichotomy of trust (or lack of trust). While the 
debate about the importance of social trust in the study of foreign policy has not been 
settled, a wide variety of empirical studies has shown social trust’s positive effect on 
political outcomes. For example, Rothstein and Uslaner (2005) and Knack and Zak 
(2001) showed that social trust is positively correlated with economic growth and more 
open economic policies (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005). In addition, Justwan (2014) found 
empirical evidence that social trust is a significant explanatory variable in the cross-
national variation of alien voting rights. Fukuyama (1995) argued that social trust is the 
key factor in countries’ well-being and their ability to compete. Based on these works 
pointing to social trust’s importance, this dissertation will add to the social trust literature 
linking it with soft power use.  
2.4 CONCLUSION 
This literature review pointed to two main issues in soft power research. The first 
one is the unclear and unmeasurable concept of soft power and the second one is the lack 
of research about the explanatory variables of countries’ soft power use. In other words, 
we do not know exactly what soft power is, and why some democratic countries use it 
more than others.   
           Literature in international relations offers institutional and resource-based 
explanations as to why countries use different foreign policies. The institutional 




do not tell us enough about democracies with the same types of institutions. The resource 
based- explanation concluded that rich countries will be more active than poor ones, but 
again, we did not learn enough about countries with similar amount of resources. The 
normative theories pointed to societies’ core values to better understand the differences in 
their countries’ political outcomes. The core value that stood out from this literature was 
social trust.  
          It has been clearly noted that some societies are more trusting than others and also 
that some countries use more soft power instruments, therefore I argue that the next 
theoretical and analytical step should be to study countries’ social trust values and its 
impact on their soft power use. Since other scholars have not done this, my dissertation 
will be the first to study the relationship between social trust and soft power reliance.  By 
bringing together the variation of social trust with countries’ soft power use patterns, I am 
able to test if democratic leaders with more trusting populations select more soft power 
instruments than those with less trusting citizens. This is an important question when we 
are trying to understand democratic countries’ foreign policies. As of now, previous 
literature has not looked into social trust as a possible explanatory variable when studying 
soft power use. Therefore, if this cultural variable is found significant, my dissertation 
will be able to provide a normative explanation to countries’ behaviors. This is 
particularly important when we are trying to understand the different behaviors of 











CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND THEORY 
The literature review revealed two main issues in soft power research. First, due 
to fundamental conceptual and operational issues, there is still no concrete way to 
measure countries’ soft power use. In addition, scholars have not focused on what factors 
lead to more soft power use. Therefore, in this chapter I offer my new conceptualization 
of soft power and describe my foreign policy instrument classification that includes a soft 
power category. Further, I turn to a previously unexamined factor that may explain 
democracies’ variation of soft power use. This factor is social trust. I will argue that the 
level of social trust will be a good indicator of democracies’ soft power use.  
3.1 A NEW CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF SOFT POWER 
3.1.1 AGENT 
A good concept of soft power should recognize several key distinctions regarding 
resources and actions of policy instruments, and should clearly imply who the agents are. 
Before I move on to my conceptual separation of power instruments, the agent problem 
needs to be clarified. While Nye (1990, 2004, 2011) seems to refer to state actors in his 
works, his definition of soft power does not include a specific agent. In order to improve 
upon that, I build on Nye’s (2011) definition of soft power (See Intro) and I specify the 




full control over their soft power (Zahran and Ramos 2010) as there are private actors as 
well as non-government agents creating and using soft power, my dissertation will just 
focus on governments’ explicit soft power and hard power actions. This way, I am able to 
directly evaluate and compare various governments’ soft and hard power activities and I 
will leave the remaining agents for future research.  
3.1.2 ATTRIBUTES OF SOFT POWER: SOFT POWER ACTIONS AND 
RESOURCES 
In order to clarify the term soft power, I am building on Nye’s (2011) definition 
and adding two new concepts in the form of soft power actions and hard power actions. 
My two main reasons for clarifying Nye’s (2011) soft power concept are: 1) soft power 
resources are often difficult to identify and measure, and 2) while many states have soft 
power resources, only the use of these resources can influence foreign policy, therefore it 
is the actions that matter.  
The foundation of my approach is behavior-based which means this study will 
focus on governments’ actions in order to understand their strategies. To be able to study 
only governments’ soft power actions, I had to adjust the definition of soft power and 
conceptually define and separate soft power resources from soft power actions in the 
following way: 
Soft power resources are a country’s national possessions that can be employed to make 
the country attractive abroad.  
These possessions include both private and government properties such as 
facilities, institutions, language, music, values, money, artistic and athletic talent as well 




personnel. As my definition above states, countries can employ their resources to achieve 
their goals, however, they may elect not do so. These soft power resources therefore are 
any possessions that add to the positive perception of the country. This of course as Nye 
(2011) have discussed it includes both tangible and non-tangible items such as a 
country’s popular dishes as well as its norms and values. Naturally, some of these items 
are privately owned such as Hollywood movies and Disney World but this does not stop 
the government from trying to use it for its benefits. (Example: The U.S State Department 
allowing basketball star Dennis Rodman to meet with the North Korean leader, which 
encounter was not previously achieved by any of the American diplomats for a long 
time.) 
I argue that only when scholars are able to clearly distinguish a country’s foreign 
policy actions from its resources can they successfully classify and measure such choices. 
Until this point, this separation has not been achieved. My new conceptualization of soft 
power therefore, is crucial for future research. My study builds on governments’ 
intentional foreign policy interactions. To be able to isolate them, I created the following 
definition:  
soft power actions are a government’s activities undertaken to increase its national 
attractiveness abroad.  
While it has been noted that governments do not have full control over all of the 
country’s soft power resources, they have full control over their own actions. Examples 
of soft power actions are engaging in a symbolic act, expressing an intent to cooperate, 




Following the behavior-based dichotomous framework of soft power 
conceptualization, I argue that hard power resources should also be separated from hard 
power actions when analyzing foreign policy outcomes. A country's hard power 
resources such as military size, number of military personnel or nuclear arsenal tells us 
about their capabilities but does not provide enough information about the actual use of 
such hard power instruments. Hard power actions are steps that governments take in 
order to force the other side to do something they otherwise would not have done. 
Examples of hard power actions are declaring war, posing economic sanctions or 
threatening to withdraw financial aid7. I argue that studying hard power actions will allow 
a deeper understanding of a government's foreign policy instrument selection. Based on 
this, my two other subcategories and their definitions are:  
hard power resources are a country’s possessions that can be used to force another state 
to do what it otherwise would not do. And my definition for hard power actions is: 
hard power actions are a government’s activities to force another state to do what it 
otherwise would not do. 
By creating these four new conceptual categories, two for soft power and two for 
hard power, I am able to better categorize countries’ soft power (and hard power) 
behavior and able to systematically analyze and compare them. I argue that the reason 
why these new concepts are necessary is because previously used dichotomous 
conceptualizations of soft power (Nye 1990, 2011, Nau 2005, Sun 2008, Jain 2017, 
McClory 2017) viewed soft power as both the resources of the executing state and its 
 
7 My study treats governments’ threatening actions the same as if they completed the 




influence on the receiving state. Even though recent scholarship has found that certain 
countries have more soft power resources than others (McClory 2012, 2017), this type of 
component index mixed up countries’ soft power resources and actions in a way that 
made it impossible to separate them.  This is an important conceptual and methodological 
problem that leads to confusing results and I argue that it does not provide adequate 
analysis about countries’ soft power policies.  
For example, while McClory (2017) has found that the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Germany, France, Canada, and the Nordic states are the leaders of his soft 
power index. According to McClory (2017) this outcome is measuring countries soft 
power resources but looking deeper into the factors he is using it becomes apparent that 
he included policy outcomes as well. Stating differently, when mixing previously 
established soft power resources such as number of universities with new policies such as 
changes in visa regulations, we are adding previously already measured soft power 
contributions to the countries’ current policies and we are not measuring any policy 
changes that may have occurred. If we know, for instance that the United States is 
restricting visa regulations in 2017 and limiting its diplomatic outreach with its former 
allies, this change must show up in our soft power measurement more than just one 









            Governments’ International Actions 
 
 Soft Power Actions        Hard Power Actions    Soft Power Actions   Hard Power Actions 
Figure 3.1 Conceptual Overlap of Soft and Hard Power Resources and Separation of Soft 
and Hard Power Actions 
 
The creation and separation of soft and hard power resources and actions provide 
scholars a new analytical approach that makes it possible to assess a country’s foreign 
policy strategies especially since many resources can be used for both soft and hard 
power actions (Figure 3.1). Based on this logic my conceptualization helps to separate 
hard and soft power instruments and clearly classify foreign policy tools (See Table 3.2). 
For instance, this conceptualization not only allows scholars to explain why certain hard 
power resources such as battleships (resources) can be used to deliver soft power actions 
such as providing humanitarian aid, but it also provides information about countries’ 
general foreign policy tool reliance such as the percentage of their soft power actions 










Figure 3.2. My Classification of Foreign Policy Instruments Based on the Separation of 
Resources and Actions into Soft Power and Hard Power Categories 
 
 As Figure 3.2 shows according to my framwork, in order to study what 
countries’ intended actions are, soft power schoalars should focus on the separation of 
soft and hard power actions without the impact of the types of resources that were used. 
In other words, it does not matter if the used resource was classified into hard or soft 
power categories, but instead the nature of the action must be categorized and studied. 
 By classifying foreign policy instruments based on the government’s actions 
we do not need to consider the employed resources. I will classify actions as either hard 
power or soft power based on a more nuanced matrix. For example, diplomats are good 
examples of resources that can be categorized as both hard power and soft power 
resources. But diplomats can conduct both soft power and hard power actions8. For 
 
8 Diplomatic actions such as making an empathetic comment or appeal for diplomatic 
cooperation were coded as soft power actions and disapprove or demand for diplomatic 








example, when instructed by the government, a diplomat can cooperate diplomatically or 
refuse to cooperate diplomatically. As this example shows by only looking at the 
resource, we cannot tell if this action should be hard or soft power. Instead, we must 
study the action of the diplomat to categorize the interaction (Figure 3.2). 
In order to better explain the separation and to provide concrete examples of soft 
and hard power actions, I created the following tables (Table 3.1 and Table 3.2).  As 
Table 3.1 shows, countries’ resources include a long list of private and public items.  My 
framework suggests that we do not need to be concerned with the separation of soft 
power and hard power resources as many of them are able to produce both types of 
actions. While in McClory’s Soft Power 30 index, the number of top 10 albums in 
foreign countries is an indicator of the country’s soft power ranking, my approach does 
not consider any of these private (or public) resources as it focuses on government 
actions.  
Table 3.1 Examples of Foreign Policy Resources 
Resources 
diplomats, monuments, 
cultural and sports facilities, 
famous people, popular music, 
famous brands (Coca-Cola, Nike), 
language, ministry of culture, 
level of democracy, 
budget, number of trade agreements, 
GDP, military attachés, 
generals, military capability, 
number of economic embargoes and boycotts, 
military budget, military size, 
number of military personnel, 





 As Table 3.1 shows, the classification of resources becomes irrelevant when 
scholars try to understand governments’ soft power use. The popularity of Coca-Cola 
products abroad does not help to explain the U.S. foreign policy instrument selection 
when dealing with conflicts in Yemen and in Syria. Actions speak much louder than 
resources do. The important implication of this framework is the ability to study 
countries’ foreign policy instrument choice patterns. It is important to know how 
countries tend to react in both every day international interactions and also in the long-
term especially considering that based on my data analysis, most interactions (over 80%) 
among governments are soft power actions (Trunkos 2017).  
          In addition, as Table 3.2 shows, the academic focus of this dissertation is shifting 
towards the specific government actions. When scholars are able to identify and count the 
number of soft power actions for each country, it becomes possible to compare their soft 
power activities, identify patterns and point to changes in their behaviors. For example, 
when a country significantly drops the number of its soft power activities compared to 
previous years that raises the academic and political question of the future behavior of 
such government. Also, referring to Table 2.1, learning that Finland uses an average of 
94.17% of soft power actions when interacting with other government but Australia only 








Table 3.2 Examples of Soft Power and Hard Power Actions 
Soft Power Actions Hard Power Actions 
engage in symbolic act, grant asylum, 
return or release person; appeal for 
diplomatic cooperation, nation building, 
supporting women’s rights and education, 
host a visit, make a visit, provide 
humanitarian aid,  inducements, positive 
sanctions, provide economic aid, 
cooperate economically, cooperate 
militarily, deployment of peacekeepers 
cooperate militarily, demand diplomatic 
cooperation; reject plan or agreement to 
settle dispute; threaten to reduce or break 
relations; demand settling a dispute, 
accuse of crime or corruption; reject 
request for rights; threaten to boycott, 
embargo or sanction; threaten to stop aid, 
use conventional military force, occupy 
territory, assassinate, use human shield, 
violate cease fire
 
It is important to note that these behavioral nuances play a significant role in 
countries’ everyday interactions. It is diplomatically and socially crucial for each 
government to have at least a working relationship with other countries, and even better if 
they can establish long-term good relations with them. This nearly 30% difference in the 
two compared countries’ (Finland and Australia) soft power usage in the previous 
paragraph can represent over 100,000 interactions and explain the success or failure of 
diplomatic events such as a head of state visiting a country or a government releasing a 
person from jail.  
Finally, it is true that governments are most interested in shaping the perceived 
image of their country and, the applied public relations channels also play a key role in 
their soft power use. The concept that best describes this process is public diplomacy. 
Public diplomacy is only one aspect of countries’ soft power tools and this dissertation 
aims to study a wider range of soft power use. Instruments that are not part of Public 






3.2 NEW CLASSIFICATION OF SOFT POWER AND HARD POWER FOREIGN 
POLICY INSTRUMENTS 
One of the goals of this dissertation is to create new guidelines between hard and 
soft power instruments and ultimately create a foreign policy framework which includes 
soft and hard power categories.  After describing my new categories next, I would like to 
explain how I created my main instrument groups.  
My classification builds on Nye’s (1990) initial dual-categorization of soft and 
hard power instruments with clear division between them. Following the conceptual 
separation of resources and actions. My classification is able to categorize the previously 
overlapping foreign policy instruments such as embassies or money. One of the main 
confusions about recognizing soft power and hard power wielding instruments is the fact 
that resources such as money or diplomats can be used to wield both types of power. My 
conceptual framework offers clear guidelines between the types of action that were taken 
by the government to achieve its foreign policy goals.  
Overall, understanding why certain democracies are more peaceful and use more 
soft power actions than others is the goal of this dissertation. By creating a system in 
which all foreign policy instruments can be categorized and offering comprehensive 
guidelines between instrument types is the first academic step towards learning more 
about democracies soft power use. This conceptual step is also necessary when trying to 
measure any policy changes that may have occurred from one year to the next. My 
framework connects soft power actions and policies and studies government actions to 
make inferences about their policies. Other soft power measurements were unable to 




recognizing various governments’ moves but also it is crucial for any future soft power 
policy measurement.  
It is important to note here that my dissertation does not argue against what many 
have said before about using the right amount of soft and hard power in conference with 
each other (Nye 2011, Cobaugh 2017). In fact, with my classification, I only wish to 
strengthen the strategic and effective use of soft power and hard power instruments by 
offering an operationalization method. By clearly separating soft and hard power 
instruments, I am able to for the first time in soft power research, apply my coding to 
over 1.5 million interactions and measure the percentage of soft power use per country 
per year on an international scale. I argue that by classifying government actions based 
on soft or hard power action definitions, we will be better equipped to understand the 
preferences and strategies of countries and for the first time provide a measurement 
opportunity for soft power scholars.  
3.3 SOCIAL TRUST AND SOFT POWER USE 
The next step in this dissertation is to point to a new explanatory variable that 
might be able to explain the previously discussed soft power use variation of 
democracies. In order to create a theory of international variation in societies’ mass 
attitudes towards peaceful instruments, I have to first discuss how those attitudes are 
formed and then explain how they impact the leader’s decision. A significant body of 
research on public opinion formation has identified core values as a fundamental source 
of political attitudes (Feldman 1988; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987, Chong 2000, Jacoby 




and important in life (Rokeach 1973). In international relations, these beliefs serve as 
shortcuts for the public for forming opinions about issues that can be unclear (Goren 
2000; Sniderman et al. 1993). Lack of knowledge about international matters can make it 
difficult for the average people to have a clear opinion about the best foreign policy in 
which case they tend to rely on their core values to decide (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987, 
Meernik and Ault 2001). Scholars have also argued that social trust is one of these core 
values (Putnam 1993, Fukuyama 1995, Inglehart 1999) and that these core values and 
preferences of societies’ can be measured and used to compare countries (Hofstede 1980, 
2001, Wildavsky 1987, Thompson et al. 1990, House et al 2004, Inglehart and Welzel 
2005, Schwartz 2006).  
          Social trust (Inglehart 1999, Cook Hardin and Levi 2005) is a relatively enduring 
characteristic of societies as it reflects their historical and cultural heritage (Inglehart 
1999) and it varies among populations. I theorize that the strong cross-national variation 
among democracies in their populations’ social trust at the individual level relates to the 
differences in their support for soft power use. That is because in trusting countries 
cooperative and peaceful foreign policy instruments are favored over coercion (Putnam 
1993, Fukuyama 1995) and in democracies the public opinion restricts foreign policy 
outcomes by voting leaders out of office if they do not create policies that the general 
public can support (Tomz and Weeks 2013, Stein 2015).  Therefore, in order to explain 
democratic leaders’ variation in soft power reliance, my dissertation will build on 





In international relations trust as an explanatory variable has generally been 
studied to explain cooperation, which is why it might also play an important role in 
peaceful foreign policy actions which also include soft power actions. The two sides of 
the academic debate are regarding the significance level of social trust in countries’ 
likelihood of cooperation versus defection (Axelrod 1984, Kydd 2005, McGillivray and 
Smith 2000). One side argues that trust is necessary for cooperation (Kydd 2005, 
McGillivray and Smith 2000) and the other side concludes that social trust as an 
explanatory variable is not strong enough to explain cooperative behavior (Cook, Hardin 
and Levi 2005). While I praise these scholars’ work as they have pointed to the 
importance of social trust in international relations, I argue that while game-theoretical 
models are great for illustrating the mechanism of influencing factors, they only provide a 
dichotomy of trust (or lack of trust) in their models. My research will add to their efforts 
as I plan to further study the variations of social trust as it relates to variations of different 
types of cooperative and other peaceful actions. I argue that by looking into the variation 
of social trust level among societies we will learn much more about individual state’s 
foreign policy preferences. 
           In addition, it is also important to discuss a possible spurious correlation between 
countries’ social trust and their soft power use. Walt (2020) argues that states’ 
competence/strength impact their soft power use. In fact, Walt (2020) specifically argues 
that the decline of American competence has been greatly affecting its ability to influence 
in foreign policy. While it is a fair (Realist) argument that a country’s attraction is 
influenced by its strength and competence, so far none of the scholars were able to 




also score high on soft power. For this reason, this dissertation looks for alternative 
explanations to strength or competence9. 
          Further addressing a possible correlation between social trust and this alternative 
factor, namely competence or strength, it is important to note that social trust does not 
refer to trust in government but instead it is society’s trust of other people. This 
individual-level value develops early in life, it reflects the culture and heritage of the 
society and it is rarely affected by factors such as the good or bad performances of 
foreign governments. Even more importantly, the core value of social trust applies to all 
other people regardless of political borders. Stated differently in societies where there has 
been a high value of social trust the individuals turn to people from all over the world 
regardless of nationality with trust and in the hope to cooperate. Therefore, government’s 
competence or strength cannot strongly influence the perceiving states’ individuals’ 
social trust as those had already been formed.  
The mechanism between social trust and soft power use must also be further 
explained. In foreign policy the target audience of governments’ soft power actions are 
the general foreign public. While it is true that their domestic population is also impacted, 
in order to achieve foreign policy goals, governments’ must focus their soft power actions 
to the entire foreign public. The public will then impact its leadership through the 
democratic process in democracies and through the political elite in non-democracies. 
 
9  To further study this relationship, Chapter 4 of this dissertation specifically test the 
correlation between some of the indicators of countries economic and military strength in 
the form of their GDP, unemployment rate and CINC scores and finds that none of these 
indicators are statistically significant. With respect to competence of governments, that 





The level of attentiveness differs amongst people, so the governments’ goal is to reach 
the maximum range of society with various soft power actions. 
The one method by which governments are able to focus their soft power actions 
on specific groups of foreign people are their government programs. For example, the 
United States uses the Fulbright program within the State Department to impact the 
foreign elite through academic exchange programs and in Finland the government uses 
the Sports Department (Ministry of Culture and Education) to impact the sports fan 
segment of the foreign public through organizing sport events. 
           Trusting populations by definition feel that others are generally benign, cooperative 
and honest (Brewer and Steenberger 2002) which makes persuasion and not coercion the 
most cost-effective, logical and legitimate choice of interaction with other nations. The 
normal behavior of trusting individuals is to reach out to strangers and persuade them into 
a cooperative relationship (Putnam 1993, Fukuyama 1995). This is due to trusting 
societies beliefs that the other party shares these cooperative beliefs therefore the most 
cost-effective way to interact is by cooperation. These shared beliefs include deep values 
such as the nature of God or justice but also include professional standards and codes of 
behavior (Fukuyama 1995, 26).  
 I theorize that trusting societies find the use of soft power tools the most effective 
as their goal is to sway others into working together with them as opposed to coercing 
them to do so. This thought process manifests itself when the population supports their 
leader to prefer and select soft power instruments over force when possible. Based on 




Creates a shortcut when not enough information is available about the international 
situation; and 2) suggests a legitimate option for the leader.  
There are certain countries that consistently seem to advance more peaceful 
solutions then other nations in the form of soft power use (McClory 2012, 2015, 2016, 
2017, 2018). The first step of my theory suggests that when making a decision about 
issues such as foreign policy, the public will turn to their core values when there is not 
enough information. This means that based on my theory, trusting societies will prefer 
that their leaders’ also act according to the public’s trusting values when selecting foreign 
policy instruments, and since public opinion impacts the incentive structure of the 
leaders, they will be pressured to act accordingly (Bueno de Mesquita 2003). In other 
words, democratic leaders with trusting populations will not only believe that instruments 
based on peaceful interaction will be the most effective and legitimate, but also the 
accountability of the democratically elected office will pressure them to do so.   
The next step in my theory is the connection between societies’ social trusting 
values and their constraint on their leaders’ choices. Values and norms are created early 
in life and they create a ranking of preferences (Hudson 1997) and provide ways to make 
decisions and to resolve conflict (Triandis 1994). My theory builds on this interpretation 
as I argue that due to the influence of society’s social trust, leaders prefer certain 
instruments over others. Scholarship has also concluded that democratic10 leaders take 
 
10 In autocracies institutional constraint will be a better predictor for two reasons: 1) 
Autocratic leaders with small electorates can maintain their positions simply by giving 
out rewards or punishments (Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003).  This method is simply too 
expansive in democracies as they have large selectorates. 2) The political elite plays an 




public opinion into account when deciding between peaceful and aggressive foreign 
policy choices (Sobel 2001, Baum 2004, Brule and Mintz 2006). When public opinion is 
averse to war, accountability will provide a check on the use of military force. The 
potential political cost of an unpopular war can create an incentive for democratic leaders 
to choose nonmilitary options and opt for peaceful interaction. This of course does not 
mean that trusting societies’ leaders would never go to war, but it simply means that all 
else equal, in democracies with trusting populations the preferred actions are peaceful in 
nature.  
2.4 PUBLIC OPINION’S ROLE IN FOREIGN POLICY OUTCOMES 
This final section will connect social trust and soft power use. Recent works have 
identified public opinion as an alternative mechanism to influencing foreign policies in 
democracies (Tomz and Weeks 2013, Stein 2015). When studying the choice of using 
peaceful instruments or force, public preferences vary in different countries (Hurwitz and 
Peffley 1987, Feldman 1988) and attitudes towards peace have their roots in individual 
core values (Jacoby 2006).11  Scholarship has also found that democracies in general are 
more equipped to settle disputes in a peaceful manner (Dixon et al. 1994); however, there 
is no adequate information about the quantifiable differences among democracies in 
terms of their motivations to select peaceful instruments.  
 
core values than the public when deciding to use soft power instruments as they have 
more information and policy experience than the general public (Stein 2015). 
11 It has also been noted that the public’s mood (Caspary 1970) impacts foreign policy. 
In the case of major events such as 9/11 in the United States, the mood can change but in 
general the basic core values of societies remain consistent (Inglehart 1999, Cook Hardin 




 Building on the current literature about the importance of public opinion’s impact 
on leaders’ foreign policy choices (Baum 2004, Sobel 2001, Stein 2015) and the 
undeveloped and untested impact of people’s social trust in their foreign policy 
preferences, I will test social trust’s impact on democracies’ peaceful foreign policy 
choices in the form of soft power actions. Based on the described literature combined 
with my theory, I hypothesize the following: 
H1: Democratic leaders’ with trusting populations are more likely to rely on soft 
power actions than less trusting ones because they can generate public support for 
peaceful actions more effectively. 
Overall, by bringing together the variation of social trust with countries’ soft 
power use patterns, I am able to test if democratic leaders with more trusting populations 
select more soft power instruments than those with less trusting citizens. This is an 
important question when we are trying to understand democratic countries’ foreign 
policies. As of now, previous literature has not looked into social trust as a possible 
explanatory variable when studying soft power use. Therefore, if this cultural variable is 
found significant, my dissertation will be able to provide a normative explanation of 
countries’ soft power reliance.  
This is particularly important when we are trying to understand the different 
behaviors of otherwise similar democratic countries. In order to achieve that, I plan to 
offer a more detailed picture of why and how some countries use more soft power 
instruments than others despite their similar capabilities. For this reason, I will compare 




further study the way these leaders’ use soft power instruments, I will use reclassified 
























                           CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
This dissertation focuses on democracies’ use of soft power instruments. Based on 
my theory, I test if countries with higher social trust values also rely more on soft power 
tools than countries with lower social trust in. The theoretical foundation of this 
hypothesis is that countries with more social trust feel that the others can be trusted, and 
an outreaching, cooperative behavior is the most effective behavior in international 
relations. As a result, the population of these trusting countries will encourage (through 
the democratic process) their leaders to use more soft power instruments. 
My statistical analysis examines the effects of social trust on countries’ soft power 
use for the time-period of 1995-2010. The goal of this analysis is to test the influences of 
social trust on the use of soft power instruments against the resource-based and the 
institutional theories. I use statistical analysis of 51 democracies to test if higher values in 
social trust leads to more soft power use. I argue that the variation in social trust will 
offer new, previously undiscovered answers about the differences in countries’ soft 
power use patterns. The result of my statistical analysis shows that the variation in social 
trust is positively correlated with countries’ soft power use, however, the multivariable 





In this chapter first I will explain my unit of analysis and my dependent and 
independent variables. Later, I move onto the statistical analysis and conclude with the 
results. 
4.1 UNIT OF ANALYSIS AND SAMPLE  
The unit of analysis is the state-year. My sample consists of 51 democratic 
countries. I included all countries with a polity score average higher than 6 in 
democracies with the exceptions of those that were missing from one of the datasets12. In 
order to test my hypotheses and control for all of my selected variables I had to restrict 
my analysis to the time-frame of 1995-2010 as the latent social trust data (Justwan et al. 
2018), the COW's Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) (Palmer et al. 2015) and its World 
Religion data (Maoz and Henderson 2013) are only available until 2010 and thus I had to 
end my analysis at that year. This time-period gives me 16 years which is sufficient to 
examine any patterns in foreign policy decision-making in various countries.  
4.2 DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES AND DATA SOURCE 
4.2.1 DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
 My dependent variable is the percentage of soft power action per state-year. I 
selected this variable because I would like to study countries’ frequency of relying on soft 
power.  
Percentage of soft power action: the percentage of governments’ actions to increase its 
national attractiveness abroad over the total power instruments used. The total power 
instruments used includes the sum of all soft and hard power actions.  
 
12 Democracies not included in the sample of 51 countries are Hong Kong, Taiwan, 




Selecting this format was an important analytical step as I had two other options for a 
dependent variable after recoding the data into soft and hard power use. One option was 
to use the total count of soft power actions and hard power actions per year per country. 
This method significantly disadvantaged the less active international players and without 
a comparison with hard power tools selected, therefore it did not provide an adequate 
picture about countries’ soft power instrument patterns. Another option was to use the 
soft and hard power ratio for each country. This approach was also dismissed as it did not 
provide an adequate picture about countries’ patterns of foreign policy instrument 
selection over all of their tools (soft and hard power). This pointed me to use the 
percentage of soft power actions over the total (soft and hard power) instruments. This 
approach provides a comprehensive picture in the form of the percentage of soft power 
choices over both instrument categories. In other words, my dependent variable reflects 
the percentage of soft power choices each country made over all its instrument choices 
for each year. 
  To produce my dependent variable, I collected global events data from the ICEWS 
dataset. The international events are based on news reports from a variety of international 
news sources and coded according to the CAMEO13 (Conflict and Mediation Event 
Observations) ontology. The event data is machine coded and it is provided in a dyad 
format which I collapsed into a monadic format for all my models. This means that the 
TABARI machine coding system produces interaction codes for each event between two 
 





countries. Since this research is not concerned with the receiving state’s characteristics, I 
only included the giver state’ and its interaction code for each interaction.  
Since its creation in 2002 (Gerner, Schrodt, Yilmas, Abu-Jabr) the CAMEO 
codebook has been evolving to include more detailed events. The creators of the ICEWS 
data set (Boschee et al. 2015) added their own adjustments to the original CAMEO 
codebook to clarify the events. In addition, my coding of the CAMEO coded events has 
also evolved. For example, one of the most used event categories (10) is “making a 
public statement.”  This refers to any government official who makes a public statement. 
Originally in 2015, I have coded this event as an interaction that cannot be decisively 
categories as attraction or coercion, since the correct coding should depend on the subject 
of the statement. More specifically, President Trump announcing to send troops to the 
Southern border is a coercive (hard power) action, but President Trump announcing the 
opening of Easter festivities at the White House is a soft power action. Since the machine 
coded event does not provide more information about what kind of statement was made, 
originally, I coded this event as 0 and dropped it from the database. But lately, new 
scholarship has pointed to the soft power importance of making a public statement 
(Rutland 2018). I realized that regardless of the message of the statement, the general 
nature of “making a public statement” must be coded as a soft power action because the 
appearance of a government official combined with his/her statement already express the 







4.2.2  RECODING THE ICEWS EVENT DATASET 
I created the dependent variable by recoding the ICEWS event data into two 
categories either as a soft power action or as a hard power action and then calculate the 
soft power action percentage over the total power usage. The reason used the ICEWS 
dataset is that it is one of the most current applications of machine coded global events 
data and it will allow me to recode the specific government actions14. This dataset 
includes the range of different interactions that took place between states including, but 
not limited to, providing humanitarian aid, returning/releasing a person or granting 
diplomatic recognition. ICEWS is a new CAMEO-coded dataset containing more than 15 
million events with global coverage from 1995 to 2014.  
Sources that were examined to identify events include all international news 
coverage from AfricaNews, Agence France Presse, Associated Press Online, Associated 
Press Worldstream, BBC Monitoring, Christian Science Monitor, Facts on File, Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service, United Press International, and the Washington Post. 
Additional sources examined include all national and international news coverage from 
the New York Times, all international and major US national stories from the Associated 
Press, and all national and international news from Google News with the exception of 
sports, entertainment, and strictly economic news (Leetaru and Schrod 2013). 
The CAMEO coding system is based on extensive dictionaries which identify 
actors and events and then associate these with specific codes. Using a machine-coding 
program called TABARI, the events are coded 1 through 20 based on the nature of the 
 
14 Events datasets were specifically created to capture the interactions between actors 




action.  The codes were originally designed to indicate cooperation or conflict on a scale 
of 1-20 with 1 making a public statement and 20 being mass violence (Leetaru and 
Schrodt, 2013). The actions range from diplomacy to waging war and have multiple 
subsections such as hosting a visit and expressing diplomatic cooperation which today 
extends the scale to near 300 different event categories. After recoding the events I was 
able to study countries’ soft power actions. 
I used MySQL, which is an open-source data management system to recode the 
ICEWS dataset. All events that I re-classified as soft power actions were recoded as 1.  
All events that I re-classify as hard power action received 2 (See Table 4.1).  
Table 4.1 Re-coding ICEW’s CAMEO coded events into hard and soft power actions 
 
In cases where it could not be decided for sure if the action was taken to create 
attractiveness or coerce were dropped from the analysis. Events were dropped in two 
basic instances:  
 1) When the description of the event was more specific, but the giver or initiator 
state’s intentions such as coercing of building attractiveness could not be determined. For 
instance, 1.11 decline comment, 2.241 appeal for changing leadership or 2.244 appeal for 
military cooperation. 
 Soft Power (1) Hard Power (2) 
Type of Action positive influence/payment coercion/payment 
Type of Impact Attraction deterrence/fear 
Specific Actions making a public statement, 
express intent to cooperate, 
engage in diplomatic 
affairs, support publicly, 









2) If the initiator state asked a third party to do something. This action did not 
provide information about the initiator’s action. The specific coding of each action type is 
listed in Appendix A.  
The ICEWS dataset grew out of a large body of academic research 15 on using 
discrete events for studying international (and domestic) relations (McClelland 1976, 
Azar 1980, 1982, Goldstein 1992). The results of such data collection is applicable to my 
coding of soft and hard power actions. Some of the earlier criticisms of using machine 
coded events data included problems with source selection, coding rules, data 
management and the scale (Laurance 1990, Goldstein 1992)16.  My method uses the 
counting approach as I am only interested in the number of soft power actions per state. 
One of the main criticisms of aggregating event data without weighting it has been that 
weighted events are more conceptually grounded in the theory than events that are just 
counted (Goldstein 1992). My conceptual framework, however, will not focus on the 
intensity of the event or the responses from the receiving state. This makes my counting 
approach the applicable method. 
 
 
15  Initially there were two basic event coding frameworks, namely McClelland’s (1967, 
1976) WEIS (World Event Interaction Survey) dataset and Azar’s (1980) COPDAB 
(Conflict and Peace Data Bank) dataset. Later other event datasets were created using 
machine coded events such as KEDS (Kansas Event Data System). In the 2000s two new 
event coding taxonomies appeared, CAMEO (Conflict and Mediation Observation 
(Gerner et al. 2009) and IDEA (Integrated Event Data for Events Analysis) (Bond et al., 
2003). 
16  The issue of how to best use discrete events to study interstate interactions resulted in 
two approaches which are either counting the events and using an ordinal scale or 




Finally, I resolve the issue of representing interstate conflict on a continuum 
(Sayrs 1990, de Vries 1990) because I am recoding the 20-point scale into two categories: 
soft or hard power and I am studying the percentages of soft power actions per year.  The 
process of re-coding is based on my categorization of all occurring events into either soft 
or hard power actions, or in case the category cannot be clearly selected dropping the 
event from the dataset. Although hard and soft power actions are mutually exclusive 
according to my codes, each event represents only a small fragment of each nation’s total 
annual hard and soft power actions because hundreds of events are included in the 
dataset. In other words, state A can have hard power and soft power actions many times 
in the same year with the same country.  
Recoding the dataset by applying my conceptualization of hard and soft power 
actions is the core of my method.  As the results show, there is only some overlap 
between mediation and soft power actions, and conflict and hard power codes. The 
results also show that all cooperation and mediation events do not code as soft power 
actions (See Table 4.2). One of the main operational contributions of this study therefore 
is the recoding and measuring of such events as hard or soft power actions.    
Table 4.2 Analysis of re-coding CAMEO Coded Events into Soft Power and Hard Power 
Actions 
 Number of Various 
Events 
Dropped Events Coded Differently 
from CAMEO 
Soft Power 87 26 (29.88%) 22 (25.28%) 
Hard Power 121 21 (17.25%) 19 (16%) 





4.3 INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Social Trust (Latent_Trust). To measure my main independent variable, I relied 
on Juswan, Bakker and Berejikian (2018) latent trust variable. Adopting a Bayesian 
measurement model, they treat social trust as a latent concept. Their latent trust variable 
was constructed with a broad set of correlates (19 variables) providing a cleaner and more 
reliable estimates than previous survey data such as the World Value Survey. Justwan et 
al.’s (2018) dataset also solved the problem of missing data as they have produced a 
state-year variable for my selected time-frame while the World Value Survey’s dataset 
was missing 80% of the needed data points. 
The collected observables were used in multiple disciplines including political 
science, psychology, sociology and neuro-economic combining survey data as well as 
institutional social and environmental correlates of social trust (Justwan et al. 2018). The 
full list of the variables used can be seen in Appendix B. The latent trust variable ranges 
from -1.92 to 2.18 (In my selected countries the range is (-.46-2.18). The units of this 
latent variable are not directly interpretable, but we can say that higher values show 
higher social trust in each country (Justwan et al. 2018). This means that in this 
dissertation based on my hypothesis a positive correlation is expected between soft power 
use and social trust. Data is available from 1946-2010. 
4.3.1.  INSTITUTIONAL AND RESOURCE VARIABLES 
In my models the variable that represent the institutional theory is Polity4 and the 
variables that reflect the resource-based theories are gdp and CINC. The Polity4 variable 
reflects countries democracy levels and gdp and CINC represents countries’ economic 




National Material Capability (CINC). I used COW's Combined Index of 
National Capability (CINC) (Singer, Bremer and Stuckey 1972, Singer 1987) for Model 
1. Scholars have identified resources and the national capability of countries as 
significant variables in foreign policy decision making and as being positively 
correlated with the amount of foreign policy actions taken (Palmer and Morgan 2006). 
This index is constructed with two measures of each of three dimensions: industrial, 
demographic, and military which encompasses six indicators (military expenditure, 
military personnel, energy consumption, iron and steel production, urban population, 
and total population). This combination of dimensions captures the national capability 
of states. The impact of states’ military capabilities in interstate conflict is one of the 
most addressed issues in international relations. While there is still disagreement about 
the exact effect of military capability on conflict (Morgan 1984, 1990, 1994; Morrow 
1989; Fearon 1994b; Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, and Zorick 1997), it is without a 
doubt a significant variable in foreign policy analysis (Palmer and Morgan 2000).  
          For my theory this explanatory variable tested if a country’s resources are 
positively correlated with the percentage of their soft power actions, and if national 
capability is a significant variable in a state’s choices of soft power actions. As my 
theory suggests, selecting soft power actions over hard power actions is a policy choice 
that is influenced more by the trusting level of the population than available resources. 
Thus, including CINC in my regression models allowed me to test CINC’s statistical 
significance when CINC represents the military capability of the country. Data is 




Gross Domestic Product (gdp). This economic variable reflects the product or 
value of all final goods and services produced within a nation in a given year and in this 
study, it tests the resource-based theory. I collected data from the World Bank.  I used 
gdp to indicate countries’ economic power in the world as it has been a commonly used 
variable in international relations scholarship (Pzeworski and Limongi 1995, Gilpin 
2011, Inglehart 1997, 2000). I expect to find that countries with higher gdps will have a 
higher percentage of soft power actions/year compared to countries with lower gdps. I 
find the World Banks dataset on gdp specifically useful as it will allow me to use 
current USD so I will not have to adjust it any further for inflation. Data is available for 
the years 1960-2014.  
Democratization Level (polity).  The Polity IV project is sponsored by the 
Center for Systemic Peace (Marshall, Gurr and Jagger 2016). In my regression models I 
use Polity IV scores to capture the democratization level of states, which represents the 
institutional theory in my dissertation. Polity IV captures the regime authority spectrum 
on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated 
democracy). On the monadic (national) level scholars concluded that due to various 
internal dimensions or assumptions, liberals tend to be pacifists, and liberal 
(democratic) governments (especially larger democracies) prefer negotiations over war 
and pursue peaceful foreign policies (Morgan and Campbell 1991). Polity IV considers 
countries with scores from 6-10 as democracies and that is what I used when selecting 
my democracies (Marshall 1). I expected to find that the higher a country’s democracy 
score is the more likely it is to use more soft power actions over hard power actions. 




4.3.2 CONTROL VARIABLES 
In order to include other important factors that can impact countries’ foreign 
policy decisions, I included thirteen other sets of control variables from the Correlates of 
War Project; MID, MID count, formal alliances, import, export, gdpgrowth, 
unemployment, five religions and non-religion. I collected data about unemployment 
from the IMF and about gdp growth from the World Bank. My main interest is in the soft 
power actions of states relative to their total interactions, but these can only be estimated 
accurately if other conditions and capabilities are also represented in the analysis and 
controlled for.  
MID (MID): Militarized Interstate Dispute data (Palmer et al. 2015) collected by 
Correlates of War Project provides information about conflicts in which a country 
threatens, displays, or uses force against one or more other states between 1816 and 2010. 
By definition, “militarized interstate disputes are united historical cases of conflict in 
which the threat, display or use of military force short of war by one-member state is 
explicitly directed towards the government, official representatives, official forces, 
property, or territory of another state. Disputes are composed of incidents that range in 
intensity from threats to use force to actual combat short of war” (Jones et al. 1996, 163).  
The data is coded as a dummy variable in which 0 indicates the lack of any 
conflict for the year and 1 signals conflict. The inclusion of conflict for each country 
helps me to explain soft power use as countries with more conflict are less likely to rely 
on high level of soft power tools as due to their conflict, they are prone to rely on hard 
power tools. For this reason, I expect to find that MIDs are negatively correlated with soft 




MID Count (MIDCount): In addition, to control for the number of conflicts for 
each state, I also included the Correlates of Wars’ MID data (Palmer et al. 2015) coded as 
MID count data, which indicates the variation of countries’ number of interstate disputes 
per year. Ever year when any kind of conflict started according to the dataset, it was 
counted as 1 conflict. The range of the MID count per year is 8 conflicts (USA) to 0 
conflicts (Switzerland). This control variable allows the variation of conflict heavy and 
little or no conflict countries to be indicated in the regression models.  I expect MID 
count to be negatively correlated with soft power use as in conflict prone countries there 
is more attention and effort paid to hard power instruments. 
Formal Military Alliance (militalliance): This data set is also part of the 
Correlates of War Project (Gibler 2009) and it records all formal alliances among states 
between 1816 and 2012, including mutual defense pacts, non-aggression treaties, and 
ententes on monadic level. The data is used as a dummy variable where 0 indicates the 
lack of any formal alliance for a country for each year and 1 indicates the existence of at 
least one formal military alliance. Based on my theory, countries that are in military 
alliances do not feel safe (for geographic or historical reasons) and therefore rely on soft 
power instruments less frequently than nations with no formal alliances. Therefore, I 
expect military alliances to be negatively correlated with soft power use.  
           Trade (import, export): to capture the effect of economic dependence of 
countries’, I included the Correlates of War Project’s monadic trade data (Barbieri and 
Keshk 2016) which reflects the incoming and outgoing volume of trade of each selected 
country17. The variable measures the annual completed trade in current USD and 
 




provides an economic dependency indicator in the models. The amount of trading 
indicates an amount of economic dependency and connection with other countries which 
makes it more likely to turn to soft power instruments for countries that import and 
export heavily. For this reason, the expected relationship is positive. Data is available for 
1816-2014. 
             Religion: to collect data about countries’ religious affiliations I turned to the 
Correlates of War’s World Religion Project’s (WRP) (Maoz and Henderson 2013) most 
specifically to the National Religion Dataset. The data records the percentages of the 
state's population that practice a given religion. I used the five main religions indicators 
in percentages as control variables; Christian-Catholic (catholic), Christian-Protestant 
(protestant); Islam (islam); Buddhism (budhism); Hindu (hindu). Also added non-religion 
(nonrelig) as a variable. Based on previous studies, I expect Protestant, Buddhism, 
Hinduism and Non-religion affiliation to be positively correlated with soft power use 
(Landes 1998, La Porta et al 1999). On the other hand, I expect Catholic and Islam to be 
negatively correlated with soft power use (Landes, 1998, La Porta et al 1999). The unit of 
analysis in this dataset is the individual state, observed at five-year intervals. This dataset 
provides information the percent of the state's population practicing a given religion. Data 
is available from 1945-2010. 
 Unemployment (unempl) to include the effect of unemployment rate I used the 
International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook database’s unemployment data. 
The World Economic Outlook (WEO) database contains selected macroeconomic data 
series from the statistical appendix of the World Economic Outlook Report, which 




level, in major country groups and in many individual countries18. The unemployment 
rate indicates the economic strength of each country but also serves as an indicator of 
social openness towards outsiders (La Porta el at 1999). Higher unemployment rate 
indicates a weaker economy and less openness towards outsiders. I expect unemployment 
rate to be negatively correlated with soft power use. The information is provided in 
percentage of the population for each year from 1980-present.  
 GDP Growth (gdpgrowth):  I also included gdp growth as a control variable to 
indicate the annual changes of economic strength in a percentage. I expect that this 
variable will be positively correlated with soft power use as with a stronger economy the 
country can afford to spend more on non-defensive foreign policy instruments such as 
soft power tool and actions. This data is collected from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators and it is available for 1960-2017.  
 4.3.3 MULTICOLINEARITY AND REVERSE CAUSATION 
 There are two additional statistical problems that must be address. 
Multicollinearity and reverse causation. With respect to multicollinearity some of the 
listed independent variables are also correlated with each other in addition to soft power 
use thus inflating the error term in the regressions. For example, many of the high soft 
power user countries have strong democratic institutions and plenty of resources as well 
as they have a Protestant religion and cultural background with low unemployment. My 
solution to address this problem was to run a Pearson correlation estimate amongst all my 
explanatory variables to see how strong the correlation was between them. Once the 
Pearson coefficient was higher than r=0.50 between two of my independent variables, 
 




they could only remain in my linear regression model if the model was still significant, 
and they added to the R² of the regression model. COW imports and COW exports, for 
instance has a 0.93 bivariate correlation, but keeping both variables in my models still 
resulted in a statistically significant model and raised the R². 
 Finally, the last statistical issue is reverse causation. As Delhey and Newton 
(2005) explains, between the association of trust and another variable is that trust can be 
the cause or the effect of another indictor. For example, richer countries may be more 
trusting than poor countries, but that may be because their wealth and financial security 
allows them to risk possible loses and approach others with trust and openness. On the 
other hand, they might be richer than others because they are more trusting. Same logic is 
true for using more or less soft power. Some democracies may use more soft power 
because they are trusting. On the other hand, they might be more trusting because they 
have always used soft power instruments to a large degree. Also, as it is evident from my 
analysis and from other scholars’ work, social trust is deeply embedded with other social 
and economic factors (Inglehart 1999, Inglehard and Welzel 2005, Delhey and Newton 
2005).  I used control variables to resolve this issue.  
4.3 VALIDITY CHECK 
 In order to check the validity of my social trust data I used two different datasets’ 
social trust data to test the correlation between latent trust and the others. First, using the 
OECD (Organization of Economically Developed Countries) social trust data which was 
only available for one year (2007), I ran a bivariate linear regression model and I found 
that the correlation was weak (r=.0021) with n=23. Next, I used Inglehart and Welzel’s 




social trust. I found that the correlation is considerable (r=43) with n=51. Overall, while 
the OECD’s limited data did not appear to have a strong correlation with my dataset, the 
wildly used WVS’s social trust data appears to be strongly correlated with my latent trust 
variable and by running two regressions with two other social trust data, the validity of 
my independent variable appears robust enough for the analysis.  
4.4 RESULTS 
 
In order to be able to compare the competing theories about the main factors that 
influence soft power actions, I created three linear cross-sectional regression time-series 
models. 
4.4.1 MODELS 1-4 
In Model 1 (Resources) using an OLS regression, I only included the resource 
variables (gdp and CINC19) in addition to the control variables (military alliances, MID, 
imports and exports, Catholic, Protestant, Islam, Hindu, Buddhist, non-religious, 
unemployment, gdpgrowth and midcount). I wanted to find out how much soft power use 
variation can only the resource variables explain. The result showed that the Resource 
Model (Model 1) can explain 21 % of the soft power reliance variation (See Table 4.3).  
Model 1 also showed that gdp and CINC are statistically significant indicators and that 
gdp is negatively correlated with soft power use. In addition, the results revealed that 
CINC is positively correlated with countries’ soft power reliance.  
 
 
19 Because GDP and CINC are both resource variables, I tested a Model with each of the 
variables without the other, to see if the Model was still significant. I found that the 





Table 4.3 Resource and the Institutional OLS Regression Models on Soft Power Use 
Percent as a Dependent Variable (1995-2010).  
 








Military alliance -9.11** -8.77** 
MID 0.80 1.00 
Imports 0.00** 4.60e06 
Exports -0.00* 2.03e-06 
Unemployment .21* .17 
Protestant -2.23 -4.01 
Catholic -1.44 -1.47 
Islam -3.9 -2.99 
Buddhism 32.12** 10.02* 
Hindu -1066.13** -1048.633** 
Non-religious 18.10** 17.68** 
GDP Growth 0.25* .25* 
MID Count -1.31 -1.26* 
Cons 89.00 92.68 
 
R² .2063 .1898 
Obs. 598 598 
Notes: *p< .10   **p< .05  Significance: p > 0.05  
          This means that a lower gdp and a larger military capability both reduces soft power 
use. In other words, according to the analysis, poor countries use more soft power and 
countries with more military capabilities also rely more on soft power actions. This is an 
intuitive finding as countries with more military capability probably feel that they do not 
need to use soft power tools as much because they view their military tools as more 
effective in international interactions than soft power instruments. With respect to poorer 
countries using more soft power actions, this finding makes sense soft power instrument 





          In Model 2 (Institutional) using a multivariable OLS regression again, I only 
observed the institutional variable’s (polity) impact on soft power use. The results 
showed that polity is not a statistically significant variable and it is negatively correlated 
with soft power use. This confirms my expectation that countries with lower democracy 
scores rely more on soft power use. The results based on Model 2’s R² value was slightly 
higher at 0.19. This meant that none of these two competing theories represented by the 
appropriate variables were able to explain more than 21 % of democracies’ variation in 
soft power use which result suggested that I keep looking for more robust results. 
In order to capture the effects of each individual country in the regression and to 
avoid unobserved heterogeneity, I ran fixed effect estimators on Model 1 and on Model 2. 
The result can be seen in Table 4.4 in Models 3 and 4 respectively.  The fixed effects 
estimator revealed that when the unique qualities of each country is taken into account, 













Table 4.4 Resources and Institutional OLS Regression Models with fixed effects 
estimators on Soft Power Use Percent as a Dependent Variable (1995-2010).  
 




Trust   
Polity -.01 
GDP -5.22e-13  
CINC 7.93  
Military Alliance -5.41* -5.45* 
MID -.25 .74 
MID Count -.25 -0.25 
Imports -5.56e-07 -3.88-06 
Exports 3.88e-07 5.39e-06 
Unemployment .15 .15 
GDP Growth .15* 0.15* 
Protestant .39 5.55 
Catholic .96 1.19 
Islam -3.96 -3.60 
Buddhism 14.55 12.73 
Hindu -739.21* -744.65* 
Non-religious .96 .74* 
Cons 87.06 87.08 
  
Obs. 598 598 
Notes: *p< .10   **p< .05 
Significance: p > 0.05  
           4.4.2 MODELS 5 AND 6 TESTING SOCIAL TRUST’S IMPACT 
  The research question of my dissertation is how does social trust impact soft power 
use?  According to my theory and hypothesis, social trust is positively correlated with 
soft power use. Including social trust in the multivariable regression therefore was 
supposed to increase the strength of the model and provide more robust results. With my 
final regression models (Table 4.5 Models 5 and 6), I tested the correlations between 
social trust and countries’ percentage of soft power actions including all other control 
variables. The results of Model 5 indicated that social trust is positively correlated with 




5 also revealed that military alliance, protestant, Hindu and Non-religious were also 
strong indicators of soft power use. Finally, to capture the unique effects of each country 
in the regression and to avoid unobserved heterogeneity, I ran a mixed effect estimator in 
Model 6. Since my linear regression was not using log likelihood, I ran a mixed effect 
estimator. The command in Stata treats everything as fixed effect unless it is otherwise 
specified. As Table 4.5. shows in Model 6 social trust is negatively correlated with soft 
power use and it is not statistically significant. The change from a positive to a negative 
correlation also indicates the lack of robustness of social trust on soft power use.  
Table 4.5 OLS Regression Models with Mixed Effects Estimators on Soft Power Use 
Percent as a Dependent Variable and Social Trust as the Independent Variable (1995-
2010)  









Military Alliance -7.87** -5.55* 
MID 1.03 0.75 
MID Count -1.06 -.25 
Imports 1.15e-06 -3.87e-06 
Exports 5.86e-06 5.49e-06 
Unemployment .16 0.14 
GDP Growth .25* -.25 
Protestant -6.44* 6.16 
Catholic - 2.13 1.19 
Islam -2.51 -3.91 
Buddhism .04 13.05 
Hindu -1029.39** -754.38* 
Non-religious 15.73** 1.11 
Cons 89.42 87.56 
 
R2 0.18





 This also means that Model 5 confirmed my hypothesis that countries with higher 
trust in the population use more soft power in their foreign policies. I also learned that 
social trust’s statistical impact is not significant. Further, the coefficients of Model 5 
indicate that one unit increase in social trust leads to 1.07% increase in countries’ soft 
power use. In addition, Model 6 showed that after running mixed effects, the coefficient 
of social trust changed to negative indicating the weak correlation.  
In addition to comparing the R² s of each of my models, also wanted to compare 
their BIC’s (Bayesian Information Criterion), therefore the final step in my statistical 
analysis was to complete my model selection using the BIC (Bayesian Information 
Criterion) number for each model. There are two ways to read the BIC numbers. One is 
to compare the BIC numbers of each of my models to compare the robustness of each 
(when log likelihood is used). As Table 4.6 shows, Model 1 has the lowest BIC number 
there’re it is the most robust of the three. The second way to understand the BIC numbers 
is to compare the BIC number changes between Models 1 and 3 and Models 2 and 3 and 
look for the largest (larger than 10) change between two models. In this case, as we can 
see there is not a significant change in the BIC numbers between Model 2 and 5 but there 
is a significant change between Model 1 and 5. Stated differently, compared with the 
most robust model, which is Resource Model (1), the Institutional Model (2) produced 
the least robust result. Also, comparing the Resource Model (1) with the Social Trust 
Model (5), we can see that based on the BIC numbers, the Resource Model (1) is more 







Table 4.6 Model Selection. Comparing BIC Numbers 
  
 Overall, the real importance of my statistical analysis is that I was the first soft 
power scholar to test social trust value’s impact on countries’ soft power reliance. More 
specifically, I was able to test the statistical impact of the variation of a normative value 
(social trust) on countries’ soft power reliance over a 16-year timeframe. While my 
results do not support my hypothesis about trust’s robust impact on democracies’ soft 
power patterns, but my statistical analysis also showed that the resources and institutions 
can only provide about 20% explanation about soft power variation. This raises the 
question of what other variables must be examined in the future. Based on my results, I 
would start looking into democracies resources. I am inspired by the results and the lack 
of explanatory power of the included variables to keep searching for the explanatory 
variable that will tell soft power scholars much more about countries’ soft power use.  
 It is interesting to note here that one of my control variables, military alliances 
proved to be statistically significant and negatively correlated with soft power use. In my 
case studies comparing Finland high soft power user (94%) and New Zealand low soft 
power user (65%) I found that in these two countries’ Finland had no military alliances 
and the government relies on high soft power, while New Zealand, which had military 
 BIC Number of Observation 
Model 1 Resources 4556.704 598 
Model 2 Institutional 4569.058 598 




alliances uses soft power actions to a much lower level.  A larger n study focusing on the 
impact of military alliances could explain more of the negative correlation. 
 Overall, I offered a new operational framework to studying soft power instrument 
use. This is an innovative academic step as previous literature struggled with separating 
and measuring countries’ soft power reliance. What leads to such variation in soft power 
usage is the main research question of this dissertation. My statistical analysis revealed 
that social trust is not a statistically significant factor in soft power use, and I have also 
learned that the institutional and the resource-based models were also not robust enough. 
This means that new variables need to be found and tested to better explain why 
countries’ use soft power tools. Based on the statistical results, the resource route is the 
more promising one, as polity remained insignificant. Perhaps future analysis can study 
the impact of countries’ soft power budgets. 
4.6 LIMITATIONS 
 One of the main limitations of using the ICEWS data set is that not every kind of 
interaction is recorded in it. For instance, drone strikes are not represented. Athletic 
interactions and cultural events between countries usually constitutes soft power actions, 
however, these are also excluded from the dataset. Perhaps future changes made to the 
TABARI dictionary could include official athletic exchanges and events such as hosting a 
multilateral mega sport event like the Olympics or simply include leaders and diplomats 






 Finally, a conceptual limitation of this project is that it only focuses on means of 
power and does not address other important dimensions such as scope, domain and 
weight. A future project needs to incorporate those dimensions into the analysis of 













































MOST-SIMILAR CASE DESIGN: FINLAND AND NEW ZEALAND. WHY 




In Chapter 4, I outlined factors that may impact countries’ soft power use and 
using statistical models I tested their impact. The results revealed that social trust has a 
positive impact on soft power use in my 51 democratic countries, but the statistical model 
was only able to explain about 18% of the soft power use variation. In order to 
understand what other factors impact the use of soft power instruments, I now turn to a 
qualitative approach in the form of a most-similar case design to study in-depth the 
already included factors and to explore previously left out independent variables.  
5.1 CASE SELECTION AND THE MOST-SIMILAR CASE DESIGN 
 There are 51 democracies in my dataset that are spread out geographically in all 
five continents and have diverse economic and institutional characteristics. In my sample 
there are 28 European, 12 from the Americas, 7 Asian, 1 Middle-Eastern, 2 Australian 
and 1 African nation. Finland and New Zealand have been selected for a most-similar 
case design for the following reasons. 
In terms of their general geographically, political and economic indicators, 
Finland and New Zealand are similar in the following ways: geographically they are both 
considered small countries. Finland is 338,145 km² with the population of 5.5 million. 




In addition, according to my statistical analysis, both countries have similar 
values in the independent variables. More specifically, both countries score high on social 
trust (Finland has 2.04 and New Zealand has 1.88) and both countries are considered 
wealthy. The average GDP of Finland for the observed time-frame (1995-2010) was 180 
Billion USD while for New Zealand it was 90 Billion USD. In terms of their military 
capabilities, both countries have low CINC values (Finland is 0.002 and New Zealand is 
0.0008). Finally, both countries are strong democracies receiving a perfect 10 scores on 
the Polity scale (Polity IV). Table 5.1 shows the comparison of these independent 
variables.  
Table 5.1 Average values for the main interdepend variables from the statistical analysis 
for time period of 1995-2010. GDP is in current USD.  
 Social Trust GDP CINC Polity 
Finland 2.04 1.80E+11 0.0020 10 
New Zealand 1.88 9.03E+10 0.0008 10 
Scale min -0.46 1.97E+09 0 -10 
Scale max 2.18 1.50E+13 1 10 
 
 
Despite their similarities in their independent variables, Finland and New Zealand 
vastly differ in their soft power outcomes. Out of the 51 democracies included in this 
study, Finland established itself as a high soft power user country by relying on 94% soft 
power use.  New Zealand, on the other hand belongs to the low soft power user group 
with 68% soft power use. I turn to a most-similar case design to explore what factors led 




 The most-similar case design can evaluate pairs of cases in various ways in order to 
isolate the differences between them (Lijphart 1971, Collier 1993). In the cases of 
Finland and New Zealand, both have similar values on their independent variables which 
allows for the isolation of new independent variables. Finland has a threatening neighbor 
and this geopolitical situation has been deeply impacting Finnish foreign policy. On the 
other hand, New Zealand seems to be buffered from threat by its peaceful neighbors.  In 
this section I will further explore these differences.  
 International relation literature has offered an alternative explanation regarding the 
geopolitical differences between countries. Specifically, realist literature suggests that a 
country that perceives threat will seek to form alliances (Walt 1985). The political elite of 
the country that is being threatened will create a narrative that emphasizes national 
security and the need to form alliances for protection (Zhu 2012). The alliance formation 
serves as a defense mechanism against the perceived threat. This is called balancing 
(Walt 1985).  
 In terms of soft power use this means that countries that feel threatened may use 
soft power instruments to create a climate of attractions and a web of personal ties. The 
high level of positive interaction between countries makes alliance formation more likely. 
Specifically, this means that using a most-similar case design, I will evaluate if Finland 
has a high soft power use as a reaction to its threating neighbor (Russia), while the lack of 







5.2 EXPLAINING THE DIFFERENCES IN SOFT POWER USE 
  In search of stronger soft power use indicators, I turned to the foreign policy 
literature, which have pointed to alternative factors. One of them was geopolitics. 
According to the literature, geopolitical threat can make countries take actions that are 
designed to mitigate the threatening neighbor (Clerk 2015, Sberro 2015, Moisio 1998, 
Browning 2002). In international relations threat has been defined as a situation in which 
one agent or group has either the capability or intention to inflict a negative consequence 
on another agent or group (Davis 2000, 10). Realist and neorealist literature have also 
suggested that when a country is framed as a strong military power, it will impact the 
others by causing them to perceive them as a threat (Sherif 1966, Levine and Campbell 
1972, Waltz 1979, Mearsheimer 2001).  
 Realist literature also suggested that states that appear aggressive can make others 
react with the goal of strengthening alliances against this perceived threat. This is called 
balancing (Walt 1985). When the aggressor is believed to be unalterably aggressive, 
balancing with others is also the best way to avoid becoming a victim20 (Langer 1950, 
Walt 1985). In this chapter I theorize that threatened countries are more likely to use a 
high level of soft power to balance out the strong regional threat by trying to build 
alliances.  
 It is also one of the underlying assumptions of this theory that a large number of 
soft power interactions with other countries can enhance alliance building by creating, 
what Nye (2011) called a climate of attractions and a web of personal ties. The high level 
 
20 Walt (1985) specifically used Finland as a country that bandwagons but I argue that in 




of positive interaction between countries makes alliance formation more likely. In terms 
of my most-similar case design, this means that, according to my theory, Finland should 
be expected to use a large number of soft power actions to balance against the perceived 
Russian threat, while without having an aggressive neighbor, New Zealand relies on a 
low number of soft power actions.  
 Further, international relations literature has also suggested that major geopolitical 
actors, such as Russia, create a situation in which the political elite of the neighboring 
countries perceives them as an existential threat (Zhu 2012). The political elite consists of 
people with a voice in the political process for example presidents, prime ministers, 
ministers and directors of key political institutions. In order to communicate this threat to 
the public and to policy makers, the political elite creates a narrative that emphasizes 
national security and frequent interaction with other countries (Moisio 1998) as well as 
the importance of alliances building in the form of balancing (Walt 1985).  
 The political elite’s narrative also supports the creation and expansion of the 
institutions and programs which results in a political and institutional commitment of 
high soft power use in foreign policy. As a result, governments that are facing a threat, 
create soft power institutions, which strengthen their alliances using programs that build 
bridges and enhance the connections between governments. For this reason, the history 
of the programs signals the age of each soft power program and possible reveals path 
dependency.  
 When programs exist for many years, this can create a self-reinforcing process 
which results in the continuation of the program for a long time instead of its cancelation 




This process is captured well by the concept of increasing returns (Pierson 2000). 
Increasing returns means that the probability of further steps along the same path 
increases with each move down that path because the relative benefits of the same steps 
compared to a new direction increases over time (Pierson 2000). Stated differently, the 
longer a program is in place, the more likely it is that they will remain in use and thus 
they enhance the country’s soft power use abroad. This can also lead to an institutional 
commitment of high soft power use. On the other hand, where the soft power institutions 
have not been created, like in New Zealand, there cannot be the same degree of 
institutional commitment to soft power use. 
 Finally, allocating national budget to soft power programs is also closely related 
to the political elite’s narrative and it can also reveal path dependency. Because of the 
political elite’s narrative about the constant threat to their national security, and the need 
to strengthen alliances, this defensive narrative builds into the budget calculation and 
increases the amount of funds approved for soft power programs. This often results in a 
lock-in mechanism, which makes it more likely that the government will continue to fund 
these programs instead of canceling them. As the later section of this chapter illustrates 
Finland spends over 2% of its national budget on soft power programs, which is a high 
percentage. On the other hand, New Zealand spends less than 0.04% on its soft power 
programs annually, which represents a low soft power budget. The consistent and high 
soft power budget allocation signals the general policy direction of the government21 
(Jones et al. 2009). In the cases of high soft power user countries, the political leadership 
 
21 Changes in the distribution of budgetary outcomes in crucial to the study of policy 
changes (Jones et al. 2009) and in in this dissertation indicates a change in the support of 




funds soft power programs well and consistently with the intention of balancing against 
the threat by strengthening alliances. In other words, high soft power budget leads to high 
soft power use.  
 Overall, in countries with a threating neighbor, the political elite is likely to 
emphasize the importance of national security and alliance building, constructing a 
narrative that influences institutions and the federal budget allocation. Based on this 
theory, when a country perceives a threat, the political elite constructs a narrative that 
promotes alliance building. In order to build alliances, the threatened country uses soft 
power instruments by creating soft power programs and funding them well. The longer 
this narrative persists over time, the resulting soft power programs will become bigger 
and a normal part of the country’s foreign policy. In countries such as in New Zealand 
where some or all of these factors are missing, the country is expected to use less soft 
power. 
 In the next section first, I discuss Finland’s and New Zealand’s geopolitics with 
special attention to the perception of threat. Second, I turn to the narrative of the political 
elite to find out if it indicates a perception of threat and whether it constructs foreign 
policy goals that emphasize national security, alliance building and balancing. Third, I 
study soft power institutions and programs to see if they support the alliance building 
goals and to see if they have been in existence for a long time. Fourth, I collect budget 
information from each selected soft power programs and study the amount and the 
consistency of such budget allocations in order to establish if the budget is provided to 




factors and soft power use and answer the question: why does Finland (94%) use so much 
more soft power than New Zealand (68%)?  
5.3 FINNISH SOFT POWER  
 The statistical analysis showed that Finland is one of the highest soft power user 
countries (94%). This means that, out of 100 international interactions, the Finnish 
government selects soft power instruments 94 times. Finland has been known for its 
stable government, high living standards, successful private companies such as 22Nokia 
and video games like Angry Birds. 
5.4 GEOPOLITICS OF FINLAND  
 Based on my theory, geopolitics impacts countries’ foreign policy including its soft 
power use. For this reason, Finland is said to be one of the best cases to illustrate the 
influence of geopolitics in foreign policy (Moisio 1998). Finland’s location on the map 
has been shaping its foreign policy even before the Cold War (Moisio 1998). Finland’s 
geopolitical history with Russia began with the formation of the Finnish nation and 
territory as an autonomous quasi-state under the Russian Empire (1809-1917) (Moisio 
1998) and continued with Finland’s independence in 1917 (Browning 2002). During this 
time, Finnish autonomy was threatened by the rising Russian empire (Apunen and 
Rytövuori 1982). While Finland became an independent sovereign state in 1917, the 
Russian threat did not disappear. 
  In 1939, Germany and the Soviet Union signed a nonaggression pact, which 
included a secret protocol transferring Finland to the Soviet sphere of interest. When 
 
22 While private soft power resources are also part of a country’s soft power resources, 




Finland refused to allow the Soviet Union to build military bases on its territory, the 
Soviets attacked Finland. The “Winter War” ended in a peace treaty drawn up in Moscow 
on March 13, 1940, giving southeastern Finland to the Soviet Union (This is Finland. 
History. 2019). The Soviets did not give up their future plans to occupy the Finnish 
capital until 1944. That is when the border between Finland and Russia were finalized 
based on the lines where the military front lines were stabilized late in summer of 1944 
(Apunen and Rytövuori 1982). While Finland lost some of its territory, it was able to 
preserve its independence and was forced to handle the continued threat from Russia for 
the years to come. 
 After WWII, the Soviet leaders made it clear that they do not tolerate any hostile 
governments on their borders (Apunen and Rytövuori 1982). This approach was accepted 
at the Yalta conference (Tuomo 1980, Apunen and Rytövuori 1982). As a result of the 
great powers’ acceptance of such concept, in order to defend its autonomy from the 
Soviet Union, Finland carefully formulated a sophisticated foreign policy in 1948 
(Apunen and Rytövuori 1982). According to this plan, Finland dealt with the perceived 
threat from the USSR by staying neutral and did not join the Western defense community 
(Apunen and Rytövuori 1982). 
 The Finnish proximity and history with Russia have led to the development of the 
perception of threat (Apunen and Rytövuori 1982, Moller and Bjereld 2010). Since 
Finland’s national security has been threatened for over two centuries by the Russian 
geographic proximity, the main Finnish foreign policy goal was to protect the country 
from an invasion by not provoking any forceful actions from Russia. And since Finland 




Russia with its non-aggressive soft power tools. For this reason, the Finnish leadership 
decided to react to the perceived threat by building alliances with the West. As a result, 
Finland learned to use soft power to strengthen its alliances in order to protect itself from 
Russia (and the Soviet Union) (Apunen and Rytövuori 1982, Browning 2002).  
5.5 THE FINNISH POLITICAL ELITE’S NARRATIVE-HOW FINLAND BALANCES 
WITH SOFT POWER 
 My theory suggests that the political elite’s narrative plays a key role in countries’ 
soft power use. As it was explained before, the Finnish political elite is expected to 
construct a narrative that directs Finnish foreign policy to alliance building against the 
perceived Russian threat. Specifically, in this section I am looking for indications of the 
Finnish elite’s concern about the threat and the encouragement of international alliances. 
In other words, I am looking for indicators of the Finnish government’s balancing with its 
soft power actions.  
In Finland, presidents play a crucial role in foreign policy. As part of the political 
elite, their narrative is represented in the foreign policy formulation and their agendas and 
soft power policies can increase or decrease soft power use. Finland is a parliamentary 
representative democracy. The head of state is the President who is also in charge of 
foreign policy. This means that the use of soft power to achieve foreign policy goals is 
also vested in the hand of the President. This section will highlight some of the 
presidents’ speeches to study if there is a national security threat present and if they were 
likely to rely on soft power instruments in order to create alliances. This section will also 
look at the alliance that were formed during this time-period to see if they were created to 




 After Finland earned its independence from Russia in 1917, and later after WWII 
the great powers agreed that Finland cannot be allowed to become hostile to the USSR, it 
was the job of the Finnish presidents to promote a carefully designed foreign policy in 
which they do not provoke the aggressive Russian neighbor. As President Kekkonen said 
in 1956, Finland will not and cannot pursue good relations with the West at the expense 
of its relations with the Soviet Union (Apunen and Rytövuaki 1982). 
As a result of the Russian threat, this carefully crafted foreign policy of balancing 
with Finnish soft power continued after the Cold War by future presidents with additional 
goals. The new Finnish foreign policy included an E.U. integration, increased 
engagement with international organizations and the support of an E.U. common security 
and defense policy in the form of peacekeeping operations (Palosaari 2013). All of these 
goals required high interactions with other countries.  
President Ahtisaari was elected president (1994-2000) at a historical moment in 
Finland’s life which also altered its foreign policy. This moment was Finland’s E.U. 
membership in 1995 which also changed a policy of neutrality into a policy of E.U. 
integration (Browning 2008, Palosaari 2013). In terms of President’s narrative in foreign 
policy, in 1994 he stated the following in light of its effort to gain E.U. membership: 
“Yesterday’s tools are not sufficient to solve the future’s problems. […] In history all 
upheavals had an impact on Finland’s security. This was particularly true during and after 
the Second World War. Communism collapsed and the bipolar system yielded. […]. New 
tools and new shared views are needed to deal with the new security challenges of 
Europe. […] An important part of this Northern dimension is the 800 miles of land border 
that we share with Russia. With Finland in the E.U. and Russia will meet at this point. 
[…] Ladies and gentlemen, Finland is a firm advocate of cooperative security. […] We 
favor closer cooperation and joint efforts by all democratic states not only in Europe but 





The above-referenced speech illustrates President Ahtisaari’s narrative about 
Finland’s national security issues connected to Russia. More specifically the speech 
shows that the 800 miles of shared border between Russia and Finland together with 
Russia’s historically aggressive behavior in the region still causes a perceived threat for 
the Finnish political elite. The speech also explains the government’s new direction 
towards E.U. integration. Regarding the threat from Russia, a closer membership and 
cooperation with the European community strengthens Finnish alliances with all other 26 
members and connects Finland with the West. In terms of soft power, this meant that 
President Ahtisaari’s main foreign policy promoted soft power use with E.U. members as 
well as strengthened Finland’s global mediator role on the world stage (Browning 2018).  
The fact that during the Ahtisaari presidency Finland became member of the E.U 
and engaged in numerous crisis management and peacekeeping operations further 
illustrates this foreign policy shift (Browning 2008). Based on the conceptualization of 
this dissertation providing peacekeeping operations is a soft power action, Finland found 
another way to use soft power to build alliances without provoking Russia. For instance, 
some of these peace keeping operations included the Concordia operation in Macedonia 
in 2003 and the Althea operation in Bosnia in 2004 (Palosaari 2013). By actively 
supporting the stabilization of the Balkan, Finland showed that they were reliable 
partners of European nations. This tightened its alliances within Europe and signaled to 
the world that Finland is a reliable ally.  
In terms of building new alliances, Finland continued to join alliances after the 
Cold War (Moller and Bjereld 2010). In fact, by 2000 the Correlates of War IGO 




greatest number of alliances of all countries (Pevenhouse et al 2004). Stated differently, 
looking at the new alliance memberships of Finland, since the Cold War ended, the 
Finnish presidents’ foreign policy encouraged and implemented high soft power use to 
build alliances regionally and globally.  
 Tarja Halonen (200-2012) followed Ahtisaari as President. She was a Foreign 
Minister before becoming the 11th President of Finland. In terms of using a narrative that 
points to the Russian threat, the below speech illustrates that national security has 
remained a key issue in her speeches as well. In a meeting of ambassadors in 2002, 
President Halonen stated the following about Finland’s international engagement: 
“I am a supporter of multilateralism on both a global and a European level. In the existing 
crisis-management tradition we have many actors. On the global level, the UN still holds 
an overwhelmingly dominant position. We are actively participating in the development 
of a common foreign and security policy.” (Halonen 2002) 
 
As the above speech indicates, Halonen’s foreign policy’s general goal was to 
maximize Finnish influence abroad by using peaceful instruments (Haukkala 2010). 
Specifically, this meant that President Halonen’s government used all diplomatic tolls 
necessary to secure a seat at most international organizations, especially within the E.U. 
(Haukkala 2010). By achieving and strengthening Finland’s E.U. membership, Halonen 
also strengthen Finland’s connections and alliances within the European community. As 
the speech stated, one of Finland’s main foreign policy goal is to keep working with 
international organizations. In the same speech Halonen also noted:  
“I see Europe as being better at development work than at using force. It is better at 
managing crises than at waging wars. […] Finland has been active, both alone and 
together with Sweden and other countries which are not members of military alliances, in 
the development of European security policy.[…] In reality, independently taking care of 
crisis management in Europe is already a very demanding task for the E.U. and its 





President Halonen’s preferences of non-coercive foreign policy tools have also 
been recorded (Doeser 2017). Specifically, Halonen continued the previous 
administration’s peaceful approach and favored political, humanitarian and civilian 
efforts to resolve conflict, and while the narrative of threat and national security 
persisted, Finland’s foreign policy direction also states the preference for non-hard 
power-based tools and demonstrates the goal of alliance building. 
In terms of Finland’s NATO membership, the issue had come up numerous times 
during Halonen’s presidential campaign and during her tenure. Halonen and the Finnish 
leadership decided that Finland would not join NATO (Doeser 2017). It is interesting to 
note that due to its close location to Russia, Finland to date has still not joined NATO but 
instead focused its foreign policy towards promoting a strong international role for 
Finland23 (Browning 2008). It must also be stated here that the last two presidents’ 
speeches mention Russia as an in important actor in the context of national security, crisis 
management and conflict. This suggests that the Finnish political elite continues to be 
worried about the Russian threat and this concern builds into their narratives and 
speeches. 
Overall, by studying the political speeches of Finnish presidents as part of the 
political elite, it became apparent that they include national security as one of the main 
issues in foreign policy. The speeches also implied the Russian threat. In addition, they 
all favored an outgoing foreign policy in which Finland builds alliances in Western 
 
23 Also important to note that slightly before the time-frame of this dissertation, based on 
COW data, Finland has only signed one military agreement, and that was a non-
aggression agreement with Russia in 1992. This agreement allowed Finland to proceed 
towards its E.U. membership. It can also been seen as a great foreign policy win for 




Europe and beyond (Doeser 2017). In terms of soft power actions, this meant that the 
presidents were creating the narrative that encouraged soft power actions to engage with 
the world in order to build alliances. These narratives ultimately resulted in high soft 
power use. 
5.6 SOFT POWER PROGRAMS AND INSTITUTIONS OF FINLAND  
My theory suggests that in countries where there is a perception of threat, the 
political elite creates a narrative that leads to the creation of soft power institutions and 
programs with the goal of strengthening alliances. My theory also suggests that by 
balancing with soft power, the creation of such programs ultimately can lead to 
institutional and political commitment to use high level of soft power in foreign policy. 
For this reason, in this section I identify the Finnish soft power institutions and programs, 
discuss the reasons they were created and trace how the programs have developed over 
time. The goal is to reveal any connections between the elite’s narrative about national 
security issues caused by the Russians and the level of soft power use via these 
institutions. 
   In order to better understand the Finnish government’s strategic priorities in soft 
power and to find out if there is an institutional and political commitment to high soft 
power use in this section, I turn to the analysis of soft power programs to reveal which 
Finnish programs support alliance building using soft power tools. I also study the time-
span of the programs to find out if they have been in existence for a long-time. In order to 




documents about the Finnish government’s long-term programs24. In addition, I refer to 
articles on foreign policy analysis to evaluate Finnish soft power use facilitated by 
government programs.  
Even though there is no specific soft power program or department within the 
Finnish government, the evaluation of the below listed programs reveals their soft power 
elements. In the Finnish government’s budget documents, I found that some of the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs’ (MFA) programs and some of the Ministry of Education 
and Culture’s (MEC) programs were compatible with my soft power definition. The 
following list presents the found soft power institutions and programs starting with the 
oldest and ending with the newest.  
Ministry for Foreign Affairs Programs (MFA) 
o The Foreign Service (1918) 
o International Development Cooperation (1988) 
o Neighboring Area Cooperation (short-term) 
o Civilian Crisis Management (1990s) 
o Cooperation with Central and Eastern Europe, Russia and other CIS 
Countries (short-term) 
o Commercial-Industrial Cooperation (short-term) 
o Unit for Public Diplomacy (2008) 
 
Ministry of Education and Culture Programs (MEC)  
o The Sports Department (1966) 
o Art and Culture (1974) 
o International Cooperation (1974) 
 Finnish Cultural and Academic Institute (2005) 
o Cultural, Museum and Library Activities (1990s) 
 
As this list of soft power programs show, in Finland there are 2 ministries and 12 
programs that are practicing soft power in order to support Finnish foreign policy efforts. 
 
24 There are also short-term programs such as Neighboring Area Cooperation, 
Cooperation with Central and Eastern European, Russia and CIS Countries, Commercial- 





In the next section, I will evaluate the 2 ministries (Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Ministry 
of Education and Culture) to reveal how they facilitate Finnish soft power use with their 
long-term programs25. 
5.6.1 MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MFA)  
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is the main Finnish institution that is 
designed to support the Finish government’s foreign policy including its soft power use. 
This means that while not all of the Ministry’s programs use soft power abroad, the 
selected programs use soft power to achieve foreign policy goals. In the next section, I 
will evaluate the main mission of each ministry looking for the goal of alliance building, 
reveal the year it was created and discuss some of their programs that use soft power.  
According to the official website of the MFA of Finland, their central task is to 
build a secure and predictable future for all Finns (Finland. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Mission. 2019). In addition, part of the mission statement on the ministry’s website also 
explains the country’s foreign and security policy which focus on preserving Finland’s 
independence.  
The establishment of Finnish Foreign Affairs representation started very early, 
during the imperial Russia’s rule over Finland. While Finland was not an independent 
sovereign country yet, Finns used the diplomatic services of the Russian embassies as 
early as 1858 (The History of Foreign Affairs Administration in Finland). The 
independent Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs was first created in 1918, under the 
name of Foreign Affairs Bureau right after Finland became an independent country (The 
 
25 The short-term programs will not be discussed as they do not represent well the long-




History of Foreign Affairs Administration 1). The Ministry’s goals were to organize 
Finland’s official relations with the foreign media and to spread general information 
about the country, its people, history, culture and the economy (Clerk 2014, Clerk 2015, 
Ipatti 2018). These functions promoted Finnish attractiveness abroad and its ability to 
strengthened alliances since 1918. Creating these soft power programs built a strong 
foundation for Finnish soft power use in foreign policy. 
Between 1918 and 1955, the Finnish MFA continued to strengthen its cultural 
relations with the West while dealing with the Russian threat from the East. From the late 
1930s through the end of the Cold War, two main factors impacted Finnish soft power 
use abroad. These were the Soviet Union’s attack in 1939 and the diplomatic and 
strategic balancing of Finland’s neutrality during the Cold War (Clerk 2015, Sberro 
2015). During the Cold War the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ goal was to communicate 
Finland’s political neutrality while maintain its cultural ties with the West by projecting 
its attractiveness (Browning 2002, Clerc 2015, Ipatti 2018). Maintaining cultural ties and 
projecting Finnish attractiveness are key aspects government’s strategic use of soft power 
in order to balance against the Russian threat and build alliances with the West. 
The duties related to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs increased greatly from 1955 
for three reasons. With new independent countries emerging after decolonization of 
French, Dutch, Spanish, Portuguese and British colonies, Finland began to establish 
political and commercial relations beyond the borders of Europe. Also, Finnish 
international cooperation started to expand from the traditional areas into science, 
technology, education and social affairs. In terms of foreign policy this meant that 




its soft power it was to balance against it. For this reason, Finland needed a robust 
ministry to handle its international negotiations and its soft power use.  
After Finland's accession to the United Nations in 1955, the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs’ involvement with various international and regional organizations, including 
economic cooperation programs greatly increased. Even more importantly for soft power 
use, within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1987 and 1988, new departments were 
created to support development, cooperation, press, and culture (The History of Foreign 
Affairs Administration 1). These functions are the core of soft power use. As a result, in 
1988 the Department for Development Cooperation was created and became the first soft 
power program within the MFA. 
5.6.1.2 FOREIGN SERVICE 
 The other major department within the MFA that supports Finnish soft power use 
is the Foreign Service. While the main mission of the Foreign Service is to conduct 
traditional diplomacy, it is also the most visible outposts of Finnish foreign policy 
conducted abroad. The Finnish Foreign Service was first created in 1918 with the 
formation of the Foreign Affairs Bureau to support the foreign missions and their 
diplomats abroad (The History of Foreign Affairs 1). The official government website 
describes the following as the Finnish Foreign Services strategic priorities: Foreign and 
security policy aims to strengthen Finland’s international position, desires to secure 
Finland’s independence and regional integrity (Strategic Priorities 1). In order to achieve 
these goals, diplomats and other foreign service personnel are carrying out the Finnish 





In terms of soft power use, in addition to traditional diplomatic missions, the 
Finish MFA has clearly stated that Finland wants to be a key player in the global 
community by supporting attractive global issues such as global warming and poverty. 
By supporting global problems Finland also works in cooperation with other 
governments organizations thus strengthening its international alliances (Moller and 
Bjereld 2010).  
5.6.1.3 INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION 
 The Department for Development Cooperation (DDC) was created in 1988 within 
the MFA and to date serves as the first Finnish soft power program within the MFA. The 
Program of International Development Cooperation ensures that Finland implements its 
development policy by cooperating with international partners, including international 
organizations and NGOs, in order to achieve development goals (Goals and Principles 1). 
As the official website of the MFA states, via development cooperation, Finland has been 
strengthening its dialog with international organizations and with its allies (Goals and 
Principles 1). In terms of Finnish soft power use, this means that Finland has been relying 
on its development policy’s execution to strengthen its alliances internationally and 
regionally. With close cooperation with the United Nations, Finland also strengthens its 
role in the global community which is also the largest international alliance in the world.  
5.6.1.4 CIVILIAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT 
Finland takes an active part in international civilian crisis management since the 
beginning of 1990’s implemented by the European union (EU), the United Nations (UN), 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), NATO and the European 




towards respect for the rule of law and human rights, democracy, good governance and a 
well-functioning civil society in the target regions. The MFA is responsible for the 
political guidance of civilian crisis management and decides in which operations Finnish 
experts participate (Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Crisis Management 1). Civilian crisis 
management operations are conducted in crisis areas and other regions in which the most 
critical functions of society are in need. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Crisis Management 
1). By providing assistance to countries in crisis, Finland strengthens its international role 
as a reliable ally. By focusing on the civilian aspect of crisis management, the Finnish 
government is using its careful strategy to balance against the Russian force.  
5.6.1.5 UNIT FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 
The MFA’s Public Diplomacy program has been renamed many times, but since 
2008 it has been called the Unit for Public Diplomacy. This department plans the Finnish 
country branding in the foreign service (Finland. Unit for Public Diplomacy 1). Finnish 
public diplomacy (which is a form of soft power use) is a type of strategic 
communication in order to strengthen international networks in various sectors such as in 
cultural exports, education, innovation policy, immigration, or even in the environmental 
field. This work is accomplished through media and culture in addition to other means of 
promotion and influence. The emphasis and strategic application of public diplomacy is 
an important factor that suggest the Finnish government’s ability to rely on soft power 
instruments in its foreign policies. The creation of the Unit for Public Diplomacy in 2008 
also indicates that the Finnish government has been strategically using soft power 




The MFA has been overseeing other important short-term soft power programs as 
well including the Neighboring Cooperation, Cooperation with Central and Eastern 
European, Russia and other CIS Countries, and the Commercial-Industrial Cooperation. 
As this brief historical overview of the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ programs 
revealed, the Finnish government had over 31 (since 1988) years to develop its 
institutions and foreign policy mechanism for representing the Finnish interest abroad 
using soft power. As the above overview also revealed, Finland’s main foreign policy 
goals of connecting with the West and building alliances (Sberro 2007, Browning 2008). 
All these foreign policy goals require the existence of many programs, which overall 
boosts soft power use.  
5.6.2 MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND CULTURE (MEC) 
The second ministry that actively supports soft power programs to achieve foreign 
policy goals is the Ministry of Education and Culture (MEC). The formation of Finnish 
international cultural policy goes back to the 1970s. In 1974 the Bill for the Promotion of 
Municipal Cultural Activities articulated three objectives, one of which was the 
promotion of international cultural cooperation (Kangas 2001). Later in 1999, the new 
directions of cultural policy, especially regarding the role of the cultural industries in a 
strategy of economic development were also written into the official program by the 
Finnish government (1999). According to this new direction, art played a crucial role in 
Finland’s international outreach (Kangas 2001) and as such enhanced soft power use.  
The MEC is responsible for the development of education, science, cultural, sport, 
and youth policies and for strengthening international cooperation in these fields. One of 




Education and Culture 2019). The Ministry outlines national policy concerning 
cooperation with international organizations, culture, youth, sports, and certain fields of 
research. In international affairs, MEC participates in the work of major international 
organizations and regional councils, implements programs and initiatives nationally, and 
supports cultural cooperation and expatriate activities (Ministry of Education and Culture 
2019).  
          Under MEC there are numerous programs whose mission is to use Finnish soft 
power in in foreign policy. Some of these initiatives are Art and Culture, The Sports 
Department, International Cooperation and the Cultural Museums and Library Activities. 
The next section will review the history and mission of these programs in order to reveal 
their alliance building purposes.   
5.6.2.1 SPORTS DEPARTMENT  
The Department for Cultural, Sport and Youth Policy was created in 1966 as an 
Arts Office within the MEC (Kangas 2001). In terms of using sports to achieve foreign 
policy goals, the MEC states that the focus in cooperative efforts has been on 
strengthening the integrity in sports; the promotion of equal rights; anti-doping activities; 
the prevention of spectator violence; and issues related to the status of athletes within 
Europe as well as globally. MEC further emphasizes its role in international 
organizations in sport-related cooperation. Stated differently, the underlying objective of 
the Sport Department is to appeal to other countries with its focus on the ethical and 
performance-based regulation and drug freeness of sports.  
In terms of international interactions and objectives related to MEC, Finland's 




and UNESCO (United Nations Education Scientific and Cultural Organization). While 
Finland stresses that the main goals of athletic cooperation are to coordinate and 
harmonize the sport-related policies and practices within the E.U., by investing into such 
goals they are also using sports as a soft power tool to interact with other European 
nations. Therefore, with sports Finland does not have any global ambitions, it only uses it 
to strengthen its European alliances.  
5.6.2.2 ART AND CULTURE  
Arts and Culture section of the MEC has been in existence since the 1974 with the 
objective of strengthening international cooperation by using Finnish arts and culture 
(Kangas 2001). This function also made the Arts and Culture Program the MEC’s first 
Finnish soft power initiative. Before Finland’s membership into the E.U. (in 1995), this 
function of the MEC focused on connecting Finland with Western countries. After 1995, 
the Arts and Culture concentrated on reaching and connecting with the other members of 
the E.U. Arts and Culture works to promote and fund cultural exchange, cooperation 
between operators and actors working in different art forms and the distribution of works 
among the E.U. members states. Thus, Arts and Culture program within MEC works to 
strengthen Finland’s alliances with the other E.U. members using the cultural aspects of 
soft power since 1974. This makes this program (together with the International 
Cooperation) the oldest soft power initiative within the MEC.  
5.6.2.3 INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
The MEC’s international cooperation function is responsible for the coordination 
of Finland's international cooperation in arts and culture since 1974. Specifically, Finland 




the Nordic Culture Fund, the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), the Arctic Council, 
the Barents Euro-Arctic Council and their cultural bodies as well as their neighboring 
areas (Ministry of Education and Culture/The E.U. and International Cooperation in Arts 
and Culture 1). The International Cooperation function reaches countries inside and 
outside of the E.U. with the ultimate goal to strengthening cooperation and alliances.  
5.6.2.4. FINNISH CULTURAL AND ACADEMIC INSTITUTE 
One of the newer programs created under the MEC’s International Cooperation 
initiative is the Finnish Cultural and Academic Institute. This Finnish network of 17 
institutes was created in 2005 with the goal to increase the recognition of Finnish culture, 
art and science in strategically important countries and promote cultural exchange and 
cooperation as well as field-specific research and teaching abroad (Ministry of Education 
and Culture/The E.U. and International Cooperation in Arts and Culture 1). This is also 
the program that is designed to reach countries outside of the E.U. Some of the cities 
where the Finnish Cultural and Academic Institute is hosted that are not E.U. members 
are Beirut, St. Petersburg and Tokyo (Ministry of Education and Culture/The E.U. and 
International Cooperation in Arts and Culture 1).  
5.6.2.5 CULTURAL, MUSEUM AND LIBRARY ACTIVITIES 
When it comes to international cooperation in the library field, since the early 
1990s the role of the Ministry of Education and Culture’s Cultural, Museum and Library 
Activities has been to strengthen the cooperation within E.U. members (Finland. EU and 
International Cooperation 1). Finland has two mobile libraries as well. These mobile 
libraries contain materials in Finnish, Norwegian, Swedish and Saami (Finland. EU and 




library activities Finland only works to strengthen its alliances with other E.U. members 
and the Nordic states (Taraskina 2009).  
Overall, as the listed foreign affairs and cultural programs indicated, Finland has 
created its foreign affairs institutions as early as 1918 with the purpose of connecting 
diplomatically and culturally with the West as well as strengthen its alliances abroad. In 
terms soft power programs, the MEC’s Arts and Culture initiatives were created in 1974, 
which ultimately grew into the Finnish Cultural and Academic Institute in 2005. The 
MFA’s initial soft power institution was the Foreign Service (created in 1918), which by 
1988 developed into the International Development Program. Both ministries work 
together to achieve Finnish foreign policy goals by using soft power programs.  
The early establishments of these government institutions strongly supported its 
strategic use of soft power programs starting in 1974 all over the world, which also lead 
to institutional commitment to rely on them. The descriptions and the timeline of the 
creation of the foreign affairs and cultural programs further revealed that Finland has a 
45-year history relying on cultural tools, and a 31-year history in using economic aid as 
foreign policy soft power tools. As the listed programs indicated, as a reaction to a 
perceived threat from Russia, Finland’s political elite directed Finnish foreign policy 
towards a strategic application of soft power with the goal of strengthening alliances with 
the West. This foreign policy was built on high soft power use abroad.  
5.7 FINLAND’S SOFT POWER BUDGET  
In the last section of this most-similar case design, I turn to the closer analysis of 
Finland’s soft power budget. Based on my theory, due to the political elite’s narrative 




high soft power budget is calculated into country’s federal budget as a defense 
mechanism that is aimed at building alliances. This section will look into the Finish soft 
power budget to see if there is a high soft power budget allocation due to the perceived 
threat of Russia.  
 In 1998 the total budget of Finland was $69.9 Billion (USD) (Statistics Finland 
2019) of which 1.6 Billion USD was spent on soft power programs26. The amount of 
USD is just important as the size of this budget compared to the entire government 
budget. The percentage of soft power use indicates the size of the government’s 
investment into soft power use as oppose to all other budget items. 1.6 Billion USD 
indicates that the soft power budget allocation was 2.2% of the total budget. In 2010, the 
total annual budget of Finland was $113.7 Billion (USD) (Statistics Finland 2019) of 
which they spent an average of $2.9 Billion on soft power annually. That figure 
represents 2.5% of the total budget.  
The soft power budget of Finland was calculated by adding up the budgets of all 
of the programs that qualified as a soft power programs within the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs (MFA) and selected programs from the Ministry of Education and Culture (MEC) 
(see Figure 5.1 for complete list). The original Finnish budget data was provided in Euros 
which was converted in USD with the fix rate of (1.11)27. These budget items allocated to 
these two ministries support the Finnish government’s ability to use soft power actions28.  
 
26 The reason the detailed budget analysis does not start at 1995, is that program level 
data was not available until 1998.  
27 The original Finnish budget data was also received in Finish so using google translate, 
I translated each budget item into English. 
28 The Unit for Public Diplomacy receives its funding through the Ministry of Foreign 




In order to better understand the way Finland allocates its budget for soft power, 
Figure 5.1 shows the money allocation for all soft power programs allocated to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Education and Culture. The highest soft 
power budget receiver is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The selected soft power 
programs within the (MFA) collect about twice as much funding as the selected programs 
of the Ministry for Culture and Education (MCE). These soft power programs ensure 
Finland’s attractiveness abroad as well as the government’s continuous reliance on soft 
power actions such as consult, host a visit, and express intent to meet and negotiate.  
Studying further Finland’s program-level budget information (Figure 5.1), it is 
revealed that the most well-funded soft power activities are: International Development 
Cooperation; Art and Culture: The Foreign Service and the Sports Department (Finnish 
Budget 1995-2010). Looking at the distribution of funding within the MFA, we can see 
that the International Development Cooperation receives the most funding (average 523 
Million USD) followed by Arts and Culture from the MEC (average of 376 Million 
USD). Scholars have noted that Finland historically spends a lot of its budget on culture 
(Kangas 2001) and this budget showed that they also use culture as a soft power tool in 
foreign policy.  
In terms of the consistency of funding, 9 out of 12 receive a consistent amount 
each year as those are planned to be long-term programs. The three programs that receive 
0 USD for selected years are: 1: the Commercial and Industrial Cooperation program, 
which only received funding in 1998; 2) the Cooperation with Central and Eastern 
Europe, Russia and Other CIS Countries program, which was only funded for the years of 




from 2001 to 2008. All of these programs were designed to be short-term and were 
discontinued, while the nine other programs continued to be well-funded. 
Figure 5.1 Finland’s Program-Level Soft Power Budget 1995-2010 Sorted in the Order of 
Highest to Lowest Budget. 
 
 With respect to Finland’s total soft power budget during the 1995-2010 time-
period, as Figure 5.2 shows, Finland provides consistent and slightly increasing funding 
for its soft power programs. While the lowest budget was allocated in 1998 in the amount 
of 1.6 Billion USD, Finland has increased its soft power budget until 2008, when it has 




































allocation for each ministry. Not surprisingly, MEC gets about twice as much funding as 
the MFA. As it has been pointed out, Finland has been known to spend high on its culture 
and education, and it is not any different in its foreign policy either.  
Figure 5.2 Finland’s Ministry-Level and Total Soft Power Budget for 1995-2010 in 
Billions of U.S. Dollars Including the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the 
Ministry of Education and Culture’s (MEC) Selected Programs. 
 
In terms of the total amount of money allocated for soft power programs within 
these ministries, this amount represents roughly 2.2 % of Finland’s total budget between 
1998 and 2010. The collected soft power budget also revealed that Finland does not shy 
away from spending money on long-term soft power programs, and the consistent budget 
allocated to these two ministries suggests that Finland will continue to spend money on 
its soft power with elevated focus on cultural programs. 
Overall, observing four new indicators (geopolitical threat, political elite’s 
narrative, historical analysis of soft power programs, and the soft power budget 
























increased Finnish soft power use as the Finnish political elite constructed a narrative 
that continued to remind of the Russian threat and encouraged the Finnish government 
to balance against Russia (using soft power tools) with alliance building.  
The soft power programs are over 45 years old and have been used to 
strengthen Finland’s foreign policy. The continuation of 9 out of 12 programs also 
suggests path-dependence, which self-enforcing lock-in mechanism ensures the future 
of the soft power programs. The old institutions provided support for the soft power 
programs and facilitated soft power actions all over the world resulting in an 
institutional commitment to use soft power.  
Finally, the foreign policy budget allocation revealed that the political elite’s 
narrative about the Russian threat has been increasing the use of soft power in foreign 
policy. The relatively high (2.2% of total budget) soft power budget allocation of 
Finland, also revealed path-dependence, which self-enforcing mechanism further 
enhances the country’s soft power actions abroad. Stated differently, in Finland the 
theorized mechanism of the geopolitical threat’s enhancing impact on soft power use 
has been confirmed. 
5.8 GEOPOLITICS OF NEW ZEALAND  
The second country in this most-similar case design is New Zealand. New 
Zealand is a small, trade-dependent, geographically isolated country (Buchanan 2010). 
Geopolitically New Zealand is in a very different situation than Finland. While Finland 
is sharing borders with its neighbors (including Russia), New Zealand is an island 
nation at the southwestern edge of the Pacific Ocean, lying around 994 miles from the 




Australia, which country does not pose any threat to New Zealand. This means that in 
the case of New Zealand, the government has not been threatened by a large military 
power. 
 In addition, historically New Zealand’s has been part of the United Kingdom’s 
Commonwealth since 1840 but has a unique relationship with Britain. New Zealand 
had secure economic ties with Britain (until 1973) and at the same time, it is located at 
a great distance from the center of the Empire (Buchanan 2010). These geopolitical 
factors allowed New Zealand from the early twentieth century a high degree of 
independence and flexibility (Buchanan 2010). In terms of geopolitical threat, New 
Zealand did not have to protect its independence from any invaders, and only had to be 
concerned with domestic issues such as the support of its native populations (Māoris). 
Stated differently, due to the lack of any existential geopolitical threat, according to 
my theory, New Zealand’s political elite did not have the need to develop a narrative 
addressing an imminent threat, therefore, alliance building using soft power was also 
not needed.  
5.9 NEW ZEALAND’S SOFT POWER  
The statistical analysis of this dissertation concluded that New Zealand is one of 
the lowest users of soft power actions (68%). This means that, out of 100 international 
interactions, New Zealand will only rely on soft power actions 68 times. Since this is one 
of the lowest levels among the studied 51 democracies, this qualitative analysis will look 





The New Zealand government’s strategic use of soft power has been a young 
phenomenon. Before the 1990s, New Zealand was mostly known for spectacular scenery, 
natural beauty, Kiwi birds, and its indigenous Māori culture, but not for its constant 
international reach and efforts to build alliances in foreign policy. 
5.10 THE POLITICAL ELITE’S NARRATIVE          
According to my theory, in countries where there is no geopolitical threat, the 
political elite does not need to create a narrative that emphasizes national security in their 
programs and institutions, which leads to lower use of soft power. New Zealand is a 
constitutional monarchy, which means that the Prime Minister has the most political 
power including the decision to decide how much to rely on soft power. In order to 
connect New Zealand’s soft power use with its political elite, the next section will look at 
Prime Ministers’ narrative about national security issues. If my theory is correct, in New 
Zealand there is no imminent national security issue that would threaten the existence of 
the country, which also means that New Zealand does not need to rely on high soft power 
us to build alliances.  
           In order to study the main national security issues in New Zealand, I looked at the 
specific topics that Prime Ministers discuss under national security. Since WWII, the 
main security issue has been the desire to ban nuclear testing in the pacific region. In 
1963 Prime Minister Holyoake said the following in a parliamentary debate: 
“[…] the New Zealand government has received the news that a partial nuclear test ban 
treaty has been initiated in Moscow by British, United States and Soviet negotiators. 
Beyond a doubt this represents the most important step taken post-war disarmament 
discussion. Because of the obvious difficulties of in the way of rapid progress toward 
general disarmament, which is and must remain our aim, the New Zealand Government 
has joined with many other governments in advocating the urgent need to conclude a test 




As Prime Minister Holyoake later explains in the same speech, New Zealand’s main 
concern with nuclear weapons was not existential, instead they were worried about 
possible radioactive fallout of the tests and the spread of nuclear weapons to other 
countries in the region. As this example illustrates, the political elite did not feel 
threatened by any imminent existential threat. And while the banning of nuclear testing 
from the territory of New Zealand was a key foreign policy issue for the political elite 
starting in the 1960s, it did not directly threaten the independence or the existence of New 
Zealand, thus the narrative only had to focus on the collective good aspect of a potential 
test ban treaty. 
           In terms of threat perception, nothing has changed in the next two decades. In the 
1980s Prime Minister Robert Muldoon’s 1980 observation that “our foreign policy is 
trade” also pointed to New Zealand’s lack of any geopolitical threats (New Zealand 
Institute of International Affairs 2019). Years later, taking a closer look at the New 
Zealand’s political elite’s narrative in 1997, Prime Minister Bolger’ said the following 
about China: 
“China is now New Zealand's fifth largest market. Our relationship has also facilitated 
links in other areas: in science and technology, in education, in sport and cultural 
activities. We have exchanged not just goods but services, human resources and capital. 
The strength of the relationship owes much to the complementary way our two countries 






 As this speech reveals, New Zealand does not feel threaten by China’s military 
power. In fact, according to this speech, the two countries have a close economic 
relationship and a strong social connection. Addressing the relationship between another 
potential military threat, namely Japan, Prime Minister Shipley stated the following in 
1999: 
“In the case of New Zealand and Japan we have moved from two countries who hardly 
knew each other, to regional partners. Around the region, we are entering a new 
millennium woven together by a wide and colorful fabric of people to people links, trade, 
investment and an emerging sense of being an Asia Pacific community.” (Shipley 1999) 
 Similarly to Prime Minister Bolger’s speech earlier, Prime Minister Shipley’s 
narrative also confirms a strong social and economic link between New Zealand and 
Japan without the perception of any threat from the military power. Moving on to the 
2000s, the one threat identified in some of Prime Minister Clark’s speeches in 2000 was 
globalization: 
“New Zealand, as a small nation ‘surrounded by the images and perceptions of others, 
was particularly vulnerable to cultural globalization but insisted that we are not a suburb 
of Los Angeles, London or Sydney.” (Clark 2000, 1) 
 
As a result of the Clark policies, by 2004 the Ministry for Culture and Heritage 
stated that in a “globalized world it is all the more important that people are able to assert 
their own unique identity.” (11) The ministry wanted to provide necessary protection 
against the threat of global cultural homogenization (Goff 2000). As this example shows, 
in 2000 the only threat identified in the political elite’s narrative in New Zealand was 




culture, identity and lifestyle, which is why the Clark Administration focused its narrative 
on protecting New Zealand’s culture.  
Similarly, to the listed predecessors, Prime Minister Key has named non-
proliferation as well as trade and regional cooperation as New Zealand’s main foreign 
policy objectives and did not talk about national security threats. Continuing his 
predecessor’s foreign policies, in a speech delivered in 2008 Prime Minister Key stated: 
“I said I did not believe there would be major changes in our international relationships 
under a National Government, and that New Zealand’s nuclear-free legislation should 
remain.” (Key 2008) 
 
In terms of alliance building, New Zealand is a member of the UN, which makes 
the government set objectives that include the goals of the UN as well.  
“New Zealand has contributed troops and personnel to UN peacekeeping operations since 
they began in 1948. We’ve been involved in more than 40 peace operations in more than 
25 countries over the past seven decades, either under UN auspices or as part of 
coalitions. In peacekeeping duties we're known as collaborative, practical and respectful 
team players with a good understanding of multiculturalism and an easy rapport with 
local communities.” (New Zealand. Peace Rights and Security. 2019) 
  
Providing peacekeeping forces and humanitarian aid are definitely soft power 
actions, and as the official foreign policy website has shown, New Zealand has been 
utilizing these types of soft power. For example, in the 1990s, New Zealand participated 
in numerous peacekeeping missions in Somalia, Cambodia, Kosovo, East Timor and in 
the Asia-Pacific region (McGraw 2000). These missions were conducted for two reasons: 
1) to demonstrate New Zealand’s international commitment to security issues to its allies, 
and; 2) to strengthen its regional economic connections (McCraw 2000).  
In addition, in 1951 New Zealand joined ANZUS, which was a military alliance 
with the U.S. and Australia to protect the security of the Pacific. In 1984 the ANZUS 




refused to allow U.S. nuclear-powered submarines to visit its ports, and on September 17, 
1986, the United States suspended its treaty obligations toward New Zealand (Office of 
the Historian 1). Even though New Zealand has been unprotected by ANZUS since 1986, 
she has not joined any other military alliances, which also indicates that they do not feel 
threated by any of the military powers in the region.  
 In summary, the listed Prime Ministers and their foreign policy narratives made it 
clear that New Zealand was living in peace with its neighbor and with the regional 
hegemons. Without the perception of any threat in the region, New Zealand’s political 
elite did not turn its foreign policy towards national security and alliance building but 
rather focused on tightening the economic relations within the region, especially with 
China and Japan. Two national security issues that were uncovered by the analysis were 
nonproliferation and globalization.  
While the resolution of these issues requires some soft power use, based on the 
analysis of the above-listed political leaders, New Zealand’s political elite did not create a 
narrative that would encourage more alliance building in addition to the existing 
alliances. Instead, the political elite promoted strengthening existing economic 
relationships in the region, which required a low degree of soft power. Further, since 
2000 New Zealand’s foreign policy goal also included protecting the country’s culture 
from globalization. This goal also required very low or no soft power use abroad.  For the 
listed reasons, New Zealand did not need to build a high level of soft power use into its 






5.11 SOFT POWER INSTITUTIONS OF NEW ZEALAND 
In order to learn more about the possible indicators of New Zealand’s low soft 
power use, I turn to the closer study of its institutions. In the following section using 
historical analysis, I identify and describe the soft power government programs of New 
Zealand to uncover when they were created and for what reason. In New Zealand, I found 
9 programs within two ministries that carry the mission of soft power. These are: 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (selected programs) (MFAT) 
o Administration of Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities (1968) 
o Subscriptions to International Organizations (1968) 
o Pacific Cooperation Foundation (1989)  
o Promotion of Asian Skills and Relationships (1991) 
o Policy Advice and Representation - Other Countries (1998)  
o Policy Advice and Representation - International Institutions (1998)  
o Hosting of Pacific Islands Forum Meeting (MFAT) (short-term) 
o International Radio Services (MFAT) (short-term) 
 
Ministry for Culture and Heritage (selected program) (MCH) 
o Cultural Diplomacy International Program (2007) 
 
In order to better understand the goals of each ministry that funded the selected soft 
power programs, I went to the official websites as well as read the New Zealand 
treasury’s budget documents for each year. In addition, I collected foreign policy analysis 
articles written about such programs and government goals.  
5.11.1 THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE (MFAT) 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) was created in 1943 with the 
purpose of making New Zealand more prosperous and safer (2019). As indicated in the 
MFAT’s 2003 budget, the specific goal of this section of the government was the active 
and constructive engagement on political, security, and economic issues within the Asia-




Australia, Japan, and the United States) and through participation in regional groupings 
(Treasury New Zealand 2003 p.4).  
The appropriations of the MFAT programs aimed to secure advice and services 
for the government’s businesses with foreign countries and their governments, and with 
international organizations. MFAT contributes to the achievement of key government 
goals through the pursuit of activities which strengthen national identity, promote an 
inclusive, innovative economy for the benefit of all, protect and enhance the 
environment, and restore trust in government (p. 4). When listing the eight strategic goals 
of MFAT, the list includes the goal of strengthening and protecting the use of 
international rules and institutions to pursue New Zealand values and interests, but it 
mostly focuses on regional economic development and territorial security (New Zealand 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2019).  
In 1995, the government also announced that New Zealand’s diplomatic 
representation would be strengthened in Asia in the following cities: Beijing, Kuala 
Lumpur, Singapore and Seoul (McCraw 2000). In 1995, New Zealand opened an 
embassy in Hanoi to strengthen trade with Vietnam (McCraw 2000). This meant that the 
foreign policy goals of New Zealand remained strictly regional and with an economic 
focus. As the previous examples demonstrated, the MFAT’s main foreign goal is to 
create economically beneficial partnerships mostly in Asia (New Zealand. Aid and 
Development. 2019). The missions and activities of the Ministry are crucial in facilitating 






5.11.1.2 SUBSCRIPTION TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
In accordance with the Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act 1968, this 
section and payments is responsible for using soft power with international organization 
by maintaining a good relationship with organizations such as the UN (United Nations), 
the Commonwealth Secretariat, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (New Zealand 
Foreign Affairs and Trade Budget 1998 p. 186). By promoting a positive relationship and 
facilitating communication between New Zealand and large multinational organizations, 
New Zealand is increasing its attractiveness with other countries as well as with the 
organizations. In terms of the political elite’s narrative, membership to international 
organizations helps New Zealand to strengthen its economic connections with its regional 
trading partners thus improving New Zealand’s position in the regional market. 
5.11.1.3 ADMINISTRATION OF DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND 
IMMUNITIES 
 Since the Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act of 1968, another special 
section that was created focuses on administering special privileges and diplomatic 
immunities to diplomats of other countries. Specifically, this program enhancement of 
New Zealand’s political and economic relationships with other countries by providing 
diplomatic privileges (New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade Budget 1998, p. 191). 
This is an important aspect of New Zealand’s soft power use, as providing diplomatic 
benefits to representatives from other countries enhances its attractiveness abroad. This 




receiving country’s perception of New Zealand increases but also all those countries’ 
who are aware of the list of countries’ who were provided the diplomatic privileges. 
5.11.1.4 PACIFIC COOPERATON FOUNDATION 
 Established in 1989, this program ensures that New Zeeland is pressing for 
practical economic benefits from the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
process, asserting New Zealand’s role in the wider Asia Pacific region by: strengthening 
key bilateral linkages with Asia Pacific states; actively engaging in regional political 
groupings and working closely with Australia and South Pacific countries to address 
neighborhood issues (New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade Budget 1998 p. 189). 
According to the official website of the foundation, the ultimate goal of this foundation is 
to promote connected, informed and enabled communities in the Pacific region by 
implementing public/private sector economic development and socio-cultural initiatives 
in the Pacific region (Pacific Cooperation Foundation 1). This program became New 
Zealand first soft power program within the MFAT. 
5.11.1.5 PROMOTION OF ASIA SKILLS AND RELATIONSHIPS 
In order to reach out to strategic partners, the government set up and substantially 
funded the Asia 2000 Foundation stating in 1991, which administered programs that 
helped the business sector to operate in Asia, promoted Asian studies in New Zealand, 
supported cultural links and media coverage of Asia and helped greater knowledge and 
acceptance of Asia among New Zealanders (McKinnon 1993).In terms of soft power use, 
this was New Zealand’s the second set of programs within the Ministry of Foreign 




The Asia 2000 Foundation focused its foreign policy instruments to strengthen its 
economic relationship with its non-threatening regional partners.  
5.11.1.6 POLICY ADVICE AND REPRESENTATION-OTHER COUNTRIES 
 Since 1998, this group of programs has been created to improved conditions for 
New Zealand’s trade and economic growth – focusing especially on Asia and the Pacific 
- through regional and bilateral mechanisms, including APEC. The other function of 
these programs is to maintain New Zealand’s role in the South Pacific and the close 
relationships with Australia and South Pacific countries. In addition, these programs 
work to enhance New Zealand’s political and economic relationships and high-level 
contacts with other key countries in Asia, the Americas, Europe, Africa and the Middle 
East (New Zealand Budget 1998 p.1990). 
5.11.1.7 POLICY ADVICE AND REPRESENTATION-INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS 
 Based on the budget documents of New Zealand, this budget item was created in 
1998 to improved conditions for New Zealand’s trade and economic growth through 
multilateral mechanisms, including the WTO. This set of programs increased New 
Zealand contributions to collective security through cooperation with allied and friendly 
nations, a positive role in the UN, strengthening of the UN system and the rule of law, 
and participation in peacekeeping, disarmament, humanitarian and regional security 
networks. Finally, this initiative also supported New Zealand’s interests in the 
development of international action, both multilateral and regional, for the protection of 




5.11.2 MINISTRY FOR CULTURE AND HERITAGE (MCH)  
           The other Ministry in New Zealand that funds soft power programs is the Ministry 
for Culture and Heritage. The history of this Ministry goes back to 1963, when the first 
ministry to oversee art was created under the name of Queen Elizabeth II Arts Council of 
New Zealand29. The purpose of this royal council was to support high art (classical 
music, ballet, literature etc.) and make it widely accessible domestically (Skilling 2005). 
In other words, the purpose of this council was to get the people in New Zealand cultured 
(Skilling 2005). Such was the government's growing interest in the cultural sector that, in 
1975, a ministerial portfolio for the arts was established (Volkerling 2010). This was 
coordinated by the Department of Internal Affairs until 1991, when a separate 
department, the Ministry of Cultural Affairs was created. 
In the previous year’s arts and cultures were not strategically applied in foreign 
policy. In 2000, there was a change in New Zealand’s political elite’s narrative as well as 
in its foreign policy. With the leadership of Prime Minister Clark, the Ministry for 
Culture and Heritage (MCH) was established not only to support and protect domestic 
culture from globalization, but also to rebrand New Zealand as unique, welcoming and 
innovative in order to improve the country’s position in the global market. MCH was 
created by bringing together the Ministry of Cultural Affairs with the history and heritage 
functions of the Department of Internal Affairs. The core functions of this ministry were 
to strengthen New Zealand’s modern image abroad and to protect New Zealand’s culture 
 
29 The involvement of New Zealand governments in culture, however, has a much longer 
history. The government's role in protecting and managing the nation's cultural resources 





from globalization (Skilling 2010, Mark 2010). The creation of the MCH could focus on 
protecting domestic culture and at the same time promoting New Zealand as a welcoming 
business partner to other countries (Mark 2010). This new foreign policy goal and new 
function of MCH also boosts New Zealand’s soft power use. 
The MCH also provided advice on arts, culture, heritage, sport, recreation, and 
broadcasting in addition to care for New Zealand memorials, monuments, war graves and 
symbols of national identity domestically and abroad (New Zealand Ministry of Culture 
and Heritage 2019). The creation of the MCH in 2000 was an important soft power 
milestone for New Zealand. It formally marked government's recognition of the benefits 
to be gained from bringing together the various cultural activities that for many years had 
been scattered among several departments and now they could be applied in foreign 
policy as well. 
5.11.2.1 CULTURAL DIPLOMACY INTERNATIONAL PROGRAM  
The first soft power program within the MCH was the Cultural Diplomacy 
International Program’s (CDIP). At its creation in 2007, the objectives of the CDIP were 
to project abroad a distinctive profile of New Zealand as a creative and diverse society 
with a unique, contemporary culture strongly rooted in its diverse heritage. Even more 
importantly for soft power use, to position New Zealand among targeted overseas 
audiences as a country they could understand and want to engage with (Mark 2010).  
          The CDIP was created as a collaboration between six core New Zealand 
government agencies: The Ministry for Culture and Heritage (MCH) and supported by a 
Steering Group made up of representatives from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and 




(TNZ), Te Puni Kōkiri (Ministry of Māori Development) (TPK), Education New Zealand 
(ENZ) and New Zealand Story. The Steering Group consults other government and 
cultural agencies and, on occasion, private sector interests, in order to recommend 
programs or activities to the Minister for Arts, Culture and Heritage. The roles of the 
CDIP program are the management and delivery of a series of projects and activities 
primarily focused on Asia and in locations where New Zealand is pursuing free trade 
agreements such as in the U.S. and in the E.U. (Ministry for Culture and Heritage 2010).  
          CDIP programs included presentations of New Zealand cultural activities in the 
selected region, including cultural activities, publicity, media, catalogues, translation and 
project management. In addition, some of the other activities include management of 
historic places, museum services, performing arts services and public broadcasting 
services (NZ Cultural Diplomacy Report 2010). The economic benefits of each programs 
were crucial for the New Zealand government and they were highlighted in each 
program’s outcomes.  This meant that in the case of New Zealand, even with this new 
soft power program, the government was mostly using soft power actions to strengthen 
its economic partnerships but not to gain alliances all over the world. 
          While the CDIP was established to spread New Zealand’s attractiveness abroad, 
there was an issue that weakened its effectiveness. CDIP did not coordinate the 
appropriate programs with the desired foreign policy objectives well (Mark 2010). The 
reason for such miscoordination was the lack of a clear plan to create programs that can 
connect with the country’s foreign policy objectives. For instance, the many of the 
programs portrayed New Zealand as unique, deeply rooted in a diverse heritage but they 




foreign policy object of New Zealand was to promote an image of society and culture that 
is open to foreign investors, but what the CDIP program actually promoted was a 
traditional cultural heritage that has been protected and sheltered. Stated differently, the 
practice of New Zealand’s soft power has been poorly managed and badly executed as a 
soft power tool.  
           As this analysis revealed, New Zealand’s soft power institutions were created in 
1943 (MFAT) and in 2000 (MCH) and its first programs were formed in 1989 (Asia 
Pacific Foundation) and in 2007 (Cultural Diplomacy International Program). As these 
examples showed, New Zealand’s soft power use is mostly limited to their Asian partners 
and allies and to peacekeeping missions to support developing nations. While New 
Zealand does use some soft power to reach countries outside of the Pacific region, New 
Zealand does not have to deal with a threatening power thus she does not seek to spread 
its influence intensely outside of the existing alliances. 
5.12 NEW ZEALAND’S SOFT POWER BUDGET 
          Similarly to the Finnish case, in the last part, I will evaluate New Zealand’s 
spending habits on soft power programs while looking for indicators that may explain its 
low soft power use. The shown budget is the combination of the above explained two 
ministries and their 9 programs from 1995-2010, including specifically selected 
programs’ budget from the MFA and from the MCH30. It is important to note here why 
the education and sport budgets were not included in New Zealand’s soft power budget 
while they were part of the Finnish soft power budget calculation. As the treasury 
 
30 Online budget information was only available from 1998. The Treasury of New 
Zealand scanned in their budget books and emailed them to me. While ministry level data 




document from 2010 explains, the government’s goals for education are solely focused 
on education of citizens, closing educational gaps between communities, and supporting 
the Māori and Pacific communities (Treasury 2000, p7). The Department of Education of 
New Zealand does not identify education as a tool to increase the country’s attractiveness 
abroad so for this reason, it was not included in the soft power budget. On a similar note, 
after studying New Zealand’s the strategic goals of the sports programs, (despite of the 
international success of the ALL Black Rugby team), I concluded that they did not 
support any foreign outreach efforts at all, so these were not included in the soft power 
budget programs.  
          In 1998, the New Zealand government’s total budget was 24.28 Billion USD of 
which 0.01 Billion USD was allocated to soft power programs (NZ Treasury 1999). This 
budget allocation represents 0.001% of the total federal budget. In 2010, New Zealand’s 
annual budget increased to 68.8 Billion USD (New Zealand Treasury 2010). As Figure 
5.4 shows, the soft power budget was 0.28 Billion USD which represents 0.04% of New 
Zealand’s governments budget. Figure 5.4 clearly shows an increase in the total soft 
power budget as well as in the percentage of soft power spending over the total 
government budget from 0.001% to 0.04%.  
          The original budget data was provided in New Zealand Dollar and was converted 
into US Dollars at the fixed rate of 0.69. It is also important to note that in addition to the 
Government of New Zealand, there is also private funding received for such initiatives. 
My research focuses on the government spending and does not include any other 
financial support. In order to provide a more telling picture of New Zealand’s soft power 




power programs can be seen on Figure 5.3. Figure 5.3 shows all 9 soft power programs 
that were included in the budget analysis and also reveals any changes in their funding.  
Figure 5.3 Soft Power Budget Allocation of New Zealand by Programs31 within 
Ministries sorted by highest to lowest budget. 
 
31 Budget items Policy Advice and Representation-Other Countries PLA and 
Promotional Activities both have the same function as the Policy Advice and 



































The program-level data on soft power budget tells us that the government does 
not fund soft power initiatives consistently. Figure 5.3 shows that out of the 12 budget 
items, 10 are programs (two are supplementary budget items and not programs), two 
receive funding for a few years but then do not get any money for a while. One of these is 
Hosting the Pacific Island Forum, which received funding for the years 1998, 1999, and 
2003 but not for all the other years. The other is the International Radio Services, which 
was transferred into the private sphere after 2002. Cancelations happen because either 
these programs were planned for a short-term, or the money was allocated elsewhere. In 
the case of the Pacific Island Forum, it is not hosted by New Zealand every year. The 
program-level data also reveals that one program within the MFA, the Policy Advice and 
Representation for Other Countries receives the most funding (average of 112 Million 
USD) and all other soft power programs get a significantly lower budget for each year 
between 0.5 Million USD to 22 Million USD.  
It is also important to note that the 2010 funding is the highest amount (0.28 
Billion USD) allocated for the examined 1995-2010 time-period for soft power use.  The 
creation of a new soft power program (Cultural International Diplomacy Program32) in 
2007 and the later merged ministries creating the Ministry of Business, Innovation and 
Employment in 2012 are indications that the New Zealand government is going to focus 
more on the use of its soft power in the future, however, some of the issues surfacing are 
the lack of government programs and institutions that would exercise such soft power 
actions consistently. 
 
32 CDIP’s first budget allocation was created in 2006 so it can be fully operational by 




Moving to the ministry-level analysis, Figure 5.4 shows the country’s soft power 
budget by the two listed ministries to indicate any changes in the money allocation. As 
Figure 5.4 shows, since 1998 the soft power spending has been slowly increasing from 
0.1 Billion USD to 0.23 Billion USD by 2008. Figure 5.4 also shows that almost all of 
the soft power budget allocation was to the MFAT with the only exception of the CDIP 
programs starting in 2006. Overall, it was the last year of this analysis (2010), that 
allocated the most funds to the MFAT and to the MCH soft power programs during the 
examined time-period as the budget increased the soft power spending to 0.28 Billion 
USD by 2010. Stated differently, based on the observed changes in New Zealand’s soft 
power budget and its new (CDIP) program, it is reasonable to say that the government 
will rely more on soft power actions in the future33.   
 
33 In addition, the creation of programs under the Ministry of Business, Innovation and 
Employment fit the descriptions of Nye’s soft power, but this specific ministry was not 
created until 2012 by merging the Ministry of Economic Development, Ministry of 
Science and Innovation, Department of Labor and the Department of Building and 
Housing (New Zealand Treasury). While the time-frame of this dissertation ends in 2010, 
New Zealand shows promising budget trends and programs that indicate an increase in its 






Figure 5.4. New Zealand’s Soft Power Budget by Ministries of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, and by the Ministry for Culture and Heritage 
   
In conclusion, as the above qualitative analysis revealed, New Zealand’s soft 
power budget is low and uneven. In addition, the government limits most of the soft 
power programs to a regional reach, which also limits New Zealand’s global recognition. 
However, due to a shift in the political elite’s narrative, the government’s new programs 
such as the CDIP and its budget allocation suggests that New Zealand will focus more on 
the use of soft power internationally in the future.  
5.13 CONCLUSION 
Overall, what governments do is a very important factor in understanding their 
soft power use. As this chapter revealed, Finland has a high soft power reliance and New 
Zealand uses soft power instruments to a low degree. I theorized that this is due to a 
threatening neighbor that makes Finland to use a strategic balancing mechanism to build 
alliances. As this chapter also showed, New Zealand does not have a perceived threat that 
























soft power. And while New Zealand also uses soft power instruments, her strategic 
choices focus on positioning itself in the regional market and forming economically 
beneficial partnerships targeting China, Japan, and the Pacific Islands. While both 
countries use soft power, as the previous study revealed, they both hope to achieve 
different goals from such action, which impacts the amount of soft power they rely on.  
What this chapter has discovered were indicators that the statistical analysis 
missed. These were: 1) geopolitical threat; 2) political elite’s narrative; 3) age and 
mission of soft power programs; 4) the differences in the consistency and the amount of 
the respective governments’ soft power budgets. More deeply, what this chapter revealed 
was the importance of a perceived geopolitical threat, measured by the narrative a 
country developed and reflected in the programs it develops and funds over time. In 
Finland, where Russia has threatened the country’s independence, the political elite 
promoted a foreign policy, which carefully balanced with soft power in order to not 
provoke their aggressive military giant. This resulted in high Finnish soft power reliance. 
In New Zealand, on the other hand, due to the lack of any perceived geopolitical threats, 
the political elite focus the country’s foreign policy on existing economic ties and 
protection from globalization. None of these goals required high soft power use. Table 









Table 5.2 Finland and New Zealand Comparison  
 Finland  New Zealand 
Soft Power Use High (94%) Low (68%) 
Geopolitical Threat Threatened Not Threatened 
Political Elite’s National Security 
Narrative 
Present Not Present 
First Soft Power User Institution 1918 Foreign 
Affairs Bureau 
1943 Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and 
Trade 


















Revealing the impact of the geopolitical differences between Finland and New 
Zealand, this analysis discovered that due to geopolitical threat, the Finnish soft power 
use has been a much older phenomenon than in New Zealand. In the case of Finland, its 
proximity to Russia has pushed the elite to create a narrative that constantly reminds of 




use its soft power programs to strengthen its sovereignty and take a politically neutral 
position during the Cold War. Finland bandwagoned with its hard power but balanced 
with its soft power programs. After the Cold War, Finland shifted its soft power towards 
even more engagement with the West to build alliances. This resulted in the creation of 
early soft power programs and institutions. Today these elements all serve as strong 
pillars of high Finnish soft power use. Thus, geopolitical differences showed that having 
a threat at the border increased Finnish soft power use in the form of a defense 
mechanism. In the case of New Zealand, having a friendly neighbor resulted in a much 
lower perceived need to use soft power.  
The political elite’s narrative has been different in each country as well. While 
in Finland, the political elite continuously points to the Russian threat, in New Zealand, 
the political elite’s narrative focuses on nuclear disarmament and globalization. This 
meant that while in Finland the idea of a necessary alliance building mechanism based on 
existential threat was constructed into the soft power programs, in New Zealand that was 
not the case. In New Zealand, the political elite’s narrative focuses on less threatening 
issues and positioning the country as an attractive regional economic partner. 
Further, it is important to note the difference between the number and the age of 
soft power institutions and programs as well. The first Finnish soft power facilitating 
institution was created in 1918 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), for the purpose of 
strengthening Finland’s hard-earned independence from Russia and the first Finnish soft 
power program was established in 1974 under the name of International Cooperation 
under the Ministry of Education and Culture. In New Zealand, on the other hand, the first 




of Foreign Affairs and Trade) while its first specifically soft power program was 
established in 1989 (Pacific Cooperation Foundation). As these results show, Finland has 
been relying on soft power programs since 1974, while New Zealand only started 
utilizing it in 1989.  
Comparing the number of ministries and programs that are associated with soft 
power use in foreign policy, this chapter revealed that both countries have two ministries 
that supervise their soft power use. One is a foreign affairs ministry and the other is a 
ministry overseeing cultural affairs. In terms of the number of ministries involved, these 
two countries are identical. In addition, this dissertation also identified 10 soft power 
programs for New Zealand and 12 programs for Finland. Based on the number of soft 
power programs, Finland has a larger number of government programs specialized on 
soft power use abroad, which also contributes to its higher soft power reliance and to the 
Finish institutional commitment to soft power use. 
  In terms of the budgetary differences, Finland spends much more money on its 
soft power than New Zealand. This analysis revealed that the Finnish funding has been 
consistent and appears to be locked into the annual budget calculation. The breaking 
down of the soft power budget also revealed strategic differences. For Finland, its main 
soft power budget allocation goes to cultural initiatives while in New Zealand it is 
allocated for its MFAT’s policy advice programs, which is focusing on building 
economic relationships.  
 In addition, New Zealand’s budget allocation pattern further indicates steady 
increase in soft power budget since the 1990s. More specifically, New Zealand’s soft 




during the observed time-period. Finland, on the other hand, spends consistently on its 
soft power around 2.2% of its total annual federal budget. Even with New Zealand’s 
increase of its soft power budget, Finland still spends 55 times more money every year on 
its soft power programs than New Zealand, which results in a higher Finnish soft power 
reliance.  
 The strategic distribution of their respective money vastly differs as well. On the 
ministry-level and on the program-level, Finland allocated its soft power budget more 
evenly while New Zealand heavily funds one program (Policy Advice and 
Representation-Other Countries) and barely allocated money to the other programs. In 
order to successfully promote New Zealand’s foreign policy interest though soft power 
use, the government needs to spend its budget more evenly, so most of the soft power 
programs can strengthen and develop.  
My two cases revealed new variables that can improve future quantitative 
analyses of countries’ soft power use. The most-similar case design was able to disclose 
the boosting impact of geopolitical threat on Finland’s soft power use, which factor 
should also be tested on a larger number of countries. In the case of New Zealand, a new 
foreign policy goal emerged. New Zealand wishes to strengthen its position in the 
Southeast region and focuses most of its soft power efforts to achieve this goal. The 
regional outreach of this policy also leads to a lower use of soft power actions, while 
Finland’s alliance building foreign policy requires a more global outreach. This 











       CHAPTER 6. 
 
THE U.S.’S HISTORICAL STRONG RELIANCE ON SOFT POWER 
 
 
In the previous chapters I outlined elements that may impact democracies’ soft 
power use, and then I analyzed the patterns of soft power use amongst 51 democracies. 
The statistical results showed that my hypothesized link between democracies’ social 
trust and their soft power use is weak. In fact, social trust only explained about 18% of 
countries’ soft power use variation. The statistical analysis also revealed that the 
previously included resource and institutional variables could not explain more than 20% 
of the variation either so more qualitative analysis was needed to uncover new 
explanatory variables. I now turn to a crucial case design to study in-depth the already 
included factors and to reveal any new independent variables.  
6.1 CASE SELECTION. CRUCIAL CASE-U.S. AS A HEGEMON 
There are 51 democracies in my dataset that are spread out geographically in all 
five continents and have diverse economic and institutional characteristics. In my sample 
there are 28 European, 12 from the Americas, 7 Asian, 1 Middle Eastern, 2 Australian 
and 1 African nation. The United Stated has been selected for a crucial case design for 
the following reasons. The United States is a wealthy hegemon that is very active in 
international relations. In terms of its soft power action count, it stands out as the highest 
user of soft power compared to all other democracies in the dataset. See Table 6.1. My 




relies on an average of 32,788 soft power actions each year. This is an especially high 
value compared to all other democracies in the dataset as the average soft power action 
count is 2,306 per year.  
Table 6.1 Average Soft Power Action Count and Average Soft Power Percentage    
(1995-2010). 
 Soft Power Action Count Average 
Per Year 
United States 32,788 
51 Democracies  2,065 
 
  The case of the United States also plays an important role in soft power literature 
and in international relations in general. Not only the concept of soft power was created 
by an American scholar (Joseph Nye), but also the United States’ use of soft power has 
been the focus of most soft power scholarship1. In addition, the U.S. as a hegemon 
impacts the international behavior of all other countries. In this chapter, the U.S. provides 
a crucial case through which I will be able to examine one country for the purpose of 
understanding how the most prominent actor in international relations behaves in terms of 
its soft power use.  I am specifically interested in uncovering any new factors that may 
have resulted in such high soft power reliance.  
Turning to a crucial case design, I will explore the possible drivers of the 
American high soft power use. Crucial case studies are based on most-likely or least-
likely designs and can be useful for the purposes of testing certain types of theoretical 
arguments, as long as the theory provides relatively precise predictions and the 




assumption that some cases are more important than others for the purposes of testing a 
theory. They are based on a Bayesian perspective in which the weight of the evidence is 
evaluated relative to prior theoretical expectations (McKeown 1999, George and Bennett 
2005).  This means that the U.S.’ soft power reliance should be examined as a crucial 
case because of its major power status in world politics and because of its high soft power 
action outcome.  
My statistical analysis revealed that, the U.S. has an exceptionally high GDP 
(1.15 trillion USD) and high CINC scores (0.14). Both of these values support its major 
power status in the world but none of these factors provided adequate answers about the 
high American soft power use in the regression models of Chapter 4. The polity score 
(10) was just slightly higher than the average of 51 democracies (8.87), therefore it was 
not providing additional explanation regarding the exceptionally high soft power use 
either (See Table 6.1).  
Table 6.2 Average values for the main independent variables from the statistical analysis 
(1995-2020). GDP is in current USD 
 Social Trust GDP CINC Polity 




1.06 7.00E+11 0.01 8.87 
scale min -0.46 3.57E+09 0 -10 





My expectation based on my theory was that the high social trust value would 
drive the American high soft power use. However, the findings indicated that the U.S.’s 
social trust value was only slightly high at 1.62, which did not explain its exceptionally 
high soft power reliance (See Table 6.2). Therefore, while the American social trust value 
is somewhat higher that the average social trust value of the 51 countries include in the 
dataset (1.06), it is not high enough to confirm my theory.  
Since social trust could not provide adequate explanation for American high soft 
power use, I turn to the realist literature that offered alternative explanations. Chapter 5 
explained in detail my theory of soft power use based on the perception of geopolitical 
threat. I will apply this theory to reveal if geopolitical threat offers answers about the high 
American soft power use. The following sections will further study the impact of 
geopolitical threat on American soft power use.  
6.2 EXPLAINING THE EXEPTIONALY HIGH SOFT AMERICAN POWER USE  
Since social trust did not provide sufficient answers about countries’ soft power 
use, I now turn to alternative explanations.  As I explained in Chapter 5, the foreign 
policy literature pointed to geopolitics’ impact on countries’ foreign policy behaviors. 
This literature suggested that countries react to geopolitical threat by taking actions that 
are designed to mitigate the threatening actor (Clerk 2015, Sberro 2015, Moisio 1998, 
Browning 2002). Specifically, realist literature pointed to alliance formation as 
countries’ reaction to a perceived threat (Walt 1985). Realist and neorealist literature 
have also suggested that when a country is framed as a strong military power, it will 
impact the others by causing them to perceive them as a threat (Sherif 1966, Levine and 




that countries that feel threatened may use soft power instruments to a higher degree in 
order to build alliances against the perceived threat.  
As the realist literature also suggested, states that appear aggressive can make 
others react with the goal of strengthening alliances against this perceived threat. This is 
called balancing (Walt 1985). When the aggressor is believed to be unalterably 
aggressive, balancing with others is also the best way to avoid becoming a victim (Langer 
1950, Walt 1985). In this chapter I theorize that threatened countries are more likely to 
use a high level of soft power to balance out the strong regional threat by trying to build 
alliances.  
It is also one of the underlying assumptions of this theory that high positive 
interaction with other countries in the form of soft power can enhance alliance building 
by creating, what Nye (2011) called a climate of attractions and a web of personal ties. 
The high level of positive interaction between countries makes alliance formation more 
likely. In terms of my crucial case design, this means that according to this alternative 
theory, the U.S. is expected to rely on a very high degree of soft power to balance against 
the perceived threat. Specifically, this means that the crucial case should exhibit the 
strong alliance building and seek to balance against the threat. 
My theory further suggests that as a result of the perceived geopolitical threat the 
political elite creates a narrative that emphasizes national security and alliance building. 
As it was explained in Chapter 5, major geopolitical actors such as Russia create a 
situation in which the political elite in other countries perceives them as threat. In order to 
communicate this threat to the public and to the leadership, the political elite creates a 




Also, governments that are perceiving a threat, as a result of the political elite’s 
narrative on national security, they create soft power programs and institutions to 
strengthen their alliances. These institutions support educational, cultural and other types 
of programs that enhance the mutual understanding between countries and thus 
strengthen alliances. Over time these programs become well established. For this reason, 
the history of the American programs signals institutional commitment. Stated 
differently, when programs exist for a long time, they are likely to remain in use and thus 
enhance the country’s soft power use abroad.  
Finally, allocating federal budget to soft power programs should also be closely 
related to the political elite’s narrative. Because of the political elite’s narrative about the 
perceived threat to their national security and the need for alliance building, we 
should expect the government to fund programs that support this narrative in the form of 
cultural and educational programs. This narrative builds into the budget calculation and 
increases the amount of funds approved for soft power programs. These programs 
support the government’s efforts to balance against the perceived threat by strengthening 
the cultural, personal and often political connections between countries and ultimately the 
alliances between them. The repeated issues of national security and alliance building in 
the political narrative often result in a lock-in mechanism which makes it more likely that 
the government will continue to use these programs instead of canceling them. This is 
also called path-dependence, and it results in the consistent and high soft power budget 
allocation and signals the general policy direction of the government2 (Jones et al. 2009).   
Overall, in countries where there is a perception of geopolitical threat, the 




security and alliance building. In order to be successful in the promotion of their foreign 
policy, the country needs soft power institutions and a consistent soft power budget 
allocation. Closely studying the U.S. therefore, I seek to I seek to determine whether the 
biggest soft power user supports this new formulation of the theory as well as uncover factors 
that may have been overlooked in my statistical models. 
This chapter will proceed as follows:  I turn to four indicators. These are: 1) 
perceived geopolitical threat; 2) narrative of the political elite; 3) the history and mission 
of the soft power programs and institutions; 4) the budget of soft power programs. In the 
conclusion, I will trace the connection between the newly found indicators and soft power 
use in the United States.  
6.3 GEOPOLITICS OF THE UNITED STATES 
Based on my theory, the existence of a perceived geopolitical threat can lead to a 
defense mechanism in the form of balancing with high soft power use. In this section, I 
discuss American geopolitics with special attention to any perceived geopolitical threat 
that would lead to a possible high American soft power use.  
While the U.S. has been fortunate with its geographic location being surrounded 
by oceans to protect it and with peaceful neighbors such as Canada and Mexico, it found 
itself as one of the two key players in the Cold War. The U.S. and Russia were allies 
during WWII, but since the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, the U.S. was worried about 
the geographic and ideological spread of Communism (Scott 1996). Directly after WWII, 
the Soviet Union started to threaten the U.S. with its geopolitical ambitions (Leffer 1984). 
Since 1946, until the late 1980s the official interpretation of the strategic goals of the 




terms of geopolitics, this also meant that the U.S. was facing an enemy that was 
perceived to want to expend its borders and its influence as far as possible.  
The American response after World War I was the creation and support of a new 
network of democratic countries (Arndt 2006, Lebovic 2013). By the 1960s the Soviet 
threat became more imminent. The domino theory argued that the Soviet Union will try 
to take over the developing world country by country and destroy the American liberal 
world order (Scott 1996). In terms of an American response, the political elite chose to 
promote strong alliance building to protect against the perceived threat of the USSR. This 
meant that the political elite selected actions that would stop and even roll back the USSR 
from these countries to ensure the free expansion of Western democracies (Scott 1996, 
Persico 1990). As a result of the American political elite’s narrative on the perceived 
threat, starting in the 1960s many programs and aid packages were created and sent to the 
geographically threatened areas such as Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua, Cambodia and 
Mozambique as part of the alliance building efforts (Scott 1996). 
While my case study begins after the Cold War, this chapter argues that the 
perceived geopolitical threat of the Cold War jump-started the American soft power use 
as a defense mechanism against a threat. I further theorize that this historical occurrence 
also created the political and institutional foundations for American high soft power use 
after the Cold War.  
  With the end of the Cold War, the geopolitical threat also declined until 
September 11, 2001 (Debrix 2007). The attacks on the World Trade Centers ignited a 
new geopolitical threat in the form of the Global War on Terror.  The new policy also 




anxieties and fear born from the 9/11 attacks with respect to transboundary interactions 
continued during the 2000s in the U.S. (Coleman 2013).  
Geopolitics’ influence on the American history lead to the development and 
continued perception of threat (first from the Soviets and later from terrorists) in the U.S. 
political elite (Debrix 2007, Coleman 2013). Since U.S. national security has been 
threated since World War II, the main foreign policy goal was to protect American 
borders and gain influence abroad. Since both Communism and terrorism were perceived 
existential and ideological threats to the American way of life, as a defense mechanism 
the U.S government relied on a high level of soft power in order to combat such 
perceived threats in the form of alliance building. 
6.4 THE POLITICAL ELITE’S NARATIVE: NATIONAL SECURITY  
With this section I will pay special attention to the theorized connection between 
the political elite’s narrative in national security and the American soft power use. 
Specifically, I will focus on the American political elite’s narrative about the perceived 
Soviet threat during the Cold War, and the perceived threat of terrorism after 2001. 
Looking at speeches and publications from the political elite, I will also evaluate if the 
policy direction was pointing to alliance building as a result of such perceived threats and 
if the U.S. government was balancing with its soft power actions. 
The U.S. is a Federal Presidential Constitutional Republic in which the President 
plays a key role in foreign policy formulation. As part of the political elite, the 
President’s narrative guides the formulation of foreign policy which can increase or 
decrease soft power use. This section will highlight some presidential (and other 




security threat and if they were likely to use soft power instruments in order to create 
alliances. This section will also look at the alliances that were formed during this time-
period to see if they were created to defend against the perceived threat. 
6.4.1 THE POLITICAL ELITE’S NARRATIVE ABOUT THE SOVIET 
THREAT 
Even though Russia and the U.S. were allies during WWI, after the Bolshevik 
revolution in 1917 there was a growing fear that the Soviets planned world domination, 
which perception influenced the American political elite’s foreign policy narrative 
(Leffler 1984, Leffler 1985, Scott 1996). By 1946, it was a common place for intelligence 
and military reports to state that the Soviet foreign policy goal was to dominate the 
Communist world (Leffler 1984).  In 1947, Undersecretary of State Dean G. Acheson 
warned that three continents could fall prey to Soviet domination (Acheson 1969). As a 
result, what showed up in the political elite’s narrative was the need for the U.S. to 
remain in control of its geographic destiny (Debrix 2007) in addition to create and expand 
a network of like-minded democratic countries (Ruggie 1994). This was a carefully 
crafted foreign policy in which the U.S. protected its sphere of influence and 
strengthened its alliances.  
In the 1940s and 1950s, as a result of the perception of threat, the American elite 
supported the expansion of the American alliances in Southeast Asia and in Europe as a 
direct result of the expanding Soviet threat in China and in Eastern Europe (Leffler 
1984). As the National Security Council stated in a report in 1948, "Soviet political 
warfare might seriously weaken the relative position of the United States, enhance Soviet 




dangerously unfavorable conditions" (Leffler 1984). As this segment shows, the America 
elite in charge of national security felt that the U.S. had to implement foreign policy tools 
to balance against the Soviet threat. This policy direction led to alliance building in 
Europe and in Southeast Asia.  
In the 1960s American foreign policy turned towards Latin America to spread its 
influence. As President Kennedy announced on March 13, 1961, the U.S. government 
wanted to strengthen its alliances with Latin America. In the name of Alliances for 
Progress, President Kennedy declared that the U.S. government will provide economic 
assistance to Latin American countries:  
“I have called all people of the hemisphere to join in a new alliance for progress. Let us 
transform the American continent. For our unfiled task is to demonstrate to the entire 
world that men’s unsatisfied aspirations for economic progress and social justice can be 
best achieved by free men working within a framework of democratic institutions 
(Kennedy 1961).  
 
As President Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress speech demonstrated, the American 
president created new alliances with selected Latin American countries in order to 
balance against the soviet threat using democratic institutions and economic aid. This 
program also built democratic institutions in Latin America thus strengthening the 
political and social connection between the U.S. and selected South American countries 
including Puerto Rico, Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia (JFK Library 1).   
As the Cold War and the arms race continued into the 1970s, the political elite 
increasingly perceive the Soviet Union as a threat. In 1974 Kissinger wrote that the U.S.: 
“will oppose the attempt of any country to achieve a position of predominance either 
globally or regionally. We will resist any attempt to exploit the policy of détente to 
weaken our alliances. We will react if relaxation of tension is used as a cover to 
exacerbate conflict in international trouble spots. The Soviet Union cannot disregard 
these principles in any area of the world without imperiling its entire relationship with the 




Secretary of State Kissinger explained that the Soviet Union’s threat had to be 
stopped (Kissinger 1974). In fact, the above section also reveals the imminent perceived 
Soviet threat not only to the U.S. but also to the world. This global threat scale required 
exceptionally intensive soft power use from the U.S. Secretary Kissinger’s (1974) 
statement also reveals the special attention paid to protecting alliances in this global 
struggle. 
Even more pronounced was the Soviet threat during the 1980s when the U.S. was 
worried about a so-called domino effect of the Soviet Union’s expansion. In fact, 
President Reagan and most of his key advisors believed that the Soviets wanted world 
domination (Wolf 1984, Scott 1996). As President Reagan explained in an interview in 
June 1980: 
“Lets’ not delude ourselves, the Soviet Union underlies all the unrest that is going on. If 
they weren’t engaged in this game of dominoes, there wouldn’t be any hot spots in the 
world.” (House 1980) 
Reagan’s speech shows the continuous perceived threat from the Soviet Union. 
Using the metaphor of the unstoppable dominos falling, President Reagan’s narrative 
points to the U.S. important job to prevent any dominos from falling and also emphasizes 
the impact of the Soviet threat. 
In a speech in 1984, Reagan stressed the importance of strong alliances: 
“Strength is essential to negotiate successfully and protect our interests. If we're weak, we 
can do neither. Strength is more than military power. […] Equally important is our 
strength of spirit and unity among our people at home and with our allies abroad […] Our 
defenses are being rebuilt, our alliances are solid and our commitment to defend our 






The above speech points to the Reagan Administration’s focus on the 
strengthening alliances in order to balance against Communism. The alliance building 
process was an important aspect of the American foreign policy during the Cold War and 
continued after the Cold War (Ruggie 1994).  
Overall, the American political elite during the Cold War created a narrative of 
national security and the need to build alliances. This narrative manifested in continued 
alliance building against the perceived Soviet threat on a large scale. As a result, the U.S. 
government has joined the Allies (1941), helped create the United Nations in 1945 and 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949, joined the United Nations 
Command in 1950 and joined the Australia, New Zealand and the United States Security 
Treaty (ANZUS) in 1951. In addition, in 1954 the U.S. joined the Southeast Asia Treaty 
Organization (SEATO), 1955 the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty, in 1958 the 
North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and the Strategic Cooperation 
Agreement with Israel in 1981. 
In terms of alliance building, by 1965, based on the Correlates of War’s 
International Government Organization data shows that the U.S. was one of the most 
integrated countries with the most alliances (Pevehouse et al 2004). In addition, literature 
has also pointed to the American foreign policy goal of skillfully forming alliances 
during this time-period in order to balance against the Soviet threat (Debrix 2007, Leffler 
2005, Payne 1994) and to build and strengthen a network of democratic countries with 
U.S. leadership (Ruggie 1994). Stated differently, during the Cold War as a result of a 
perceived threat from the Soviet Union, the American foreign policy was oriented to 





6.4.2 THE POLITICAL ELITE’S NARRATIVE ABOUT THE THREAT FROM 
TERRORISM 
After the end of the Cold War, there was a calmer period where the perceived 
threats were declining. During this time, the political elite’s national security speeches 
focused on the American role in the post-Cold War era. In 1990 immediately after the 
Cold War has ended, President Bush stated the following: 
“This is the beginning of a new world order […] in which self-determination, 
cooperative deterrence, and joint action against aggression would come to hold greater 
sway.” (Bush 1990). Based on the Bush foreign policy statement therefore, the future of 
American foreign policy was based on multilateral cooperation and working together 
with other nations. This enhanced alliance building continued into the Clinton 
Administration. Working together with NATO, the United States wanted to extend, in the 
words of President Bill Clinton, "the fabric of transatlantic prosperity and security" into 
Central and Eastern Europe (Ruggie 1994).  
President Clinton later further explained in his 1995 State of the Union address: 
“Our security still depends upon our continued world leadership for peace and freedom 
and democracy. As the statement shows, President Clinton expressed a strong desire to 
build international alliances. In addition, President Clinton’s also stresses the need for 
American global leadership. 
 The attacks of 9/11 brought a high level of fear back into American society, 
especially into the political elite (Debrix 2007). As Debrix (2007) stated, after 9/11 the 




the Middle East and suggested to focus on national security. President Bush had to 
respond to a direct attack on American soil from a peacekeeper to a terrorism eradicator 
around the world. President Busch stated the following about American’s role in 
responding to 9/11. “Our responsibility to history is clear: to answer these attacks and rid 
the world of evil.” (Busch 2001, p.1). As President Busch’s statement reveals, according 
to the President, terrorism was a threat to U.S. national security and the U.S. had to play a 
global leadership role in stopping terrorism in other countries as well. As President Bush 
noted during his 2002 State of the Union address of America’s new war against terror: 
“Our cause is just, and it continues. Our discoveries in Afghanistan confirmed our worst 
fears and showed us the true scope of the task ahead. We have seen the depth of our 
enemies’ hatred in videos, where they laugh about the loss of innocent life. And the depth 
of their hatred is equaled by the madness of the destruction they design ....They embrace 
tyranny and death as a cause and a creed. We stand for a different choice, made long ago, 
on the day of our founding. We affirm it again today. We choose freedom and the dignity 
of every life.” 
 
President Bush’s address illustrates well the magnified perceived threat caused by 
terrorism. The speech advocated for the protection of the U.S. and all other countries 
from such perceived threat. Specifically defending our European allies. As Blankley 
(2006), the former speechwriter of President Reagan wrote: 
“To preserve the West, Americans must revive Europe’s Western values. We cannot 
afford to lose Europe. We cannot afford to see Europe transformed into a launching pad 
for Islamist jihad.” (p. 21) 
 
As the above-narrative shows, the post 9/11 period’s narrative was dominated by 
language that emphasized the perception of fear and the need to stay close with our allies 
as well as the need to defend them. In other words, the elite’s narrative about national 




This continued perceived threat from terrorism also played a strong part in 
President Obama’s narrative: 
“This century's threats are at least as dangerous as and, in some ways, more complex than 
those we have confronted in the past. They come from weapons that can kill on a mass 
scale and from global terrorists who respond to alienation or perceived injustice with 
murderous nihilism. They come from rogue states allied to terrorists and from rising 
powers that could challenge both America and the international foundation of liberal 
democracy. They come from weak states that cannot control their territory or provide for 
their people.” (2007 p.3) 
 
As President Obama stated, the perceived threat of terrorism from multiple 
directions was imminent and dangerous. His narrative enforced the need to focus on 
national security to protect the country. In addition, President Obama also emphasized 
that need to build alliances and defend America as well as all other countries by working 
together: 
“America cannot meet the threats of this century alone, and the world cannot meet them 
without America. We can neither retreat from the world nor try to bully it into 
submission. We must lead the world, by deed and by example.” (Obama 2007 p. 4) 
 
President Obama’s turn to the global community to engage them and work 
together with them in order to defend itself and each other shows the American foreign 
policy of building alliances as a reaction to a perceived threat of terrorism. In terms of the 
Obama Administration’s alliance building efforts, the U.S. was still member of NATO 
and in addition later joined the U.S.–Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement in 
2012 and renewed the U.S Israel Strategic Partnership in 2013. This is relevant as these 
partnership in addition to joining the Paris Climate Agreement in 2016 demonstrate that 






In the same speech president Obama also stated: 
“Today we are called again to provide visionary leadership. […] To renew American 
leadership in the world, I intend to rebuild the alliances, partnerships, and institutions 
necessary to confront common threats and enhance common security.” (Obama 2007 p.2) 
 
In the U.S. the political elite has been very clear about the perceived threat of 
Communism during the Cold War and about the perceived threat of terrorism after 2001. 
As a result of the Soviet threat, one aspect of the elite’s narrative was the focus on 
national security and alliance building which boosted soft power use. 
The political elite’s narrative also revealed a new factor in its foreign policy. The 
narrative clearly demonstrated the American desire for global leadership. Regarding 
global leadership, literature suggests that hegemons (Wight 1978) such as the U.S. aspire 
to create a global empire and to do so they will be more active in international relations. 
According to this explanation, hegemonic states have a different agenda than other 
countries as they wish to become global leaders (Lemke 2003, Wight 1978). Soft power 
is especially useful to countries that are trying to expand their global roles and project 
more power. Therefore, in the American case, a global leadership desire has also been 
revealed as a factor boosting its soft power use. 
6.5. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN SOFT POWER 
PROGRAMS  
According to my theory, in countries where there is a perceived threat, the 
political elite creates a narrative that leads to the creation of soft power institutions and 
programs so the country can balance against the threat. In order to study the U.S. 
institutions’ soft power programs and the consistency of the American government’s soft 




I will pay special attention to the age and lifespan of each institution and whether the 
mission statements include alliance building in foreign policy in the mission statements. 
The goal is to reveal any connections between the elite’s narrative about national security 
and the level of soft power use executed by these programs.  
In order to better understand the American government’s strategic choices 
regarding its soft power reliance, in the following section I turn to the analysis of soft 
power programs to reveal, which U.S. programs support alliance building with soft power 
tools. I also study the timespan of each program to see how long they have been in 
existence. I also collect information from various government websites and from federal 
budget documents. In addition, I also refer to foreign policy articles.  
Even though there is no soft power program within the U.S government, the 
evaluation of the listed programs revealed soft power elements.3 In the American 
government’s budget documents I found that it is the Department of State’s selected 
programs along with the Department of State’s affiliated agencies that are compatible 
with my definition of soft power. The following list is a chronological order of the 
American soft power programs. 
Department of State (DOS) (1789) 
o Diplomatic and Consular Programs (1789) 
o Division of Cultural Relations (1938) 
o Foreign Affairs Programs (1946) 
 Education and Cultural Exchange Programs (1946) 
 Fulbright Program (1946) 










Department of State Affiliated or Independent Agencies 
o Broadcasting Board of Governors (1941) 
o United States Information Agency (1953) 
o United States International Aid Development (1961) 
o United States Institute of Peace (1984) 
o Overseas Contingency Operations (2001) 
 
          As the compiled list shows, in the U.S. there is one department, which is the 
Department of State (DOS) with 7 programs and 5 affiliated/independent agencies that 
are using soft power to achieve foreign policy goals identified by this study.  In the next 
section, I will evaluate the DOS’ and the affiliated/independent agencies’ soft power 
programs to see if they seek to build alliances with their efforts in order to balance 
against a perceived threat.  
6.5.1 DEPARTMENT OF STATE (1789) 
The State Department, originally known as the Department of Foreign Affairs at 
the time of its creation in 1789 is the oldest of the cabinet-level agencies in the Executive 
Branch. It consists largely of diplomats and Foreign Service officers who carry out 
American foreign policy throughout the world (AllGov. DOS. 2019). Since its creation, 
the Department of State has grown and has been reorganized to focus on emerging global 
responsibilities (Office of the Historian 2019).  
The foreign affairs functions of the U.S. Government are carried out through a 
complex network of agencies. Foreign policy and diplomatic relations are led by the 
Department of State, development assistance is led by the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID), international broadcasting by the Broadcasting Board of 
Governors; and other functions carried out by several other agencies, including the Peace 




6.5.2 DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS (1789) 
The U.S. government has been using diplomatic relations programs since 
September 15, 1789 as part of the Department of State (f/k/a Department of Foreign 
Affairs). Initially there were two services devoted to diplomatic and consular activity. 
The Diplomatic Service provided ambassadors and ministers to staff embassies overseas, 
while the Consular Service provided consuls to assist United States sailors and promote 
international trade and commerce. Since 1789, these functions have greatly expanded.  
Today, the conduct of diplomatic relations involves the learning and exchanging 
in-depth knowledge and understanding of political and economic events in many nations. 
Some of the main goals include promoting human rights internationally, supporting 
emerging democracies and economic development, improving the global environment, 
and meeting humanitarian emergencies that destroy political and economic well-being 
and stability are vital to America’s long-term interest. These goals require quality 
reporting, analysis, and personal contact. American diplomats and Department of State 
staff work at more than 260 missions abroad (U.S. Budget 2007, p.13). While these 
functions were not specifically soft power programs, they facilitated the use of soft power 
as they were created to use traditional diplomacy with other governments.  
6.5.3 DIVISION OF CULTURAL RELATIONS (1938) 
The United States government has created soft power programs as early as the 
1930s to expand its influence abroad (Arndt 2006). The first U.S. soft power program 
identified by this study is the Division of Cultural Relations created in 1938. The 
formation of this department was partly the result of Wilson’s universalist pledge after 




U.S. (Arndt 2006, Lebovic 2013), and partly as a result of the growing influence of the 
Communist ideology of the Soviet Union (Leffler 1984, Leffler 1985, Scott 1996, Keys 
2004).  
The War and the U.S.’s sizable bureaucracy and large federal budget also raised 
questions about the intellectual side and goals of U.S. foreign policy, specifically about 
the best way to handle the outreach with other governments in the future (Healt and 
Kaplan 1977, Arndt 2006). As a solution to these questions, the foundations of soft power 
programs were created first in the form of the Division of Cultural Relations. The 
designers of this division had built a mechanism to support the ideas of American cultural 
internationalism and the idea that the attractive American lifestyle can transform 
ideologies and societies for the rest of the Century (Keys 2004, Arndt 2006).   
The Division of Cultural Relations was created to use influence abroad (Arndt 
2006) and while it was not technically called a soft power program, it fits my definition 
of soft power. This cultural program was created to communicate the attractiveness of 
American norms and values while promoting a dialogue with other countries in order to 
facilitate political and economic cooperation while the rest of the world was dealing with 
the rise of fascism (Arndt 2006, Lebovic 2013). Spreading American attractiveness and 
ideas soon became the main function of the Cultural Division of the State Department, 
which handled the information exchange together with international educational and 
scientific cooperation (Cull 2003).  
With the creation of the Division of Cultural Relations, the idea of creating a 
centralized department where American information flow and cultural outreach has been 




form of the America dream (Ninkovich 1981). The deeply held belief that the 
attractiveness of the American lifestyle could transform other ideologies and social 
systems was the underlying motivation (Keys 2004).  
6.5.4 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS PROGRAMS (1946) 
The Foreign (International) Affairs programs initially were broken up into issue 
areas such as diplomats, embassies, travel, culture and information. The general mission 
of these programs was to support diplomats and development experts, and project 
American values all over the world (Clinton 2011). Based on my conceptualization of 
soft power actions, I found that many of the International Affairs Programs qualified as 
soft power programs. To see the full list of State Department Programs, See Appendix C. 
According to the federal budget documents for the fiscal year 1996, the specific 
purpose of the Department of State’s Foreign Affairs programs was to support other 
nations in their needs: 
“The programs continue our commitment to strengthen democracy and the emergence of 
free market economies in the newly independent states (NIS) of the former Soviet Union 
[…] support of a strong and growing global economy and […] providing humanitarian 
response to crises and conflicts that have divided many nations.” (DOS Budget FY 1996, 
p.115) 
 
This statement was later changed to a message focusing on building international 
coalition, shifting the focus from domestic development to the War on Terror: 
“Since September 11, 2001, the Department’s top priority has been the war on terrorism. 
The State Department has led the effort to build and manage the broad-based 
international coalition that helped defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan and is now 
destroying the al Qaeda terrorist network around the world. […] While the war on 
terrorism is our top foreign policy priority, the President has stressed that it cannot be 
our only one. We live in an age of tremendous opportunities to advance America’s 





Finally, arriving to the 2011’s agenda of fostering global consensus as it was articulated 
in their budget statement. 
“The Department of State […] and other international programs advance the interests of 
the United States through engagement, partnership, and the promotion of universal 
values. Through the power of example and the empowerment of people, using diplomatic 
and development tools, the Administration is working to forge the global consensus 
required to defeat the threats, manage the challenges, and seize the opportunities of the 
21st century.” (DOS Budget FY 2011, 106). 
 
As the mission statement of the 2011 budget document above shows, the 
objective of the U.S. government’s International Affairs programs was to strengthen 
international engagement and foster global consensus and cooperation by using the 
examples of American values in addition to diplomatic, economic and other soft power 
instruments. This statement makes it clear that spreading American values and interest 
vis soft power instruments in order to create alliances is one of the core American foreign 
policy goals. This statement also confirms that in 2011 the main objective remains to 
spread American influence through attraction abroad. With respect to soft power actions, 
the mission statement also indicates that the U.S. wishes to use soft power instruments to 
foster global cooperation in order to protect against threats.  
6.5.5 EDUCATION AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE PROGRAMS (ECE) 
(1946) 
The Education and Cultural Exchange Programs (ECE) was first created in 1946 
under the name of Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs (OIC). In 
1961 it became the Education and Cultural Exchange Programs with the mission to 
increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of 
other countries by means of educational and cultural exchange that assist in the 




State (Under Bureau of Educational Cultural Affairs), the Education and Cultural 
Exchange Programs connect scholars, artists, educators, athletes, students and the youth 
in the United States and in almost every other country in world (ecastategov/about 1).  
ECE cultivates mutual understanding between the people of the United States and 
the people of other countries to promote friendly, and peaceful relations, as mandated by 
the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961. ECE exchange program 
alumni consist of over 1 million people around the world, including more than 75 Nobel 
Laureates and nearly 450 current and former heads of state and government 
(ecastategov/about 1). In terms of soft power, the ECE programs use a high degree of soft 
power to connect people in the U.S. and abroad through talent and scholarship. 
6.5.6 FULBRIGHT PROGRAM (1946) 
The 1940s produced another significant soft power program. The Fulbright Program, 
created in 1946 was one of the new initiatives which later became one of the most 
significant exchange programs (Dizard 2004, Arndt 2006, Lebovic 2013). Today the 
Fulbright Program runs under ECE. The basic idea was to support the free exchange of 
the elite from various countries who would spread the American norms and values and 
make the U.S. more attractive abroad. It was initial funded by the surplus of the wartime 
economy and that its ideological and foreign policy justifications were based on rational 
efforts to promote American hegemony and power politics (Lebovic 2013). More 
specifically, as Lebovic (2013) explains, the idea of the Fulbright exchange programs 
grew out of American “nationalist globalism” in support of U.S. global hegemony by 
using the unifying power of American culture. In addition, by strengthening the mutual 




government is also increasing its ability to build alliances with those countries through 
exchange visitors. 
6.5.7 UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY (1953) 
United States Information Agency (USIA) is an independent agency which was 
initially only responsible for providing information about the U.S., its policies and about 
the good understanding of American society and its values. The agency was created in 
1953 in order to spread American influence via culture and people to people diplomacy 
until 1999 when it was merged into the State Department under the newly created Under 
Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. 
The United States Information Agency (USIA) served two purposes: 1) to 
promote better understanding of the U.S. in other countries and; 2) to increase mutual 
understanding between Americans and the public abroad (Wang 2007). Even more 
importantly, the creation of USIA with the Unites States Information and Education 
Exchange Act of 1948 provided a legal foundation for American soft power use for many 
years to come (Wang 2007).  
At the birth of USIA in 1953 the Cold War and the bipolar system guided the 
foreign policy of the U.S. This meant that the long-term goal of the government was to 
defeat Communism. In 1953 the main function of the newly created USIA was to handle 
cultural information such as books, libraries, cultural centers and exhibits in other words 
focus on the information side of American soft power (Arndt 2006, Cull 2003, Wang 
2007). From its creation in 1953, USIA served as the key information agency which was 




Nevertheless, the use of American culture and the way of life remained part of the 
method to conduct foreign policy. The American soft power machine was fueled by the 
Cold War’s ideological conflict with the Soviet Union and it was going strong until the 
end of the Cold War in 1990. As a result, USIA had numerous directors throughout the 
years promoting various messages and foreign policy agendas, but overall, continued to 
be the most extensive public relations machine in the world (Cull 2003, Wang 2007).  
By 1994, the agency defined, explained, and advocated U.S. policies abroad and 
sought to increase knowledge and understanding among foreign audiences of U.S. society 
and it values which is a remarkable vehicle for soft power use (United States Budget 
1994, p. A-1155). Other programs included overseas missions, Radio Free Asia and the 
Bureau of Information among others. For the full list of programs see Appendix H. USIA 
as independent agency was later melted into the Internal Communication Agency in 1998 
(Act 1998), but it’s mission and prior activities abroad created the foundations of soft 
power programs that are still active today. The formation of USIA contributed to the 
American government’s consistent and strategic soft power use around the world (U.S. 
Budget 2020).  
The above-mentioned soft power programs were not discontinued only transferred 
into the State Department in 1999 (Cull 2003, Wang 2007). Studying these programs and 
their goals and mission statements while considering the historical changes in the world, 
it becomes apparent that the U.S. mission to influence other nations with its culture, 
norms and values did not end with the Cold War. In fact, the mission statements 
continued to express the will to build alliances using the attractiveness of American 




The United States Information Agency was the largest full-service public relations 
organization in the world during the Cold War, spending over $2 billion per year to 
highlight America's view, while diminishing the Soviet's side interacting with about 150 
different countries (Snyder 1995). It was also one of the first centralized government 
bureaucracies in the world that was created to use influence abroad (Gienow-Hecht 
2010). In 1953 the information flow was centralized under USIA with the ultimate goal 
of overseeing all outgoing information about the U.S. (Cull 2010). Initially, the agency 
created programs that shaped the information flow to their countries about the U.S., but 
later it also included programs that supported the exchanges of persons, both short and 
longer-term visits and created publications, television and radio broadcasting, libraries 
and exhibits (U. S. Budget 1992 p. Part 2-198). Overall, USIA played a key role in the 
formation and execution of soft power use and thus increased American soft power use 
abroad.  
6.5.8 PEACE CORPS (1961) 
The Peace Corps was created in 1961. Its mission was to share American ideals 
and values abroad. The volunteers of the Peace Corps dispel myths about the United 
States, help people of interested countries and create bonds of friendship with host 
country citizens. The volunteers are teachers, business advisors, information technology 
consultants, agriculture and environmental specialists, and health and HIV/AIDS 
educators (Peace Corps Budget 2009). 
Since 1961, the Peace Corps has represented the United States in 141 countries, 
working to advance the agency’s three goals: 1) building local capacity by strengthening 




volunteers; 2) sharing America with the world by promoting a better understanding of 
Americans through volunteers who live and work within local communities; and 3) 
bringing the world back home by increase Americans’ awareness and knowledge of other 
cultures and global issues through volunteers (Peace Corps Congressional Budget 
Justification/Summary, ii).  The Peace Corps strengthens mutual understanding between 
countries therefore strengthen American soft power use and alliance building. 
6.5.9 UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
(USAID) (1961) 
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is an 
independent agency of the United States federal government that is primarily responsible 
for administering civilian foreign aid and development assistance. The programs within 
USAID are designed to expand diplomatic and development operations (QDDR 2). These 
commitments are compatible with my soft power definition of soft power as they include 
increased U.S. foreign assistance in order to reduce poverty, combat global health threats, 
develop markets and govern peacefully, which makes the U.S. attractive abroad […] 
(New Era of Responsibility 2010, 87). With large sum of development assistance 
provided mostly to developing countries by the U.S. government, the U.S. appears 
supportive, and attractive which increases its soft power. The USAID’s sizable budget 
also reflects the U.S.’s commitment to strengthen diplomatic and assistance tools to 
address current and future challenges that impact the security of the United States. While 
USAID is an independent agency, its budget is often treated with DOS’s foreign affairs 




The origin of the United States Agency of International Development (USAID) 
can be traced back to the post-World War II U.S. foreign policy. Moving away from 
isolationism, policy makers had been advocating for a more internationally involved 
foreign policy. The cornerstone of this policy shift was the result of Secretary of State 
George C. Marshall’s commencement address at Harvard University in 1947 (Natsios 
2005). The core message of the speech was that the U.S. should use its wealth and power 
to help the world devasted by the war back to economic health (Marshall 1947).  As a 
result of this speech, the Marshall Plan was created and soon after USAID was 
established. Secretary Marshall’s speech indicated; the U.S. should help other countries 
for the simple reason that it can. This notation was built into the foundation of both the 
Marshall Plan and later into USAID. In terms of soft power, helping war-torn countries 
has always been one of the actions that results in a favorable view and increased political 
and economic cooperation.  
Building on the success of the Marshall Plan, President Harry S. Truman 
proposed an international development assistance program in 1949. The 1950 Point Four 
Program focused on creating markets for the United States by reducing poverty and 
increasing production in developing countries and diminishing the threat of Communism 
by helping countries prosper under capitalism. Similarly to the Marshall Plan, these 
programs provided economic aid to countries in need which action in return brought the 
U.S. into a favorable light and increased its attraction abroad. From 1952 to 1961, 
programs supporting technical assistance and capital projects continued as the primary 
form of U.S. aid, and were a key component of U.S. foreign policy (USAID History). 




instrument also became one of the core pillars of U.S. global engagement. But it needed a 
strong institution to oversee these foreign policy actions, therefore in 1961 President 
Kennedy created USAID (United States Agency for International Development). 
USAID has many programs focusing on separate issues such as Agriculture and 
Food Security, Democracy, Human Rights and Governance, Education, Gender Equality, 
Global Health and Science, Technology and Innovation, just to mention a few. For the 
full list of programs, see Appendix I. The Bush Administration has made development a 
national security priority and one of the three strategic areas of emphasis for foreign 
policy and the Global War on Terror (Natsios 2005). As a result, international economic 
development became one of the three foreign policy goals of the U.S. after 2001.  
 In terms of soft power actions, sending aid to other countries is one of the key 
soft power instruments that connect countries together. And in terms of the U.S.’s foreign 
policy objectives, USAID programs continue to strengthen the U.S.’s global leadership 
role and they play a key role in U.S. foreign policy. The fact the U.S. government 
continuously uses these soft power programs (U.S. Budget 2020) reveals that it sees them 
as effective and useful foreign policy tools.  In addition, the use of development aid 
increases American soft power use abroad.  
Overall, USAID has been functioning as a soft power institution, running 
programs that provide financial aid to other countries and thus increase American soft 







6.5.10 BROADCASTING BOARD OF GOVERNORS (1941) 
The Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) was originally formed in 1941 as 
part of the United States Information Agency, but it is now an independent entity since 
1999. The BBG is still funded by Congress under Foreign Affairs programs budget items. 
BBG is responsible for all U.S. non-military international broadcasting programs. The 
BBG promotes freedom and democracy and enhances understanding through multimedia 
communication of accurate, objective, and balanced news, information, and other 
programming about America and the world. BBG radio, television, and internet programs 
reach over 215 million people each week in 61 languages. The agency was created when 
the USIA was folded into the State Department and remained independent ever since. 
Through this program, the BBG funds operations of the Voice of America (VOA), 
Office of Cuba Broadcasting (Radio and TV Marti), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 
(RFE/RL), Radio Free Asia (RFA), and Middle East Broadcasting Networks (MBN, 
including Alhurra and Radio Sawa). Their budget includes funding for local and regional 
coverage on VOA Radio Deewa to Afghanistan and Pakistan, MBN television and radio 
maintenance and repair, and digital equipment at RFE/RL and RFA (U.S. Budget 2012). 
These radio programs have played a key role in ending the Cold War using soft power 
tools (Simonyi and Trunkos 2015). And today they continue to spread American culture 
and influence using only the voice of radio programs in numerous languages. By 
contributing to the understanding of American culture and values, the BBG also fosters 






6.5.11 THE UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE (USIP) (1984) 
The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) formed in 1984 is an independent 
institute that is established and funded by Congress. USIP was created to help prevent 
and resolve violent international conflicts, promote post-conflict stability and 
development, and increase conflict management capacity, tools, and intellectual capital 
worldwide. The resources of USIP support peace-building efforts around the world and 
empower people with knowledge, skills, and resources through conflict management 
education, training, and research. USIP promotes peace and democracy in 15 developing 
or war-torn countries. Assisting post-conflict countries by which increasing America’s 
attractiveness abroad not only create bridges with other countries but also adds to the list 
of soft power action of the U.S and promotes alliance building.  
6.5.12 DEPARTMENT OF STATE’S-OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY 
OPERATIONS (OCO) (2001) 
In addition to the highlighted DOS Foreign Affairs and Related Agencies, the 
Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) programs must also be discussed as their sole 
purpose is to rebuild specific war-torn countries (Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan), which, 
similarly to the Marshall Plan, fits my definition of soft power. The main goals of the 
operations were to assist with post-war reconstruction of facilities as a result of the 
Global War on terror and train people to be able to run their own government, but such 
actions also bring the U.S.  government welcomed attraction as the Department of State 
helps the fragile countries to grow into self-reliant and secure nations (Department of 




Since 2001, the Contingency Operation budget is a new temporary part of the 
Department of State’s budget, which was created to replace some of the previous efforts 
of the Department of Defense to provide reconstruction, security, and stabilization 
assistance funding executed by non-military personnel. The account provides a source of 
flexible contingency funding to meet unforeseen reconstruction and stabilization needs of 
strategic countries (DOS FY 2011, McGarry and Epstein 2019).  
The Department of State’s Budget for the fiscal year 2011 stresses these Overseas 
Contingency Operations funds. The increasing amount of aid provided to Afghanistan 
and Pakistan is allocated in order to revitalize economic development and to confront the 
resurgence of the Taliban. Also, these OCO funds support the continued progress towards 
a sovereign, stable, and self-reliant Iraq and prepares the Department of State to assume 
responsibility for security, logistics, and police training programs as part of the military-
to-civilian transition in Iraq (DOS FY 2011, 105).  
This type of soft power has not been outlined enough in previous soft power 
literature; however, it fits my definition of the concept. While the contingency operations 
used to be coordinated and executed by military personnel thus, they may appear as hard 
power actions at first, but looking closer into the nature of these actions reveals that 
helping war-torn countries to rebuild can increases the U.S.’s attractiveness in Iraq and in 
Afghanistan and thus qualifies as a soft power program. Not only people receiving 
assistance from the U.S. government in the selected countries build trust and admiration 
for the U.S. servicemen on the ground, but also the international community notices the 
help of the U.S. government. All these activities increase American attractiveness abroad. 




One thing that became apparent by studying closer the listed programs while 
putting them in a historical context was that since 1938, the U.S. government has been 
consistently working on strengthening its alliances using all the previously established 
soft power programs. Initially, the U.S. government created programs as a reaction to the 
Soviet threat, and after 2001, the OCO program was established as a result of the 
perceived terrorist threat. The historical analysis also revealed that for the past decades, 
old programs such as the Fulbright Program and institutions such as the USIA4 has been 
executing American soft power in order to build alliances in order to balance against the 
Soviet Union and later against terrorism. 
The mission statements and the timeline of the creation of the foreign affairs, 
cultural, educational and economic programs further revealed that the U.S. has an 82-year 
history relying on cultural instruments, 79-year history in using broadcasting tools and 
59-year experience in using economic aid in foreign policy. As the listed programs and 
institutions also revealed, as a reaction to the perceived threat from the Soviet Union and 
later from terrorism, the American political elite directed foreign policy towards a 
strategic use of soft power tools in order to strengthen alliances all over the world, which 
resulted in overall high soft power use.  
In addition, similarly to the previous section on the analysis of the political elite’s 
narrative, the evaluation of the government programs also revealed the U.S.’s desire to 
have a global reach with its cultural and educational programs. This means that while the 
perceived threat from the Soviet Unions and later from terrorism boosted the reliance on 
these soft power programs, in addition to alliance building the American desire to be a 




6.6 SOFT POWER BUDGET 
In order to reveal more about the American soft power budget, I will look at the 
allocated budget covering a 16-year timeframe. Based on my theory, in countries where 
there is a perceived threat, the political elite creates a narrative that focuses on national 
security which builds into the budget. As a defense mechanism, this narrative encourages 
alliance building in order to balance against the perceived threat. My theory also indicates 
that due to a path-dependent mechanism, balancing against a perceived threat result in a 
consistently high soft power budget. This section will look into the American federal 
budget to see if there is a high soft power allocation due to a perceived threat.  
I compiled the U.S.’s soft power budget by first selecting those agencies and their 
specific programs (listed above) which fit my soft power definition, then their annual 
budgets were collected for the time-period of 1995-2010. This included the combined 
budgets of the Department of State’s International Affairs Programs (including selected 
foreign operations and related programs), plus the Department of State’s Overseas 
Contingency Operations budget5 since 2002. Since the U.S. government’s International 
Affairs budget includes over 60 programs and the programs are regularly renamed, 
placed under new budget items, under new programs, or moved out of the DOS’s budget 
as an independent program, so I only compiled program-level budget data on the most 
known, consistently named and placed and funded budget issues and programs. These 
are: Diplomatic Relations, USIA, BBG, Peace Corps, USAID, and USIP in addition to 
the Department of State’s Overseas Contingency Operations budget6.  
The goal of the collection of the soft power budget and the breakdown of the 




and connecting it with possible enhancers such as the political elite’s narrative on 
national security. The budget quantifies collective political decisions made in response to 
incoming information, the preferences of the decision makers and the institutions that 
structure how decision are made (Jones et al. 2009). Changes in the distribution of 
budgetary outcomes is crucial to the study of policy changes (Jones et al. 2009) and in in 
this dissertation indicates a change in the support of soft power use with the underlying 
objective to build alliances in order to balance. It is the underlying assumption of this 
dissertation that if a government allocates money to a program, it intends to use its 
instrument to achieve its foreign policy goals. In addition, the amount of money allocated 
represents the level of significance of such programs to the government.  
The U. S.’s soft power budget within the State Department increased from $25 
billion (in 1995) to $65 billion by 2010 (See Figure 6.1). This increase was consistent 
with the rise of the total U.S. federal budget. After 9/11 when the Overseas Contingency 
Operation funding was added to assist with the non-military side of nation building, 
American soft power budget began to increase. As a result, the combined budget of the 
State Department’s International Affairs Program and its temporary emergency funding, 





Figure 6.1. U.S.’ Soft Power Budget 1995-2010 
Studying closer the three budget items on Figure 6.1, a steady increase can be 
discovered with peaks in 1999, 2004 and 2007. Seeing the consistency of a minimum of 
2% budget allocation for soft power programs throughout the examined time-period 
signals an important strategic statement. It is also important to note, that the two main 
soft power programs are both related to the Department of State, which indicates the 
government’s intention to use these soft power programs to achieve foreign policy goals. 
Looking deeper into the budget spike in 1999, the federal budget document 
reveals that the Clinton Administration requested more money for the Foreign Affairs 
programs specifically to support the newly independent states and for supporting the 
NATO integration of three new countries (Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic) (US 
Budget 1999, p 126-127). Supporting the three new former Soviet Satellite’s countries’ 
membership into the alliance made the U.S. look attractive not only to the supported 




explains his increased budget request with his desire to “advance U.S. leadership around 
the world” (US Budget 1999, p. 126).  
The budget spikes of 2004 and 2007 were the results of the Global War on Terror 
(GWOT). The U.S. government decided to fund the non-military foreign affairs related 
efforts through numerous departments. In 2004, the State Department received a large 
amount of funding for its Overseas Contingency Operations7 program for Iraq, 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. The 2007 budget spike represents the Bush Administration’s 
efforts to enhance democracy building and cultural and education exchange programs 
focusing on the Muslim world (US Budget 2007, p. 197). Both of these budget spikes 
were created as a reaction to the political elite’s narrative about the perceived threat from 
terrorism, and as a defense mechanism, these budget items were built into the American 
effort to strengthen American alliances abroad.  
Looking into the program-level analysis of the American soft power programs, as 
Figure 6.2 shows, the budget items receive a stable allocation between 11 Million USD to 
1.8 Billion USD each year. Since the Department of State has over 60 programs (only 
seven are shown), these allocations nicely add up into a consistent and stable soft power 
budget. Overall, soft power had enjoyed the consistent support of the federal government 
at a 2% of the federal budget with the lowest budget allocated in 1997 and 1998 (less 
than 2%) and the largest spike in 2007 to 2.6% of the federal budget (See Figure 6.2). 
Most of the mentioned programs belong to the Department of State and three are 
(USAID, USIP, Broadcasting Board of Governors) are now independent agencies. Some 
programs such as the Voice of America Radio broadcast are placed into new programs 




larger programs such as the Internal Communication Agency (Act 1998). Moving issue 
areas into different departments, creating and recreating mission statements is just the 
way governments try to adjust to changing demands (Arndt 2006, Cull 2003). In term of 
budget allocations, moving budget items into different department or program happens 
frequently. The historical overview of this dissertation revealed that cultural programs, 
for instance, have been moved multiple times within the State Department’s various 
bureaus (Arndt 2006). This analysis also revealed that in 2001 as a result of 9/11 a new 
policy orientation of the U.S. government increased the reliance and funding of nation 
building projects in post-conflict areas (Marks and Lamb 2012). This increase also leads 
to higher soft power use and enhanced alliance building in the targeted region.  
 
Figure 6.2 Program-Level Budget Information for Selected Department of State Related 






And while the U.S. total budget allocated for soft power programs are not high 
compared to its hard power allocations (Schneider 2005, Pigman 2010) it is one of the 
key findings of this dissertation that while the American government’s allocation of a 
minimum of 2% of total federal budget does not match its military spending (over 20%), 
but compared to other countries’ soft power programs it is a consistent and significant 
funding. In New Zealand for instance, there is less than 0.5% of the total budget allocated 
for soft power initiatives.  
The increasing numbers speak for themselves. Just as Nye suggested in a hearing 
at the Committee on Foreign Relations (2008b), the U.S. government considers the soft 
parts of power and allocates money for democratization and developments. The stability 
and the long history of the soft power institutions also indicate the government’s 
consistent strategic use of soft power tools. Another important observation about the soft 
power budget allocation is that it remained consistent with the lowest budget allocated in 
1997 and 1998 with only $15 billion, and the highest budget provided in 2007 with $74 
billion including the contingency operations, which constituted a budget spike (Jones et. 
at 2009).  
In addition, the evidence of path dependency can also be discovered in relations to 
the timespan and budget allocated. As Pierson (2000) explained path dependency, once a 
budget item or program is introduced it is likely to continue due to a relative benefit of 
the existing program. In this increasing return process, the probability of taking steps 
towards the same path increases with each step taken into that same direction (Piearson 
2000). In other words, in terms of soft power use, since 1938 the U.S. created institutions 




over time as doing so was relatively easier and cheaper than stopping the existing 
programs and starting new ones. Also, the idea of alliance building for national security 
reasons and the need to strengthen global leadership remained locked into the listed 
government programs’ mission statements.  
Overall, all these programs were created to spread U.S. influence around the 
world starting in 1938. This indicates a strong motivation not only to continue to use soft 
power instruments but also to create new ways to reach out to people in other countries. 
These programs continued to survive because the U.S. has also continued to rely on them 
to advance its interest. Also, these programs play a role in solving international problems 
using cost-effective tools such as economic aid (Clinton 2010, McGarry and Epstein 
2019). This analysis confirmed what has been revealed many times (Schneider 2005, 
Pigman 2010, Nye 2011) soft power instruments are cheaper than hard power tools. The 
fact that most of these programs still exists today is a strong indicator that the U.S. 
government is planning to rely on soft power actions in the long-term (US Budget 2020). 
The budget documents also revealed that the mission statements include the desire 
for American global leadership. While in the 1960s, economic assistant was needed, in 
the 1990s, it was democracy building in Europe and in the 2000s defeating global 
terrorism were the main budget items of the American government. In all these cases, the 
American political elite envisioned U.S. global leadership in these listed issues and 
Congress allocated the funds. Ultimately the high soft power spending lead to high soft 







This chapter discovered indicators that the statistical analysis missed. The 
underlying question was what factors led to the American high soft power use outcome 
when the theorized social trust was only at a medium level?  The American case study 
provided the following answers: First, the U.S. leaders perceived a strong geopolitical 
threat since the Cold War and later after 9/11. These perceived threats were geographic 
as well as ideological. Second, in order to stop the Soviet Union from spreading and 
terrorism from attacking, a strong national security focused narrative became part of the 
political elite’s narrative and policy recommendations. This narrative encouraged a 
form of a defense mechanism based on alliance building. The strong alliance building 
efforts (balancing) also ensured the high reliance on soft power instruments. This analysis 
also revealed that the political elite also supported a strong American global leadership 
role in the new world order for the same reason. Both of these policy directions resulted 
in high soft power use. 
Third, the history of American government programs revealed that since 1938, 
the U.S. government intentionally created programs which were designed to spread U.S.’ 
influence via attraction. In addition, the consistent alliance building, and global 
leadership mission of these programs has also been revealed. This means that in the U.S. 
the political elite’s narrative supported the use of soft power tools in order to balance 
against the perceived threats. This also led to high soft power use in foreign policy.  
Fourth, the budget distribution of the U.S. government’s soft power programs 
also confirmed that only some of the budget changes dynamically with policy changes 




path-dependent and the American government continues to rely on them since 1938. 
Also, by studying the patterns of soft power budgets, this analysis showed that the 
smaller soft power programs continue to run without disturbance or spikes while the 
major programs that receive the most funding react to policy changes in the form of 
budget spikes. This means that, as Pierson (2000) explained, steps taken into one 
direction become self-enforcing because the relative benefits of continuing the same path 
is higher than starting something new. Increasing returns processes ensure that the 
American soft power programs communicating attractiveness abroad continue to live on 
and get funded. Therefore, the U.S. soft power institutions’ budget are path-dependent, 
strong and stable. 
As the consistent funding of soft power programs together with the mission 
statements of the programs also revealed, the U.S. government continues to fund 
programs that strengthens its global leadership role. By relying on a high level of soft 
power actions the U.S. continues to work on achieving its ambitious global agenda. 
Stated differently, one of the findings of this chapter is that the U.S. government has had 
an inspiration to become a global leader and has been consistently creating soft power 
programs and allocating budget to support such a cause. While this a unique aspect in 
studying countries’ soft power actions as most countries do not seem to desire a global 
leadership role, this is an important factor in American soft power use and sheds light on 
the soft power use of a critical case. This also means that learning about the strategic soft 
power selectin of the strongest soft power user country in the world (in the number of soft 
power actions per year) also confirms my new theory about the importance of geopolitics 




This budget analysis also revealed spikes in soft power allocation in 1999, 2004 
and in 2007. These spikes indicate a policy move in favor of supporting soft power 
actions and programs. Since this analysis ends in 2010, a longer time-series is needed to 
reveal more about this uncovered budget increase and possible policy changed with soft 
power use. In general, the U.S. soft power budget has been found consistent with a slight 
increase.  
In conclusion, based on the findings of this chapter, the U.S. government’s 
geopolitical threat combined with its global leadership ambition are the key factors in 
its high level of soft power use. In addition, the institutional factors pointed to the 
willingness to use more soft power to achieve foreign policy goals. It seems that the 
perception of threat is a much stronger indicator of the U.S.’s soft power actions than 
social trust. The examined new factors of the American case study point to a quantitative 
testing of the new variables. If they are found statistically significant, those will 



























CONCLUSION AND POLICY RELEVANCE 
 
 
This dissertation started out by comparing a constructivist approach of 
democracies’ social trust’s impacting their soft power uses, to realist approaches of 
resources and institutions. While social trust could not produce strong answers to why 
some democracies use more soft power than others, nor did the realist explanations of 
resources or institutions. Therefore, the real finding of this dissertation was answering the 
question, what else could explain democracies’ soft power use? The case studies of this 
analysis revealed that different countries construct their soft power use differently to 
achieve their goals as a reaction to geopolitical threat. 
More specifically, my quantitative approach revealed that social trust was not the 
main indicator of democracies’ soft power use. While social trust was positively 
correlated with countries’ soft power use, the statistical analysis showed that it only 
explained a small amount of the soft power use variation, therefore new indicators had to 
be explored. The quantitative multifactor analysis revealed that military alliances was 
statistically significant factor in countries soft power reliance. In order to learn more 





The three case studies revealed two independent variables that were driving soft 
power use. In Finland and in the U.S., geopolitical threat led to high soft power use to an 
exceptionally high level. In addition, in the critical case of the U.S., the desire to be a 
global leader also drove American soft power use. Both of these countries turned to soft 
power use in order to create alliances as a defense mechanism and the U.S. also used it to 
strengthen its global leadership role. Overall, the case studies concluded that different 
countries create their foreign policy differently in order to achieve their foreign policies. 
 In the case of Finland where Russia has been posing a geopolitical threat, soft 
power was used to mitigate the aggressive neighbor and to strengthen global alliances to 
preserve the Finnish independence. In this carefully constructed Finnish foreign policy, 
the political elite continued to emphasize the need to reach out to Western Europe and to 
the rest of the world in order to strengthen their cultural and political bonds as well as 
protect Finland with strong alliances against Russia. And while the concept of soft power 
was coined by an American scholar, and soft power scholarship does not focus on 
countries’ soft power use before 1990, the Finnish case study also revealed that Finland 
might have been using soft power before the U.S. did. If that is the case, Finland might be 
one of the first users of soft power in the world.  
The budget description of the Finnish soft power programs and the foreign policy 
analysis articles confirmed geopolitics’ enhancing effect on Finish soft power use, where 
balancing against Russia led to the Finnish high soft power reliance. Stated differently, in 
Finland, geopolitics made the political elite create a narrative that emphasized the 
continued national security threat, which resulted in both political and institutional 




In the case of the U.S. the Cold War’s perceived ideological and territorial threats 
from the Soviet Union also boosted American soft power use all over the world.  From 
jazz diplomacy to the Marshall plan, from the Fulbright program to the creation of the 
Institute of Peace, the American government has invested lots of money and effort into 
government programs that make America more attractive. As a result of the Soviet 
geopolitical threat, the U.S. constructed a foreign policy that included showcasing the 
attractive aspects of the American way of life as well as created programs that would 
send financial assistance to countries in need.  
The crucial case study of the U.S.  also revealed another boosting factor in the 
form of the desire to be a global power. This independent variable also greatly boosts soft 
power use, especially since the Cold War, the U.S. has been relying on demonstrating the 
world the attractiveness of the American life trough government programs. This goal has 
also become a large part of U.S. foreign policy, which supports American use of cultural, 
educational and economic tools to spread American way of life all over the world.  
Finally, in the case of New Zealand, this study confirmed that countries construct 
their foreign policies according to their needs and circumstances. Since there was no 
imminent geopolitical threat or the desire to be a global leader, New Zealand’s use soft 
power serves a different reason and as a result it is used to a lower degree then Finland. 
As the most similar case design revealed, New Zealand uses its soft power to strengthen 
its position in the regional market.  
         Further, New Zealand’s main reason to use soft power is its desire to strengthen its 




strengthening of economic and social ties in the Pacific region and the budget allocation 
supports such goals. Having mostly regional economic goals resulted in New Zealand’s 
low soft power use. There was an interesting foreign policy shift in New Zealand in 2006 
uncovered by this dissertation. With the leadership of Prime Minister Clark, in New 
Zealand’s started to invest more money into soft power programs in foreign policy as 
well as started promoting New Zealand more actively not just to the regional but also 
globally. This policy shift suggest that New Zealand will prioritize its global engagement 
more and therefore will rely on soft power to a higher degree in the future.  
Overall, both the new conceptualization and the new operationalization of soft 
power actions provided scholars a new way to study soft power and test new hypotheses 
in foreign policy. The discovered five new indicators (geopolitics, narrative of the 
political elite, soft power programs, soft power budget and global leadership inspiration) 
should be further tested in large n quantitative models to reveal their impact on countries’ 
soft power use.  
7.1 POLICY RELEVANCE 
Scholars traditionally analyze conflict or the lack of conflict (peace) and they fail 
to include the application of soft power as a policy choice even though my analysis 
showed that 80% of all international interactions are soft power action between countries. 
Knowing the patterns of soft power selection, academics and scholars will be able to 







           One interesting result of this analysis was that even though one of Finland’s 
strongest soft power resource is its education, the government does not use it to promote 
its foreign policy goals. The mission statements of the education budget-items did not 
reveal any foreign policy goals for Finnish education programs. This is a subject area 
where Finland could strengthen its soft power use abroad.  
In New Zealand the recent increase soft power budget and the creation of a new 
soft power programs such as the China Free Trade Agreement in 2008, the Rugby 
Diplomacy and the TV co-production agreement with China in 2011 all indicates that 
New Zealand might be increasingly using its soft power to enhance its regional market 
share. However, in order to be successful in soft power use, the government of New 
Zealand has to coordinate its foreign policy goals well and clear with its ministries and 
programs so they can all work towards the same foreign policy outcomes.  
Finally, while historically the U.S. stood out as the leading soft power user, this 
dissertation revealed that many other countries rely on soft power as well. For the U.S. to 
remain a leading soft power user, the government needs to better coordinate its programs 
with the country’s foreign policy goals. In terms of non-democracies, future research 
needs to look into their soft power use patterns. There is a strong possibility that today, 
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SOFT AND HARD POWER RE-CODING 
 
The re-coding of the CAMEO mediation dataset is based on the following:  
Soft power actions=1 
Hard power actions=2 
 
I used MySQL to recode the ICEWS dataset. All events that I re-classified as soft power 
actions were recoded as 1.  All events that were re-classify as hard power action received 
2.  In cases where it could not be decided for sure if the action was taken to create 
attractiveness or coerce, or the action was taken towards a third party, these were dropped 
from the dataset.   
 
Dropped cases:  
 
1) When the description of the event is more specific, but the giver or initiator state’s 
intentions such as coercing of building attractiveness cannot be determined. For 
instance, 1.11 decline comment, 2.241 appeal for changing leadership or 2.244 
appeal for military cooperation. 
2) If the initiator state is asking a third party to do something. This action does not 
provide me information about the initiator’s action. 
Note: When governments only talk about doing something (express intent, demand, 
appeal for etc.) those actions are all coded as diplomatic actions.  
Dropped events: 
 dropped from soft power 
11 decline comment 
12 make a pessimistic comment 
13 make an optimistic comment 
16 reject or deny responsibility 
24 appeal for political reform 
26 appeals to others to meet or negotiate 




34 express intent to institute political reform 
52 defend verbally 
53 rally support on behalf of  
75 grant asylum 
90 Investigate 
241 appeal for leadership change 
242 appeal for policy change 
244 appeal for change in institutions or regime 
251 appeal for easing administrative sanction 
254 appeal to easing economic sanctions, boycott or embargo 
341 express intent to change leadership 
342 express intent to change policy 
831 accede to demands for change in political leadership 
832 accede to demand for policy change 




 dropped from hard power 
101 demand material cooperation 
104 demand political reform 
105 demand that target yield 
113 rally opposition against 
114 complain officially 
120 Reject 
123 reject request or demand for political reform 
128 defy norms, law 




1014 demand intelligence cooperation 
1041 demand leadership change 
1042 demand policy change 
1222 reject request for military aid 
1224 reject request for military protection or peacekeeping 
1231 reject request to change leadership 
1232 reject request to change policy 
1411 demonstrate or rally for leadership change 
1412 demonstrate or rally for policy change 
1622 reduce or stop military assistance 
 
 
Soft Power Events Coded: 
 
34 Bold indicates the most commonly used events. 
1034 make a public statement 
14 consider policy option 
15 acknowledge or claim responsibility 
17 engage in symbolic act 
18 make empathetic comment 
19 express accord 
20 make and appeal or request 
21 appeal for material cooperation 
22 appeal for diplomatic cooperation 
23 appeal for material aid 
27 appeal to others to settle dispute 
30 express intent to cooperate 
31 express intent to engage in material cooperation 




33 express intent to provide material aid 
35 express intent to yield 
36 express intent to meet and negotiate 
37 express intent to settle dispute 
38 express intent to accept mediation 
39 express intent to mediate 
40 Consult 
41 discuss by telephone 
42 make a visit 
43 host a visit 
44 meet at a third location 
45 engage in mediation 
46 engage in negotiation 
50 engage in diplomatic cooperation 
51 praise or endorse 
54 grant diplomatic recognition 
55 Apologize 
56 Forgive 
57 sign formal agreement 
60 engage in material cooperation 
61 cooperate economically 
63 engage in judicial cooperation 
64 share intelligence or information 
70 provide aid 
71 provide economic aid 
73 provide humanitarian aid 





81 ease administrative sanctions 
82 ease political dissent 
83 accede to request for political reform 
84 return or release 
85 ease economic sanctions, boycott or embargo 
86 allow international involvement 
87 de-escalate military engagement 
91 investigate crime or corruption 
92 investigate human rights abuse 
93 investigate military action 
94 investigate war crimes 
212 appeal for military cooperation 
213 appeal for judicial cooperation 
214 appeal for intelligence cooperation 
233 appeal for humanitarian aid 
234 appeal for military protection or peacekeeping 
243 appeal for rights 
253 appeal for release of person or property 
255 appeal to allow international involvement 
311 express intent to cooperate economically 
313 express intent to cooperate in judicial matters 
314 express intent to cooperate on intelligence 
331 express intent to provide economic aid 
333 express intent to provide humanitarian aid  








Hard Power Events Coded: 
72 provide military aid 
100 Demand 
102 demand for diplomatic cooperation 
103 demand material aid 
343 express intent to provide rights 
351 express intent to ease administrative sanctions 
352 express intent to ease popular dissent 
353 express intent to release person or property 
354 express intent to ease economic sanctions, boycott on 
embargo 
355 express intent to allow international involvement 
356 express intent to de-escalate military involvement  
811 ease restrictions on political freedoms 
812 ease ban on political parties or politicians 
813 ease curfew 
814 ease state of emergency or martial law 
833 accede to demands for rights 
841 return or release persons 
842 return or release property 
861 receive deployment of peacekeepers 
862 receive inspectors 
863 allow for humanitarian access 
871 declare truce, cease fire 
872 ease military blockade 
873 demobilize armed forces 




106 demand meeting 
107 demand settling of dispute 
108 demand mediation 
110 Disapprove 
111 criticize or denounce 
112 Accuse 
115 bring lawsuit against 
116 find guilty or liable 
121 reject material cooperation 
122 reject request or demand for material aid 
124 refuse to yield  
125 reject proposal to meet 
126 reject mediation 
127 reject plan, agreement to settle dispute 
129 Veto 
130 Threaten 
131 threaten, non-force 
132 threaten with administrative sanctions 
133 threaten political dissent 
134 threaten to halt negotiations 
135 threaten to halt mediation 
136 threaten to halt international involvement 
137 threaten with repression 
138 threaten with military force 
139 give ultimatum 
140 engage in political dissent 




143 conduct strike or boycott 
144 obstruct passage or block 
145 protest violently or riot 
150 demonstrate military or police power 
151 reduce relations 
152 increase military alert status 
153 mobilize or increase police power 
154 mobilize or increase armed forces 
160 reduce relations 
161 reduce or break diplomatic relations 
162 reduce or stop material aid 
163 impose embargo, boycott or sanctions 
164 halt negotiations 
166 expel or withdraw 
170 Coerce 
171 seize or damage property 
172 impose administrative sanctions 
173 arrest, detain or change with legal action 
174 expel or deport individuals 
175 use tactics of violent repression 
180 use unconventional violence 
181 abduct, hijack, or take hostage 
182 physical assault 
183 conduct suicide, car or other non-military bombing 
184 Use human shield 





190 use conventional military force 
191 impose blockade, restrict movement 
192 occupy territory 
193 fight with small arms and light weapons 
194 fight with artillery and tanks 
195 employ aerial weapons 
196 violate cease fire 
201 engage in mass expulsion 
1011 demand economic cooperation 
1012 demand military cooperation 
1013 demand judicial cooperation 
1031 demand economic aid 
1032 demand military aid 
1033 demand humanitarian aid 
1034 demand military protection or peacekeeping 
1043 demand rights 
1044 demand change in institutions and regime 
1051 demand easing of administrative sanctions 
1052 demand easing political dissent 
1053 demand release of person or property 
1054 demand easing economic boycott, embargo or sanctions 
1055 demand to allow international involvement 
1056 demand de-escalation of military engagement 
1121 accuse of crime corruption 
1122 accuse of human rights abuses 
1123 accuse of aggression 




1125 accuse of espionage 
1211 reject economic cooperation 
1213 reject judicial cooperation 
1214 reject intelligence cooperation 
1221 reject request for economic aid 
1223 reject request for humanitarian aid 
1233 reject request for rights 
1234 reject request for change in institution or regime 
1241 refuse to ease administrative sanctions 
1242 refuse to popular dissent 
1243 refuse to release person or property 
1244 refuse to ease economic sanctions, boycott or embargo 
1245 refuse to allow international involvement 
1246 refuse to de-escalate military engagement 
1311 threaten to reduce or stop aid 
1312 threaten to boycott, embargo or sanction 
1313 threaten to reduce or break relations 
1321 threaten with restrictions on political freedoms 
1381 threaten with blockade 
1382 threaten occupation 
1383 threaten unconventional attack 
1384 threaten conventional attack 










SOFT POWER RANKING (2010) 
 
Comparison between McClory’s ranking and my ranking for the year 2010 
 
McClory’s Soft Power Ranking 2010                                 My Ranking 2010 Democracies 
1. France and UK                                                           1. USA                                  
3. USA       2. Japan 
4. Germany      3. India 
5. Switzerland      4. S. Korea 
6. Sweden      5. UK 
7. Denmark      6. Australia 
8. Australia      7. Mexico 
9. Finland                 8. Brazil 
10. Netherlands      9. Germany                                         




















































LATENT SOCIAL TRUST 
 
Indicators for Measurement Model (Justwan et al. 2018 Table 2 p.153) 
 








Survey-based measures  
General Trust Question World values 
survey
0.03–0.74 +  
General Trust Question Barometers 0.02–0.75 +
Institutional correlates  














0.40–10 + You (2012) 
Bureaucratic quality ICRG (PRS 
Group, 2015)
0.04–1.00 + Rothstein and Stolle 
(2008) 
Judicial independence Cingranelli 
et al. (2014)





Clague et al. 
(1999) 
0.03–0.99 + Baliamoune-Lutz 
(2011) 
Civil liberties Freedom 
House 
(2017)







0.08–1.13 _ Rothstein and Stolle 
(2008) 






    
Protestantism La Porta et 
al. (1999)
0–97.80 + Delhey and Newton 
(2005) 






_ Rothstein and 
Uslaner (2005) 
Ethnic fractionalization Fearon and 
Laitin (2003)





    
Fertility rate World Bank 
(2015)






0–98.11 + Zak and Fakhar 
(2006) 














_ Zak and Fakhar 
(2006) 
Water pollution World Bank 
(2015)
0.09–0.45 _ Zak and Fakhar 
(2006) 
 





































LIST OF SOFT POWER DEPARTMENTS AND PROGRAMS IN FINLAND  
 
(AS BUDGET ITEMS 1995-2010) 
 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 
1. The Foreign Service 
2. Civilian Crisis Management  
3. Neighboring area cooperation 
4. International development cooperation  
5. Commercial-industrial cooperation 
6. Cooperation with Central and Eastern Europe, Russia and other CIS countries 
7. Neighboring area cooperation  
8. Other expenditure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs administration 
 
Selected Items from the Ministry of Education and Culture 
 
1. International cooperation 
2. Art and culture 
3. The Sports Department 





















LIST OF SOFT POWER DEPARTMENTS AND PROGRAMS IN NEW ZEALAND  
 
(AS BUDGET ITEMS 1995-2010) 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (selected programs) (MFAT) 
 
1. Administration of Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities  
2. Consular Services  
3. Pacific Security Fund  
4. Policy Advice and Representation - International Institutions  
5. Policy Advice and Representation - Other Countries  
6. Policy Advice and Representation - Other Countries PLA  
7. Pacific Cooperation Foundation   
8. Promotion of Asian Skills and Relationships  
9. Subscriptions to International Organizations  
10. Promotional Activities - Other Countries   
11. International Radio Services  
12. Hosting of Pacific Islands Forum Meeting   
 
Ministry for Culture and Heritage (selected programs) (MCH) 
 



























LIST OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS PROGRAMS  
IN 2001  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS BY FUNCTION (150-155) 
 
A. Administration of Foreign Affairs 
Diplomatic & Consular Programs (D&CP)  
D&CP Worldwide Security Upgrades  
Salaries & Expenses (S&E)  
Capital Investment Fund (CIF)  
Technology Fund  
Arms Control & Disarmament Agency  
International Information Programs (IIP)  
Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance: 
Worldwide Security Upgrades  
 
Other State Programs:  
Educational & Cultural Exchange Programs  
Representation Allowances  
Protection of Foreign Missions and Officials 
Emergencies in the Diplomatic and Consular Service  
Payment to the American Institute in Taiwan  
State Office of the Inspector General  
Repatriation Loans Program Account  
F.S. Retirement and Disability Fund  
 
B. International Organizations  
Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA)  
Contributions to International Organizations (CIO)  
UN Arrearage Payments (CIO/CIPA)  
 
C. Related Programs   
The Asia Foundation  
East-West Center  
North-South Center  




Commission on International Religious Freedom 
Eisenhower/Israeli-Arab Exchange Programs  
National Commission on Terrorism  
 
D. Supplemental Appropriations  
Balkans and Southeast Europe /5 
 
E. Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG)  
International Broadcasting Operations  
Broadcasting to Cuba  
Broadcasting Capital Improvements  
 
F. Other Programs  
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission  
Holocaust Assets Commission  
International Trade Commission 
 
II. Foreign Operations (Including Wye) 
Title I - Export and Investment Assistance  
Export-Import Bank (EXIM)  
Export-Import Bank - Loan Subsidy  
Export-Import Bank - Administrative Expenses  
Export-Import Bank - Direct Loans, Negative Subsidies  
Subtotal, Export-Import Bank  
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) 
Administrative Expenses for Credit & Insurance Programs  
Net Offsetting Collections  
Credit Funding - Direct & Guaranteed Loan Subsidies  
Subtotal, Overseas Private Investment Corporation  
Trade and Development Agency (TDA)  
 
Title II - Bilateral Economic Assistance  
U.S. Agency for International Development  
Sustainable Development  
Child Survival & Diseases Fund /3  
Development Assistance (DA) /3  
Development Fund for Africa (DFA)  
Development Credit Authority  
Central American/Caribbean  
Emergency Disaster Recovery Fund  
International Disaster Assistance  
Micro and Small Enterprise Development - Subsidy  
Micro and Small Enterprise Development - Admin. Exp.  
Urban and Environmental Credit Program - Subsidy  
Urban and Environmental Credit Program - Admin. Exp.  




Development Credit Program Administrative Expenses  
USAID Operating Expenses  
USAID Inspector General Operating Expenses  
 
Other Bilateral Economic Assistance  
Economic Support Fund (ESF) - w/ Fund for Ireland  
Assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States (SEED) 
Asst. for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union (FSA /NIS)  
 
Independent Agency  
Peace Corps  
Inter-American Foundation /3  
African Development Foundation /3  
 
State Department  
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INC)  
Assistance to Plan Colombia  
Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA)  
U.S. Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund (ERMA)  
Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining & Related Prog. (NADR) 
Department of the Treasury  
Treasury Technical Assistance  
Debt Restructuring  
 
Title III - Military Assistance  
International Military Education & Training (IMET)  
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)  
Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)  
Special Defense Acquisition Fund (SDAF)  
 
Title IV - Multilateral Economic Assistance  
International Financial Institutions  
Global Environment Facility (GEF)  
International Development Association  
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)  
Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) - Ordinary Capital  
Inter-American Development Bank - Fund for Special Operations  
Asian Development Bank  
Asian Development Fund  
African Development Fund  
African Development Bank  
European Bank for Reconstruction & Development (EBRD)  
IADB - Multilateral Investment Fund  
Inter-American Investment Corporation  
MDB Arrears  





Supplemental and Advance Appropriations   
Assistance to Plan Colombia  
Balkans and Southeast Europe /5  
Debt Restructuring (HIPC)  
 
Wye and Egypt Supplemental  
Total, Wye & Egypt Supplemental  
Economic Support Fund (ESF)  
















LIST OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS IN 2010 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS BY FUNCTION (150-155) 
 
A. Administration of Foreign Affairs 
Diplomatic and Consular Programs 
Capital Investment Fund 
Border Security Program 
Working Capital Fund 
Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance 
Conflict Stabilization Operations 
Office of Inspector General 
Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs 
Representation Allowances 
Protection of Foreign Missions and Officials 
Emergencies in the Diplomatic and Consular Service 
Buying Power Maintenance Account 
Repatriation Loans Program Account 
Payment to the American Institute in Taiwan 
Foreign Service Retirement and Disability Fund 
 
B. International Organizations 
Contributions to International Organizations 
Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities 
 
C. Related Programs  
The Asia Foundation  
Center for Middle Eastern 
Western Dialogue  
Eisenhower Exchange Fellowship Program  
Israeli Arab  
Scholarship Program  
East-West Center  
National Endowment for Democracy 
 
 




Broadcasting Board of Governors 
International Broadcasting Operations  
Broadcasting Capital Improvements  
United States Institute of Peace  
 
FOREIGN OPERATIONS AND RELATED PROGRAMS 
 
II. United States Agency for International Development 
USAID Operating Expenses  
USAID Capital Investment Fund  
USAID Inspector General Operating Expenses  
 
III. Bilateral Economic Assistance  
 
Global Health Programs  
Development Assistance  
International Disaster Assistance  
Transition Initiatives  
Complex Crises Fund  
Development Credit Authority  
Economic Support Fund  
Migration and  
Refugee Assistance  
U.S. Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund  
Middle East and North Africa Incentive Fund  
 
B. Independent Agencies  
Peace Corps  
Millennium Challenge Corporation  
Inter-American Foundation  



























USIA PROGRAMS (1990-1997) 
 
     1. Overseas Missions 
     2. Bureau of Broadcasting 
     3. Radio Free Asia 
     4. Educational and Cultural Affairs 
     5. Policy guidance and program support 
     6. Bureau of Information 
     7. Agency direction and management 








































 USAID PROGRAMS 
(WWW.USAID.GOV) 
 
1. Agriculture and Food Security 
2. Democracy, Human Rights and Governance 
3. Economic Growth and Trade 
4. Education 
5. Environment and Global Climate Change 
6. Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment 
7. Global Health 
8. Science, Technology and Innovation 
9. Water and Sanitation 
10. Working in Crises and Conflict 
 
 
 
